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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The thesis “Religion, Nationalism and Regional Politics in Southeast Asia : The
Relations Between Thailand and Malaysia” aims to study the impact of religions
on the foreign relations in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is the region of
religious and ethnic diversity. And religion is still one of the most influential
societal institutions. Although none of the Southeast Asian governments sets
religions as a goal of their foreign policy, they cannot completely ignore the
religious factor. Religion can at least affect the government’s policy through the
worldview and expectation of the constituencies.

But religion is definitely not the sole factor determining the foreign policy. There
are many other factors, and other national interests that the government needs to
consider. Therefore, the thesis aims to find out the extent to which religion can
affect the foreign policy of the Southeast Asian governments, how they weigh the
religious factor against the national interests, and eventually how religion impacts
the regional relations. In this process, the thesis takes the Malaysian policy toward
the Thai–Muslim insurgency as the main case study, then compares the findings
with other similar cases in the region in order to reach the conclusion on the
influence of religion on the foreign relations in the regional level.

The Background
•

The theoretical introduction

In term of international politics, this is the era of nation-states, because they are
11

the main agents which pursue the relations toward each other in the international
system. However, the nation is actually the new political concept emerging a few
centuries ago.

When the religious institution was influential in Europe and people identified
themselves through religion, the dynasties launched the war against each other in
order to support their co-religionists in other territories. But the repeating bloody
religious wars, especially the Thirty Year War, led to the settlement on the Peace
of Westphalia of 1648, in which the idea of sovereignty emerged. The settlement
agreed on the idea of sovereignty over the territory in order to prevent the
interference against each other in defense of minorities sharing the same religious
affiliation. 1

But it was the agreement among the European elites. The ordinary people in
Europe did not feel the commonality nor connection among them until the
expansion of vernacular languages. The standardized printed media in the age
of capitalism connected the people to feel the collective membership of the same
community which was a base of nation. The new kind of common identity
formed up in the same time that the religious dominance declined from the
public sphere. The wide societal changes brought about the increase of the
educated middle class who shared the common experience on the new society.
They brought the mass to participate in the formation of “nation.” 2 After the
popular revolution had started to create the nation in France, the model was
1

William Brown, Simon Bromley, and Suma Athreye (eds.), Ordering the International : History,
Change and Transformation, (London, Ann Arbor : Pluto Press, 2004), p. 203.
2
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, (London, New York : Verso, 1991), p. 80.
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imitated mainly in Europe.

However, in Southeast Asia, the formation of nation-state did not originate from
the ordinary people’s will. The idea of nation-state entered the region through the
western colonizers and the western-educated Asian students. In the same time, the
exposure to the colonization and the influx of Asian immigrants trembled the
original structure of Southeast Asian society. To term with the changing political
circumstances, the notion of nationalism was imposed to accelerate and fortify
the formation of nation in order to confront with the invaders, whether they
were colonizers or the foreign immigrants. (The details will be discussed in the
next chapter.) The notion of nationalism became an effective tool to create a
nation, because it originally suggests the congruence of the nation and the
territory. Namely, it justifies that an ethnic-religious group should have a state of
its own. 3 The notion values the societal inheritances, and legitimates the exclusion
of the newcomers from their lands.

But the notion of nationalism contains a paradox. It creates a nation based on an
ethnic-religious claim, but in most cases a nation is composed of more than one
ethnic or religious group. This means aside from the exclusion of the newcomers,
the notion unintentionally, (or intentionally by the practices of the rulers),
excludes the old inhabitants who become the ethnic or religious minority after
the borderline was drawn from the political arena. In turn, the ethnicity or
religion which the majority of population adhere to is promoted as the core
identity of the nation, and the majority ethnic-religious group is the main voice
3

William Brown, Simon Bromley, and Suma Athreye (eds.), Ordering the International : History,
Change and Transformation, (London, Ann Arbor : Pluto Press, 2004), p. 194.
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to control the country.

On the other hand, a nation is required to be neutral on ethnicity and secular in
order to transcend its legitimacy to all ethnic and religious groups. Plus, as a new
nation-state, the unification or the stability of Southeast Asian states are
unsecured. This even emphasizes the significance of the ethnic neutrality and
secularism in order to contribute to the national cohesion. But this is hard to
achieve if a particular ethnic or religious group is politically dominant.
Furthermore, if consider the societal condition when the nation-state was
established, the identity of people was still based on the religion and kinship.
And these cultural identities intertwine with national identity, which means they
have political implication.

Moreover, the cultural identity can connect people beyond the borders. The same
ethnic-religious group can be the majority in a country, and the minority on just
another side of border. When the ties between the co-religionists and co-ethnics
are strong, how far could the religious solidarity affect the foreign policy,
especially if the state has the interests of national cohesion or security to
preserve in the same time ?

•

The case study : The Thai–Muslim insurgency and its impact on

Malaysian relations with Thailand
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces are the southern-most provinces of
Thailand which border the northern states of Malaysia. The majority of residents

14

in these provinces are Muslims and Malay descendants, while the majority of
Thai population are Buddhists. The Thai–Muslim insurgency in the south of
Thailand erupted in 2004. Many Malaysians perceive the insurgency as the result
of the Thai government’s oppression against their Muslim “brothers”. The Muslim
Malaysians share the religious, ethnic and linguistic bonds with the Thai–Muslims
and they both have relatives living on the other side of the border. The heavy–
handed policy of the Thai government on suppressing the insurgents even firmed
up the solidarity of Malaysians for the Thai–Muslims. The relations between
Thailand and Malaysia, as the nearest Muslim neighbor country is inevitably
interrupted.

The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), the opposition and Islamist party, which has
the strong base on the northern Malaysian states, such as Kedah and Kelantan,
which share the border with the Thai southern provinces clearly showed their
sympathy with the Thai – Muslims by handing the protest memorandum to the
Thai consulate in Kota Baru,4 which exerted the political pressure on the
Malaysian government. As a result, when 131 Thai citizens of Muslim–Malay
ethnic fled into Malaysia as refugees, the Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi set the condition that the refugees would be sent back only if
the Thai government guarantees their safety5. This incident led to the lowest
point of the Thai – Malaysian relations.

4

Anil Netto, “Malaysia rages over Muslim killings”,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FJ30Ae02.html, October 30, 2004.
5
John Fuston, Thailand ‘s Southern Fires : The Malaysian Factor, (The paper is prepared for
Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.) November 2006, p. 60.
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Amidst the political pressure from the Malaysian constituencies and PAS based
on the claim of Muslim solidarity, one question rises. Malaysia is a Muslim–
majority country, but how much would it allow the religious factor to influence
its policy, especially when it has other mutual interests with Thailand ?

Research Question and Hypothesis

With the above – mentioned case study, the thesis hypothesizes that the religious
factor hardly affects the foreign policy of countries in Southeast Asia, because
the Southeast Asian countries prioritize the national interests over the religious
factor. And the thesis seeks to elaborate on :

1 ) What would be these national interests which the Southeast Asian countries
prioritize over the religious factor ? And why are these interests indispensable ?
2 ) How do the Southeast Asian governments balance the religious factor against
the national interests ?

The religious factor plays a role in a foreign policy but is weighed against the
national interests all the time. And the calculations are not as simple as a choice
between the national interests and the religious commitment. The second research
question will explore the conditions under which these balances take. The
answers to both questions will affirm the hypothesis. The thesis will take the

Malaysian policy toward the Thai-Muslim insurgency as the main case study, and
compare the findings from the main case to the similar cases in the region in
order to draw the conclusion in the regional level.
16

The Literature

A nation is a political unit. Many political scientists agree that to be a nation,
the members in the political unit must adequately believe in their common
national identity. The conventional view concerning the nation suggests that the
common identity is derived from the inherited quality of the community, such as
ethnicity, religion, language and the way of life. This is probably because before
the rise of the “nation,” people connected to each other through the kinship
system and the religious canopy. They recognized who was who through the
family lineage, and it expanded to the village or tribal level. The people in the
same community also had the communal religious practices, spoke the same
language, and followed the same way of life.

Therefore, for Ernest Gellner, a nation is defined through the culture. To be a part
of the same nation, two individuals must “share a common culture -a system of
ideas, signs, associations and ways of behaving- and they must recognize each
other as belonging to the same nation. 6” When a nation develops to constitute a
permanent administrative unit with the territory, then it becomes a state.

Max Weber, the German sociologist and political economist, differentiated between
“nation” and “state.” He defined a “nation” as “a community of sentiment which
would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own … and tends to produce a
state of its own” and defined a “state” as “a territorial organization exercising

6

Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, “ Religion and Nationalism : Understanding the Consequences of a
Complex Relationship,” in Ethnicities, 2003, 3(2), p. 219.
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legitimate control over its own bounded territory, unchallenged by internal power
competition or external intervention 7” Therefore, according to him, before a state
could form up, communities in a state must have a common conscience to
express themselves as the same political unit. This definition implies that a
nation, (or a collective popular sentiment as a nation) is a prerequisite of a state.

The traditional view which believes that the common identities of a nation are a
base of state can explain the state-formation of German and Italy, where
inhabitants had the common language and history. Hence, this approach believes
that the state is legitimate only when it reflects the cultural characters of the
population, and the state exists in order to protect the common cultural identity
which binds the inhabitants. 8 Lars-Erik Cederman notices that nationalism which
is derived from this type of state-formation would be “unification nationalism. 9”
However, this is the traditional explanation of the state. There are other
explanations of the nation-formation.

The modernist perspective tends to analyze the nation-formation as a result of
the societal change. Anthony Giddens, the British sociologist offers another
explanation which reverses the traditional view. Instead of that a nation is a base
of state, he believes that a state comes first, and it produces a nation. He
contends that “A nation … only exists when a state has a unified administrative

7

Lars-Erik Cederman, “ Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and
Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations, (Los Angeles, London : SAGE
Publications, 2002), p. 410.
8
William Brown, Simon Bromley, and Suma Athreye (eds.), Ordering the International : History,
Change and Transformation, (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 206.
9
Lars-Erik Cederman, “ Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and
Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations, (Los Angeles, London : SAGE
Publications, 2002), p. 411.
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reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed. 10”

In other words, the new political circumstance of the modern state era actually
conceptualizes a nation. This view can explain the state-formation in France
where the Enlightenment era ignited the recognition of the right of selfdetermination which led to the establishment of the state. Lars-Erik Cedeman
notes that nationalism which is derived from this type of state would be “stateframed nationalism. 11”

Benedict Anderson does not believes in the common identity as a base of a
nation. Rather, his explanation points to the connectedness in the society among
the people of different identity. According to him, the spreading vernacular
languages connected people. And when the spoken languages transformed to be
the standardized printed media which was massively produced, it rendered the
readers (from different religious and ethnic backgrounds) to imagine of each
other as the members in the same societal unit. However, when he touches on
the origin of national consciousness in South America, he also mentioned that the
politically and economically self-contained characters helped to create the sense
of unity. As he explained, “each of the new South American republics had been
an administrative unit from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century … The original
shaping of the American administrative units was to some extent arbitrary and
fortuitous, marking the spatial limits of particular military conquests … In

10

Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, (Berkeley: The University of California
Press, 1984) cited in Craig Calhoun, “ Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Sociology,
Vol. 19 (1993), p. 218.
11
Lars-Erik Cederman, “ Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and
Beth A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations, (Los Angeles, London : SAGE
Publications, 2002), p. 411.
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addition, Madrid’s commercial policies had the effect of turning administrative
units into separate economic zones. 12”

As for the modernization theory, it predicts that when a region is modernized, the
various traditional identities would be homogenized into the main cultural system.
Through this cultural commonality, a state would form up, and the ethnic and
religious identity would subside. 13 Therefore, the ethnic or religious mobilization
in a state is just the remainder from the pre-modern era which cannot adjust
itself to the modernity.

All theories agree on one thing which is the emergence and existence of a state
depend much on its inhabitants’ perception on their identity. The commonality of
the religion or ethnicity of the inhabitants may not be very necessary for a state,
according to the modernist view, as the population of many countries are not
homogeneous. But when a state is fully developed, its people must believe in the
common national identity embedded in them, whether the belief in the national
identity would originate from the popular level, the societal changes or it is
projected from the state level.

But in many cases, where the evolution of the state-formation does not develop
naturally and the boundaries do not completely relate to the inhabiting nationals,
the national identity could overlap with the traditional ethnic-religious identity. In
Southeast Asia, the development of the states is different from the European
12

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, (London, New York : Verso, 1991), p. 52.
13
Craig Calhoun, “ Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993), p.
218.
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model. All Southeast Asian states were either direct or indirect outcomes of the
colonial intervention and massive immigration in a short period. This external
factors did not appear in Europe, but for Southeast Asia, they imposed the
considerable influence on the state-formation, since the Southeast Asian states
were forced to strengthen their identity as a nation, even before their people
would feel belonging to the states by themselves.

Hence, David Brown and Lee Yong Leng agree that the Southeast Asian states
are not real nation-states. 14 While David Brown proposes that the Southeast Asian
states should be understood as a plural society which is diverse in languages,
religions and ethnicities bringing about the specific ethnic or religious affiliation,
(but not as a nation), which eventually leads to the unified national identity, 15
Lee
Yong Leng does not even see that Southeast Asian states were the plural society
when they were firstly established, because the people of different ethnic-religious
groups lived separately and did not consider themselves as a part of the same
multiethnic-religious society. 16

Because the formation of Southeast Asian states is reactionary, rather than
evolutionary, the traditional ethnic-religious characters of the communities persist
in the era of nation-state. In Southeast Asia, the religions are not the individual’s
choice like in the western countries. The religions are the communal inheritance
14

Lee Yong Leng, Race, “Language, and National Cohesion in Southeast Asia”, Journal of
Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1980), p. 124, and David Brown, “ Ethnic and Nationalist
Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Mark Beeson (ed.) Contemporary Southeast Asia, (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), p. 143.
15
David Brown, “ Ethnic and Nationalist Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Mark Beeson (ed.)
Contemporary Southeast Asia, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 143.
16
Lee Yong Leng, Race, “Language, and National Cohesion in Southeast Asia”, Journal of
Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1980), p. 124.
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which a person is born and raised with. A person is an adherent of the religion
through the family line and social connection in the village. Thus, the religions in
Southeast Asia intertwine with the kinship and ethnicity. When a person attends a
religious activity in a mosque, temple or church, s/he does it with the family,
relatives, or friends. And neighbors meet each other at the religious places in
their villages. (Different from the American society where an individual
voluntarily goes to a religious place by himself to perform a religious activity
along with other strangers. But the strangers may get to know each other later. 17)

Accordingly, the religious activities in Southeast Asia are actually religious-social
activities. They lay the base of social connection which can be mobilized as a
political-social movement. And it is relatively rare for an individual to convert to
another religion, not only because the religions deeply absorb into all elements of
life, but also it means breaking up the ties with the family.

Furthermore, because the religions are not an individual’s choice, they cannot be
limited to the private sphere. The religious teachings widely overwhelm in the
public life. In term of politics, the religions also represent the authenticity of the
Southeast Asian society before the colonized period. Therefore, when the
Southeast Asian leaders wanted to establish the nation-states, the nation leaders
defined the national identity through the religion and ethnicity, and they imposed
nationalism through the states’ apparatuses.

With the nationalist programs, the religion and ethnicity were reproduced as the
17

Richard Madsen, “ Secularism, Religious Renaissance, and Social Conflict in Asia,”
http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/webforum/092008/madsen_on_secularism.pdf ,
p. 2.
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symbols of the nation. In order to create the national unification, the religious and
ethnic core of nations needed to be clarified and then valued. Hence, the political
value of religions and solidarity intertwine deeply with the national conscious.
This is why Charles Taylor asserts that secularism has more than one
dimension. 18 While the constitutions and political structures of the Southeast Asian
states can be considered as legally secular, because the religion is subscribed
under the control of the states, in the social dimension, the religions are
influential, and they inevitably affect the politics.

On the other hand, each state in Southeast Asia is composed of many ethnicreligious groups, and needs to create the national harmony among them. When a
foreign policy is designed, according to the realist theory, the foreign policy is
supposed to serve the nation as a whole, and does not just respond to a
particular group’s demand or interest. Furthermore, Hans Morgenthau believes that
the foreign policy should not be guided by the morality or religion. Because
there is no agreed set of universal morality among countries anyway. But in
practice, because the nationalist programs set a particular ethnic-religious group as
a core or symbol of a country. Consequently, the religion intertwines with the
national conscience, as discussed above. Also, the foreign policy could be under
the control of a particular ethnic-religious group who controls bureaucracy. Hence,
practically, the influence of religion on the foreign policy could possibly be
different from what the theory suggests.

18

Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Harvard University Press, 2007), cited in Richard Madsen, “
Secularism, Religious Renaissance, and Social Conflict in Asia,”
http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/webforum/092008/madsen_on_secularism.pdf ,
p. 1.
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Based on the literature survey on the religious influence on the foreign policy,
the result is quite mix. The article “Religion as an Overlooked Element of
International Relations 19” by Jonathan Fox and article “Religion and Nationalism :
Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship 20” by Barbara – Ann
J. Riffer

assert that religions can affect the international relations, including in a

secular democratic state, especially in the case of ethno– religious conflict, in
which some of minorities get supports from other countries. 21” Religion also
influences the foreign relations, when it contributes to nationalism in a country.
Furthermore, religion can involve with the policy, when the politicians claim the
religion to boost their legitimacy.

The article “Religion Re – Emerging : The Role of Religion in Legitimating
Integration and Power in Modern Societies. 22” by Ole Riis asserts that when
religion has its role on constructing the national identity or the political
ideology, it inevitably affects the policy. Religion gives the worldview which
formulates the standard of the “good society” or the “good world.” Through this
process, some people or governments feel their religious commitment which
sometimes must be performed across borders. 23” In this case, it is hardly to
distinguish between the religious mission and foreign policy.

Samah Mohamed Adnan Al–Rayyes took the Kashmir conflict as a case study in
19

Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations”, International
Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn, 2001, pp. 53 – 73.
20
Barbara – Ann J. Rieffer, “Religion and Nationalism : Understanding the Consequences of a
Complex Relationship”, Ethnicities, 2003, 3 (2), pp. 215 – 242.
21
Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations”, International
Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn, 2001, p. 67.
22
Ole Riis, “Religion Re – Emerging : The Role of Religion in Legitimating Integration and
Power in Modern Societies”, International Sociology, June 1998, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 249 – 272.
23
Ole Riis, “Religion Re – Emerging : The Role of Religion in Legitimating Integration and
Power in Modern Societies”, International Sociology, June 1998, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 267.
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his thesis “ Religion, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy in the Third World :
the Case of the Indo –Pakistani Conflict over Kashmir.” 24 He found that in the
Third World where most states are still in the process of nation–building, the
security of the political structure (or the regimes) is the priority of the
government. Therefore, sometimes the ruling class composes foreign policies which
actually aim at overcoming the internal threats. 25 And in the Third World religion
is used as a political tool by the government often because these new states
frequently confront the internal opposition. 26

However, the studies which focus on the Southeast Asian region in particular
give the opposite result with the above–mentioned works. The paper “Malaysia’s
2005 – 2006 Refugee Stand – Off with Thailand : A Security Culture Analysis” 27, by
Peter Hourdequin, reminds the readers that “Islam has always played a significant
role as one of Malaysian’s core values ... [but] various interpretation of how
Islamic values should function in the Malaysian nation–state have been bitterly
contested …” And the Malaysian regime’s survival depends more on the
economic growth and the stability of its multi–racial society.

As for Indonesia, the article “The Role of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy
Since 194528” by Wahyu Wicaksana reveals that during the authoritarian regime,
24
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and Social Sciences, The American University in Cairo, November 1998, pp. 126-127.
26
Samah Mohamed Adnan Al – Rayyes, Religion, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy in the
Third World : the Case of the Indo – Pakistani Conflict over Kashmir, School of Humanities
and Social Sciences, The American University in Cairo, November 1998, p. 129.
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published on 23 November 2007.
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the leader is the decisive factor on the foreign policy setting. Under the
governments of President Sukarno and Suharto, who were nationalist militants,
Islam was barely considered in formulating the foreign policy, except in the time
that the leader wanted to regain his domestic popularity. 29 However, after the
domestic politics changed in 1998, the Islamist parties can operate more actively.
The Indonesian government engages more in the world politics with the
religious approach, but the author analyzes that this is just to decrease the
political challenges from Islamists parties and groups. Therefore, based on this
article, the religious factor is weighed under the condition of domestic political
game. Normally, the leaders still prioritize the national interests which help the
regime to survive.

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, explores the extent to which the Islamic factor plays
a role in Indonesian foreign policy. His articles “State – Society Relationship :
Assessing Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Toward the Muslim World under
Suharto” 30 and “Islam ‘Symbolic Politics’, Democratization and Indonesian
Foreign
Policy 31” found that the Indonesian government does not take Islam as a key
factor in setting its foreign policy, but in the same time, it has to decrease the
pressure from Muslims in the country, either by promoting Islamic institutions, or
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interpreting Islam in the way that supports its policy. However, with the current
trend, the Indonesian government has to open more for the societal demand.

Based on the above-mentioned studies, it can be concluded that in the Third
World countries, the leader or regime has a crucial role to decide the weight of
religion on the policy. However, how religion would affect the foreign policy
depends on whether the leader would dismiss religion, like the Malaysian and
Indonesian cases, or bring in religion to be his political tool, like the Indian–
Pakistan case. This means, normally the domestic politics in which the regime
struggles to survive defines the role of the religion rather than the world’s
politics. However, this argument needs to be examined further in the thesis.

The Methodology

Based on the hypothesis that the religious factor hardly affects the foreign policy
of countries in Southeast Asia, because the Southeast Asian countries prioritize
the national interests over the religious factor, the thesis sets the two research
questions :

1 ) What would be these national interests which the Southeast Asian countries
prioritize over the religious factor ? And why are these interests indispensable ?
2 ) How do the Southeast Asian governments balance the religious factor against
the national interests in order to politically survive ?

As for the methodology, the thesis will take the Thai – Muslim insurgency and
27

its impact on the Malaysian relations with Thailand as the main case study. It
will answer the questions on 1) what would be the national interests of
Malaysia? And why are these interests indispensable ? and 2) how does the
Malaysian government balance the religious factor against the national interests ?

The findings from the Malaysian case will be analyzed further by comparing
with other similar cases in Southeast Asia, such as the Indonesian policy toward
the Thai–Muslim insurgency, the Philippines’ policy toward the demand for the
independence in East Timor in 1998, and the Indonesian policy toward Rohingya
minority in Myanmar. The same two questions will be asked in these
comparative cases in order to draw the common conclusion in the regional level.
The comparison with other cases will also work as the counter –checking which
will add the credibility to the original findings from the Malaysian case.

To answer the first research question concerning the national interests, the thesis
adapts the methodology from the book “Asian Security Practice : Material and
Ideational Influences 32” by Muthiah Alagappa. It tries to identify first the
indispensable national interests of a regime by studying the key policies of a
country, and calls these interests “core values.” Then, the political practice
conducted by the regime is explained in relation with the core values. The
methodology is influenced by the realist theory in the sense that it hypothesizes
that the foreign policy should be judged and guided by its national interests. 33
32
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And some national interests are permanent and do not change through the time.
It believes that it is a government’s duty to defend and promote its national
interest. Hans Morgenthau, the realist political theorist, stated that the national
interests are the standard by which political practices must be judged and
directed. 34

In the same time, the methodology does not completely deny liberalism. If the
international cooperation is beneficial to the national interests, the methodology
accepts such finding, because the methodology simply aims to explain the
political practices of a state as they really are without guiding or suggesting like
the theory does.

The idea of the methodology is similar to the realist theory in the sense that it
takes the state (the government) as the main agent to decide and pursue the
foreign policy. However, the state-central approach of the methodology does not
totally ignore the domestic politics like the realism. It believes that all domestic
social and political groups can exert the pressure on the government, but in the
end the government is the agent which appropriates, weighs and balances all
pressure and factors, and eventually decides the policy. And this approach fits the
Southeast Asian politics in which the political groups can participate in the
foreign policy, but limitedly, because the states can mostly control the pressure
from the people.

Therefore, in the case of the Thai–Muslim insurgency and its impact on
34
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Malaysian relations with Thailand, the thesis will first investigate what could be
the indispensable national interests of Malaysia. Then the Malaysian policy will
be analyzed by relating to its national interests. If the religion is considered as
one of Malaysian national interests, it would be revealed in this stage, and it will
be affirmed if the government pursues the policy to protect the religious values,
even on the expense of its national interests.

To systematically measure whether the Southeast Asian governments pursue the
policy to protect the co-religionists or not, the thesis adopts the definition and
indicator of Joseph S. Nye, Jr. from his book “Understanding International
Conflicts : An Introduction to Theory and History. 35” He provides the broad
definition of the intervention that “intervention refers to external actions that
influence the domestic affairs of another sovereign state.36” It ranges from the
speech intended to interfere in the domestics affairs of another state, broadcasting
messages, providing the economic assistance to the opposition in other country, to
the military invasion. Therefore, he disagrees with the narrow definition of the
intervention which refers to it as “forcible interference in the domestic affairs of
another state, 37” because the low degree of interference, such as speeches, is not
forcible, but it is still interference. This case happens when the religious or ethnic
minority whom a state want to protect across the border have high local choices.

Other books define the intervention in the same way that its main feature is
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breaking the sovereignty and interfering in a state’s domestic affairs. But their
definitions are various on whether the interference needs to be forcible or
coercive or not. Hence, they agree that the interference basically means violating
the sovereignty of another state, but the degree and the form of the interference
is differently defined and categorized. Aurel Croissant and Christoph Trinn
categorize the involvement in the ethno-religious conflicts into five levels which
start from dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and war.38

However, the thesis chooses to adopt the indicators of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., because
he categorizes the interference into many levels, and relates them to the political
choices of minority group which a state wants to protect. As appears in the table
below, when the minority group has many political choices, the interference is
less coercive, for example, delivering the speeches. And when the group has less
political choices, the interference tends to be more coercive, such as limited
military action. The indicators of different degrees of interference will be
compared with the political practices of the Southeast Asian governments in
order to clearly identify the level of interference, if any.
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Low Coercion

Speeches

(high local choice)

Broadcasts
Economic Aid
Military Advisers
Support Opposition
Blockade

High Coercion
(low local choice)

Limited Military Action
Military Invasion

Source : Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts : An Introduction to
Theory and History, (New York, San Francisco, Boston : Longman, 2002), p. 154.

Further, the second research question believes that the religious factor plays a
role in a foreign policy, but is weighed against other national interests all the
time. And the policy-decision is not as simple as a choice between the national
interests and religious values. Therefore, the second research question aims to
explore how the Southeast Asian governments balance the religious factor against
the national interests in order to politically survive. The thesis will study the
interaction between the Southeast Asian governments, the religious institutions and
the constituencies, including their discourse on the conflict in the neighbor
countries. If the governments give more weight on the national interests, the study
in this part will reveal how the governments calm down the pressure from the
religious groups.
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The findings from Malaysian case will be compared further with the similar
cases in the region, the common findings from the main case study and the
comparison will explain the regional relations in the Southeast Asian region.

The Objectives

Since Southeast Asia comprises of various ethnicities and religious believers, the
ethno–religious conflicts frequently happen in the region. The answer on how
religion affects the foreign relations will prove whether the neighboring countries
with the different religious beliefs can still cooperate to together develop their
countries.

As presented in the part of the theoretical framework, before the era of nationstates in Europe, the wars were launched in the name of religions. However, after
the nation-states formed up around the world, the ethnic and religious identity
were subscribed under the national identity. And the religious values are
considered secondary to the national interests. But their influence on the state’s
policy exists nowadays.

The thesis acknowledges the influence of both ethnicity and religion. But because
of the high ethnic diversity in Southeast Asia, for example, Indonesia is composed
of Javanese, Sudanese, Madurese, Coastal Malays, Chinese, and many other subethnic groups. 39 There is only one case that the minority in one state is of the
39
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same ethnicity with the majority in another state, that is the Thai-Muslims of
Malay descent and the Malays in Malaysia. There is no other conflict where the
minority ethnically relates to the majority in the neighbor country. With this
limitation, the thesis can study only the influence of the religious factor on the
foreign policy, but it will analyze some influence of the ethnic factor too, if
possible. And hopefully, the findings of the thesis will contribute to better
understanding of the domestic and regional relations in Southeast Asia.

The Material

For both the main case study and the comparative cases, the study will involve
the questions 1 ) what would be the national interests of each Southeast Asian
country ? And why are these interests indispensable ? and 2 ) how does the
Southeast Asian government balance the religious factor against the national
interests ?

For the first question, to identify the national interests and address their
significance, the thesis will rely mainly on the primary sources such as the
declared state policies and national strategies, for example in the Malaysian case,
among the policies which will be analyzed are the New Economic Policy (NEP),
Vision 2020, and Islam Hadhari. The formal statements and the official speeches
of the leaders will be included in the analysis as well.

To answer the second research question, the thesis will study how each Southeast
Asian government deal with the conflict in the neighboring country and compare
its policy with the indicator of interference presented above to clarify the extent
34

to which the religious solidarity can affect the policy. In the same time, the
thesis needs to study the bilateral cooperation of countries to see how much the
country holds on with the national interests. And in the end, it will study on
how the government balance between the religious solidarity and the national
interests. In this stage, the thesis will use both primary and secondary sources, for
example, the speeches of the leaders concerning the conflict, the news from the
official agency on the bilateral cooperation and the official visits, the statistics of
the bilateral trade and investment. The involved academic articles will also be
used to be the guidance in analysis as well.

The Outline

The thesis will contain seven chapters. The first chapter will explain the topic,
introduce the research question and hypothesis. It will set the scope of the study.
It will state what is already found in the literature survey and what would be
the method of study. And what is expected to be found from this study.

The second chapter will begin with the theories concerning nation and
nationalism, and the relation between the traditional identity, such as the religion
and ethnicity, with the nationalism. Then it will provide the religious and political
background of Southeast Asia.

The third chapter will present the main case study which is the Thai–Muslim
insurgency and the Malaysian policy toward the insurgency. It will begin with
the introduction of the case, then analyze the Malaysian national interests. It will
35

describe how Malaysian government coped with the Thai–Muslim insurgency, the
influence of the religious factor on the policy, and how the government terms
with the religious domestic pressure.

The fourth chapter will bring the findings of two research questions from the
Malaysian case into comparison with another case. Here, it will be compared with
the Indonesian policy toward the Thai–Muslim insurgency. It will introduce the
Thai–Muslim insurgency only on the part that involved with Indonesia, but will
follow the same step of analysis. What were the Indonesian interests at the time?
How did the Indonesian government termed with the insurgency ? And how did
it manage the religious domestic pressure, if any ?

The fifth chapter will introduce the case of the demand for the independence in
East Timor in 1998 and study how the Philippines responded to the case, because
they are the only two Christian–majority in Southeast Asia. The chapter will
identify the national interests of the Philippines at that time, and analyze its
policy in relation to these interests in order to find how the religious solidarity
played a role on the Philippines’ policy in this case.

The sixth chapter will study the case of Rohingya minorities in Myanmar. The
chapter will introduce the case and study Indonesian policy on Rohingya
refugees. It will skip the part of Indonesian national interests, because it is
already analyzed in chapter 4. Still, it will analyze the policy to find how the
religious solidarity affected the Indonesian foreign policy toward Rohingya
minority in Myanmar.

36

The last chapter will conclude the findings from the case study and comparison.
It will answer the two research questions, and hopefully can provide the common
ground to understand the role of religion on the foreign relations in Southeast
Asia.
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CHAPTER 2
ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND NATIONALISM
“ … previously there was a ‘sacred canopy’ stabilizing life experience and
providing shared meanings, in modern times the canopy is rent and the collective
bases of morality and identity are diminished or destroyed.”
Peter Berger, 1 the American sociologist
According to the original concept of nationalism, “each nation should have a
state of its own. 2” However, the emergence of nation-states in Southeast Asia did
not originate from the nationals. The nation-states in Southeast Asia shaped up
through the official imposition of nationalism. But the traditional identity of
people, such as the ethnicity and religion, were not dismissed. They were included
as a part of the national identity, and have some political role under the
framework of nation-state. However, the ties of people through the cultural
identity can sometimes function across the border. The Southeast Asian states
need to find the right balance of the cultural factor in their foreign policy.

Nation and Nationalism

The meaning and explanation of “nation” is still fluid and contested among the
political scientists. Starting from the general explanation from the historian
1

Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, (Garden
City : Doubleday, 1967), cited in Robert W. Hefner, Islam in an Era of Nation – States : Politics
and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia, (Honolulu : University of Hawai’i Press,
1997), p. 18.
2
William Brown, Simon Bromley, and Suma Athreye, (eds.) Ordering the International : History,
Change and Transformation, (London, Ann Arbor, : Pluto Press, 2004), p. 194.
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perspective, the concept of nation initially surfaced in the Westphalia Treaty of
1648. It, for the first time, acknowledged the sovereignty of each ruler within his
territories as an independent entity. Hence, it established the principle of noninterference in other state’s affairs, especially in support of the co-religionists in
other territories. 3

The idea developed further in the Enlightenment Era, which promoted the
reasoning of human. The prevailing political belief in this era recognized the
right of self-determination of people over their government. Then the French
revolution unleashed the social force in which the people believed in their rights
over and their participation in the government. The legitimacy of the state is now
based on the collective will of its people encapsulated in the notion of nation. 4
The new kind of identity, - the citizenship, emerged. It connected people together
into the same political unit as opposed to the primordial identity which linked
people through the network of kinship, religion and language.

The political scholars provide the interpretation and explanation on the concept
of “nation.” Joseph S. Nye refers to the meaning of nation in a dictionary as “a
group claiming common identity and the right to be a state.5” However, he, and
other political scholars, debates on what could be the common identity which
will provide the legitimacy to claim a state. This is a crucial question, as a
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William Brown, Simon Bromley, and Suma Athreye (eds.), Ordering the International : History,
Change and Transformation, (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 203.
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state’s supposedly main function is to protect the group of people who share
this common identity.

Constructivism sees differently on the common identity as a base of a nation. It
explains that the collective identity of people in a nation is not fixed. It is
constructed through the interaction with other subjects (nations) in the
international system and the interaction among subjects within a nation
itself. 6 And a nation forms up through this process. Hence, the constructivists do
not consider a nation, nor a common identity, as a static entity.

As for the modernists, they assert the alternative explanation. They argue that a
nation is not the developed products of the common identity. Rather, a nation
emerges as a consequence of modernity, coupled with the wide social and
political changes in Europe.7

The historians seem to agree with the modernist explanation. Eric Hobsbawm
asserts that “nations exist as a function of or in the context of a particular
stage of technological and economic development 8” Hence, a nation is just “the
products of nineteenth-century ideologues who wanted to create independent
territorial states that would provide the most effective mechanism for ensuring
that large-scale market economies could flourish. 9”
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William Brown, Simon Bromley, and Suma Athreye (eds.), Ordering the International : History,
Change and Transformation, (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 200.
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Benedict Anderson, also sees a nation as a form of social imaginary made
possible by the social and technological changes. According to his book titled
Imagined Communities, a nation is an imagined community, since all members in
the community do not actually have face-to-face contact, but recognize each other
as members in the same community through the printed media. The modern
printed media, such as newspaper and books, replaced the sacred script on
binding the people together. The connectedness in society gradually became a
basis of a nation.

From the discourse on the notion of “nation,” there are some crucial points
which scholars discuss most. The first is whether nations are the social product
of modernity (like Anderson’s explanation), or they have their ancient roots, based
on the religious, ethnic and linguistic collectivity, and neutrally develop to be a
nation nowadays. Craig Calhoun believes that this argument has its steak, because
it would justify whether ethnicity or religion can be a claim for nationalists to
establish a nation.

Secondly, associated with the significance of the religious and ethnic collectivity,
how the primordial identities function in a new form of nation today. The
modernists believe that the notion of equal citizenship, regardless of ethnicity and
religion, replaces the primordial identity. But is it always true that all religious
and ethnic groups equally function in politics of the modern state ?

Nationalism and Ethnicity
41

Nationalism is a perceptual framework which stems from the concept of nation.
The book “Ordering the International : History, Change, and Transformation”
(2004) gives the general definition which prevailed in the era of nation-state that
nationalism is the principle that each nation should have a state of its own or at
least some degree of self-determination in the territory. 10 Because the basic idea
of nationalism links the national unit with the political legitimacy, it often
becomes a political device for an ethnic group to claim a nationhood or
reinforce the cohesion in a state.

But the modernist approach does not agree with the claim on the natural linkage
of the cultural inheritance with the nationhood. Ernest Gellner gives the
traditional definition to nationalism that it is “the political doctrine which holds
that the political and national unit should be congruent,11”but in the same time,
he perceives that both nation and nationalism are the artificial modern
phenomenon. He asserts that “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to
self-consciousness, it invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need
some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on. 12”

Roger Friedland defines nationalism that it is “a state-centered form of collective
10
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subject formation, a form state representation, one grounding the identity and
legitimacy of the state in a population of individuals who inhabit a territory
bounded by that state.” But “the cultural commonalities of that population do not
constitute the basis for the formation of a nation. Nationality is … a contested
claim, not a social fact.13”

Likewise, Craig Calhoun acknowledges the role of ethnicity vis-à-vis nationalism.
But nationalism cannot be based on the ethnic similarity only, as many ethnic
groups do not have nation of their own. To be able to support the claim of
nationhood, the ethnic similarity must contain some political implication, such as
homeland, national hero, and the past glory era. 14 He notes that the role of
culture in a nationalist claim is not in the form of pure historical continuity.
Rather, the culture is reproduced on both its content and orientation. 15 The
ethnicity, as well as language and religion, is selected, adjusted and translated
into a claim of nationhood in the attempt of nationalists to make the nation fit
the state.16

David Brown provides the constructivist explanation on this process. He suggests
that an ethnic group needs to develop the consciousness on their common
identity through the situational context, for example, the more interaction within
the group (or the imaginary connectedness in the society as Anderson explains),
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or the interaction with the external threat. 17
However, as the ethnicity is now an appropriated political claim, it does not
function similarly with ethnicity in the pre-modern era. It is not merely the
expansion of the kinship network, but it affirms the values of family members,
based on the similarity of the language, religion and the way of life. And its
influential role in the modern state is still perpetuated.

Ethnicity is still influential, because it is politicized. The state can use ethnicity
as a source for national unification, political capital in the competition with the
opposition or justification for its legitimacy. Yet, the state cannot utilize the
ethnic claim without any limitation. The ethnic policy must be consonant with
the national identity as well. In turn, the state-opposition can use a specific
ethnicity to mobilize the resistance against an existing, probably multinational,
state.

David Brown studies the role of ethnicity in a state and finds that in a monoethnic society, the national identity and the values derived from it are associated
with the dominant group in the society. But the interesting finding is in the
multi-ethnic society, where most scholars believe that the state is constrained to
pursue the ethnically neutral policy in order to expand its legitimacy to all
ethnic groups in the state.

On the contrary, Brown finds that in the multi-ethnic society, the state’s policy is
controlled by one dominant ethnic group and responds to their benefits, because
17

David Brown, “Ethnic Revival : Perspectives on State and Society,” Third World Quarterly,
Vol.11, No. 4, (October, 1989), p. 5.
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the state needs to both strengthen the loyalty of the majority ethnic group
toward the government and in the same time ensure the government’s popularity
among this main ethnic group.18 Although in some cases, the state promotes the
“unity in diversity,” there must be one ethnic group which functions as the
national core among the diversity.

Nationalism and Religion

Religions had been the original identity of people in the societal level along
with ethnicity before the nation-state arose. Benedict Anderson claims that the
first imagined community was connected through the sacred script. 19 Religious
values laid down the primary norms guiding the social and political behaviors. In
the European medieval age, Christian dogma covered all aspects of life, 20
including politics. The canon law had priority over the worldly law. The king
authority was constrained by the Roman Catholic Church’s edicts. 21 Thus, the
worldly rulers had long tried to resist the Roman Catholic Church, but their
attempt succeeded when the European society changed against the domination of
the Roman Catholic Church in the era of Enlightenment.
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The societal changes in Europe, such as the connectedness in the society through
the printing capitalism, the mass education outside the Church, and the belief in
the political right of self-determination of people, realized the formation of
nation-state. In the European part, when the state was established in France, the
religious symbols were banned from the public space, 22 as a result of the
emerging secular idea on separation between the public and private sphere. When
the model of nation-state spread in and outside Europe, secularism was adopted
along with the idea of nation-state too. However, state leaders in Europe aimed to
limit the influence of the Roman Catholic Church only. 23 They did not object the
religion as a whole. Therefore, the morality and traditions were considered
secular, and still functioned as the social values in the public sphere, 24but under
the authority of the nation-state.

The idea of nation-state exerted the identity of equal citizenship to replace the
religion as the collective identity of people. 25 Secularism also universalized the
religious toleration and the recognition of the right of the religious minorities.
With these principles, a secular nation-state can expand its authority and
legitimacy over people of different religions in its territory, and became a
political successor of religion. 26 Mark Juergenmeyer calls the polity in which
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secularism contributes to the authority of nation-state “secular nationalism.”

In the age of the western colonization, the countries outside Europe were forced
to learn and adopt the concept of nation-state. In some cases, the nation-formation
process was initiated by the western colonizers in order to unify the territory
under their controls. The process included standardization of the formal language,
setting up the centralized mass-educational system, and establishment of the ruling
apparatus or bureaucratization. In other cases, the ruling class of the local
countries launched the nationalist programs by themselves as a response to the
threatening western power. In both cases, secularism was promoted along with the
idea of nation–state in order to fortify the new “national” identity, transcending
all religions and ethnicities of the inhabitants, and eventually to legitimize the
newly–established governments.

John Markoff and Daniel Regan perceive this process as “the state’s assault on
the local (religious and ethnic) identity. 27” Hans Kohn claims that “It is the first
period in history in which the whole of mankind has accepted one and the same
political attitude, that of nationalism. 28”

However, the concept of nationalism does not operate out of vacuum. It needs
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some cultural basis on which it stands. Religion often partakes in nationalism as
a national collective identity as well. In fact, one of the most effective tool for

the state to unite the people as a nation is religion. The Philippines, Sri Lanka
and Pakistan are examples. But nationalism posits itself above religion, and
integrates it as a supplementary element of the nation in which the religious
institution cannot harm the state and give the state the religious legitimacy in
the same time. 29 In this case, the strength of religious collectivity is eventually
absorbed to be a part of national loyalty.

But the problem can occur in some cases, since the nation-state is not strongly
established everywhere. Mark Juergenmeyer notes that in the territories where the
nation-state is weak, the religious violence prone to take place, 30 because the
religious identity still prevails, and it merges with nationalism as a product of
the modernization age. The consequence is each religious group in the territory
attempts to establish their own religious state which inevitably causes the conflict
with other religious groups in the same territory.

Roger Friedland calls the polity in which a particular religion is promoted to
claim the nationhood and the secular ideas, such as the equality among all
religious adherents, is ignored, the “religious nationalism. 31” It implies that religion

29

Mark Juergenmeyer, Global Rebellion : Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from
Christian Militias to al Qaeda, (Berkley, Los Angeles, London : University of California Press,
2008) , p. 26.
30
Mark Juergenmeyer, Global Rebellion : Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from
Christian Militias to al Qaeda, (Berkley, Los Angeles, London : University of California Press,
2008), p. 22.
31
Roger Friedland, “ Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation,”
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 27 (2001), pp. 125-152.

48

is not exactly the opposite of the state, nor it is the authority which the state
displaces like secularism claims.

Here, the religion eagerly operates within the existing nation-state. In this state
form, the religion is a national collective identity, a source of legitimacy of the
state, and the ultimate purpose of the state’s existence on this earth. 32 As opposed
to the modernization theory, this type of state does not aim for the progress,
especially the economic progress. Rather, it aims toward the social redemption, 33
with which the religious values become the national goal and interest.

All religions provide the basic idea on how the good society should be and how
the resources in the society should be distributed. Although religions do not
exactly peach on the polity, the religious texts are read politically. Hence, for
some religious nationalists, its teachings easily become a base for a public policy.
Although Islam is frequently referred to in the context of political Islam, other
religions, especially when it represents the identity of an ethnic group, can
emerge, as an alternative to a secular nation-state as well.
Then again, the circumstance in which one religion is chosen to promote
nationalism can happen in both secular and religious state. Although the basic
principle of secularism overlooks the religious difference, in practice many states
are not really religiously neutral, or completely dismiss the religious factor in
politics. This is consonant with the above-discussed argument on the ethnic
32
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neutrality of the new nation-state. Even a secular state does not always stay
religiously and ethnically neutral, since the inherited culture is a part of modern
“citizen” identity. The culture is the living social institution which inevitably
influences the people’s political worldview and accordingly the national existence.
Southeast Asia
“ If Indonesia is to survive … it must create … a coherent national identity, one
which at the same time, rests on a multiplicity of local community forms and
identities. 34”
Hildred Geertz, the American anthropologist

The above quote can apply not only to Indonesia, but also to many other
countries in Southeast Asia, where the nation–states were formed up less than a
century. Before the colonization era, Southeast Asia was the region of ethnic and
religious diversity due to its wide and different geography covering the
mountains and lowland in the continental mainland and the archipelago spreading
along the equator. The geography defines the economic and social features of
communities. In the north of the continent, the mountainous geography impedes
the interaction among people. As a result, the basic social identity of people lies
in their tribes which maintain their unique linguistic and religious characteristics
until today. Myanmar and Laos are composed of 135 and 160 ethnic groups
34
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respectively. 35 On the contrary, in the south of the continent is the archipelago
which lies along the world’s main sea-route. As a result, the region was colored
with the cultural and economic dynamics. Many Persian, Arab, Indian, and Chinese
traders settled down here before the nineteenth century.
But this does not mean Southeast Asia had developed to be a fully plural
society, because the animist hill people, the Buddhist farmer in the lowland, and
the Muslim immigrants on the coastal islands separately lived their ways of life
on different parts of territories. 36 They interacted with people of different
religious and ethnic groups, but then went back to their villages where they
mainly lived with the co-religionists and co-ethnics. Not to mention that the
transportation and communication before the colonization era did not support the
intercommunication among the people.
Just like Europe before the nation-state era, the Asian rulers in the eighteenth
century had the authority over the limited territory. In fact, the territory of
governance was never clear, because it always changed in accordance with the
rise and fall of each ruler or the marriage among the dynasties. Moreover, a ruler
could sent the yearly tribute to show his homage to more than one suzerainty.
Because the concept of sovereignty was not known, the local ruler had the
inconsistent degree of independence pertaining to the relations with the
suzerainties. While the local ruler had the authority over his territory, the bigger
empires could demand him to send some resources, labors or troops. Therefore,
35
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the troops in that age were the multi-ethnic troops which fought the enemy in
order to protect the economic resources and the kinship, rather than fighting with
the common ideology of nationalism.
When the European colonizers entered the region, the idea of nationalism was
applied to the Southeast Asian countries in order to define the territory under
their control and legitimize the authority over the territory. For instance, the
Anglo-Siamese (the previous name of Thailand) Treaty in 1909 which drew the
border between Thailand and Malaysia demonstrated the British attempt to
identify the sovereign territory as the first step of making a nation when it
colonized the Malay Peninsular. 37 And other borderlines (except sea borderline) in
Southeast Asia was created by the western colonizers in the same way, which
means the border does not pertain to the characteristics of the local inhabitants.

In the case of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, Siam (presently Thailand where
the majority of population were Buddhists) lost Kedah to Malaysia, in which
inhabitants of 27 villages were Buddhist Siamese. Aside from these Siamese in
Kedah, there were Samsams who were of Malay descent, practiced Islam, but
spoke Thai language. According to the Malaysian census in 1911, five percent of
the whole Malaysian population was Samsams. 38 In return, Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat provinces in which the majority of the population were the MalayMuslims were kept under Thai territory, because the sultans in these provinces
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sent the yearly tribute to Bangkok. The tribute was politically interpreted as the
Thai authority over the three provinces, although the majority of the population
there were Muslims. If consider the case with the concept of nationalism

discussed above, this could be a factor causing the conflict, because the boundary
was arranged only among elites and colonizers, and it lacks the congruence
between the ethnicity of inhabitants and territorial boundaries.

After setting the clear borderlines, according to Benedict Anderson, schooling was
another strategy to cultivate the national identity out of the various cultural
identities and dispersed local political units. In the governmental schools, the
standardized certificates and textbooks, and the centralized curriculum diluted the
religious and ethnic background of students and built them up from the same
mold. 39 It was also a place to cultivate the idea that they were of the same
“nation.” Here, they learnt to speak the same standardized language, and believe in
the common history and future goal. Hence, the national unity was created to
supersede the religious and ethnic diversity. Although many new nations have the
motto “unity on diversity,” Craig Calhoun notices that nationalism prefers the
ethnic homogeneity to the cultural variation. 40
On the other hand, the nationalism was cultivated by the Southeast Asian elites
themselves who were threatened by the economic power of foreign immigrants.
Before demanding the independence from the Dutch in 1916, in 1911-1912
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Sarekat Islam Party aimed to protect Indonesian traders in textile industry against
the control of Chinese middlemen. 41 Before 1941, the Malay nationalists were
attracted to the idea of Pan-Islamism due to the will to protect the peninsular
from the economic encroachment of Chinese. (Actually, the Malay nationalism
was an outstanding case compared to the nationalism in its neighbors, as Malay
nationalists’ resentment objected at Chinese immigrants rather than the British
colonizers.) During and after the first World War, the Burmese nationalists
demanded the educational and economic improvement for Burmese, as they saw
Indian immigrants dominated the credit and loan system, the trade sector and the
agricultural areas of their own country. 42.
However, in some other cases, nationalism was also imposed as a response to the
threatening western colonizers. The clearest example was the Vietnamese
nationalism led by Ho Chi Minh starting since 1927 to establish the
independence of Vietnam against the French colonization. 43To respond on the
British invasion into Malayu peninsular, the Thai government abolished the selfgoverning authority of the Malay leaders in the southern provinces, and sent the
bureaucrats from Bangkok to govern the provinces instead in order to strengthen
the centralized sovereign power.44
The western colonization in a way created a common grievance among Southeast
41
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Asians, especially the Dutch and French colonization, and it was a catalyst for
the unification within Southeast Asian countries. In the first phase of their
resistance, the nationalist movements were led by ones who obtained either the
western education in Europe or the national centralized education initiated by the
western colonizers in their own countries. However, to express their authentic
identity, many of them mixed religion into their nationalist ideology, reflecting the
paradigm which classifies their country’s history into the pre and post
colonization periods. The religion, especially Buddhism and Islam which long
existed before the colonization symbolizing the old traditions and common
heritages, were presented as opposed to the western mind. Hence, the very first
nationalist movements in Southeast Asia were, for example, Sarekat Islam Party of
Indonesia and the Young Men’ s Buddhist Association of Burma. 45
But the Philippines is the exception of this tendency, since their population had
widely converted to Christianity, (the western religion), since the sixteenth century,
long before the nationalist movement began in the region. 46 By the time that the
nationalist movement began in the region, not only the Christian (western) religion
was already a part of Philippine identity, it was also a tool to unite the nation
of hundred islands. Buddhism and Islam were also the reason that after the
second World War, Marxism was objected by the nationalists in Myanmar 47and
Indonesia.
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This proves the importance of the political function of the religions in Southeast
Asia, which may contradict to the modernization theory. This is because Southeast
Asian societies’ path of modernity is different from the European path. The
emergence of nation-state is a product of modernity, but the process of stateformation in Southeast Asia, whether it was the response to the western
colonization or the foreign immigrants, was the social project initiated from the
top by the elites. The new modern “national” commonality and identity were not
driven by the ordinary people. For them, the traditional identity still hold
communities together.
Therefore, the states had to heavily build up the “nation” through the nationalist
programs to intervene into the cultural identity in order to cultivate the national
loyalty. In the same time, the states control the religious agents, either by
accommodation (like Malaysia under the era of Mahathir Mohamad, or Thailand
under the administration of General Phibun Songkram in which the religion was
a part of national identity) or by suppression (like Indonesia under President
Suharto in which almost all religious parties were banned), or the mixture of
both strategies.
If secularism is defined as the religious toleration and the right of the religious
minority, the constitutions of all Southeast Asian countries set them to be a
secular state. 48 But when the religion contains the political implication, all
religious adherents are not actually equal under the state’s policy, as the secular
48
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nationalism suggests. Although a state (or its constitution) claims to be secular in
order to transcend the authority of the government to all religious and ethnic
groups, the religion (and secularism) contains more than legal dimension. It has
also social meaning which intertwines all the time with politics.
Likewise, ethnicity was used as a tool to create a nation too in some countries.
Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei held Thai and Malay ethnicity respectively as a
core of national identity above Chinese and others. But Singapore and the
Philippines were and are still ethnic neutral. As for Indonesia, the administration
and politics are constantly under the influence of Javanese since its
independence, but its national ideology never sets any ethnicity as a national
identity.
Aside from the particular religion and ethnicity as a tool to unite the nation,
some countries hold the monarchy as the state’s symbol to unite people together.
In Thailand and Brunei, the king is a part of the national ideology. The motto of
Thai national ideology is “ Nation, Religion, and King”. As for Brunei, its national
ideology is “ Malay, Muslim and Monarchy.” In Malaysia, Sultans (Yang Di
Pertuan Agong) of nine states must be Muslims and protectors of Malays’
privileges in their states.49
This leads to the fact that although almost all Southeast Asian modern states
(except Myanmar) recognize the religious and ethnic minorities’ rights, possibly
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for the sake of national cohesion, they are not absolutely ethnically neutral nor
religiously secular. The cultural factor still plays a role not only in their domestic
politics, but its role expands to the foreign policy, because it concerns the
supreme national interest, such as the national unification which is significant for
the unstable nation-state, especially its formation did not origin from their own
grass-root people.
The consequence is that a particular religious or ethnic group dominates the state
goal and policy, such as Bumiputera policy of Malaysia which is designed and
driven by Muslim-Malay bureaucrats to protect Malays’ economic interests. In
some cases, the state imposes the centralized assimilation, or horizontal
standardization. 50 The Buddhist Burmese government claims that all of its ethnic
and religious minorities, except Rohingyas, are descendants from the same racial
stock, therefore, it justifies the government’s racial assimilation holding Burmese
as the ethnic core. 51
Lee Yong Leng claims that in 1980 the Southeast Asian countries were not
really “nations” yet, because their governments still issued the policy based on
the idea of ethnicity (or religion). 52 But the development of the nation-formation
was seen since 1990. David Brown noticed that the national policy that
emphasized on the ethnic or religious core transformed to affirm on the multi50

Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and
Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, (Los Angeles, London, : SAGE
Publications, 2002), p. 418.
51
David Brown, “ Ethnic and Nationalist Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Mark Beeson (ed.)
Contemporary Southeast Asia, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 145.
52
Lee Yong Leng, Race, “Language, and National Cohesion in Southeast Asia”, Journal of
Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 1980) , p. 124.

58

ethnic and multi-religious community instead. Even the Malaysian government
became to call for “Melayu Baru” or New Malay, which is defined as a Malay

who “could transcend Malay ethnocentrism. 53” Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi also projected Islam Hadhari policy which interpreted that the true
Muslims can live peacefully with non-Muslims. This is not to say that the
ethnic-religious core policy is dismissed, but it is now added with the
acknowledgement of the multiculturalism.
However, this kind of policy demonstrates the basic fact that the Southeast Asian
countries are still on the process of nation-making. Lee Yong Leng reminds us
the political reality that there is no nation in this world, including the Southeast
Asian countries, whose all of their population consider themselves belonging to
their legal nation. But a nation-state must at least makes the majority of its
population to feel this way in order to exist. 54
Therefore, the fundamental concerns of Southeast Asian nations revolve around
the basic problem of a state, such as the security and survival, the sovereignty, or
the national cohesion. They are the primary national interests of the states in this
region. To term with these problems, the Southeast Asian states cannot abandon
the nationalist concept. On the other hand, the nationalism is the concept of
inclusion and exclusion. Nationalism tells the people who they are and who they
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are not through setting the identity which marks how they are similar to one
group and different from other groups. And the border functions to maintain this
difference. 55
As a result, when a nation imposes the national concept to strengthen the state’s
existence, it is done on the expense of the ethnic and religious groups which are
excluded from the national identity. They are minorities who are, in most cases,
politically isolated, economically deprived, and inhabit on the geographic periphery
of the states. 56
As discussed above that the borders in Southeast Asia are drawn by the
colonizers and the local elites, hence the territories lack the congruence between
the national groups and the state, as the original meaning of nationalism suggests.
The first consequence is the religious and ethnic minorities do not, at least in the
beginning of the state-formation, consider their legal government as legitimate.
Secondly, the borders separate the ethno-religious groups. They can be minority in
one state, and majority in others. But the cultural ties based on the ethnic and
religious identity still exist and function across borders. Therefore, the ethnicreligious group which becomes a majority in one state can easily become a big
sympathizers for their co-religionists or co-ethnics who are minority in another
state. Thirdly, the religion and ethnicity is included as a part of national identity,
and they have the political influence. Although the state has its national interests
to protect, especially they are the new weak states, the cultural factor can exert
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the influence sometimes either through its constituencies or the opposition. The
thesis aims to study the extent to which the religious factor can affect the
foreign relations in the region and how the state would preserve the balance so
that the cultural factor would not override the state’s fundamental interests.

CHAPTER 3
MALAYSIA’S POLICY TOWARD THE THAI – MUSLIM INSURGENCY

Malaysia positions itself as a “moderate Muslim country, 57” based on the fact
that the majority of its population are Muslims. In the same time, it implies as
well that the government has to contest for the interpretation on how to be a
Muslim. At the time of its independence in 1957, with the high proportion of
the non–Muslims in the country, the aspiration to be a multi–ethnic and
secular society reflected in its constitution. 58 Although Islam is the religion of
the Federation of Malaysia, other religions can be practiced, 59 and the Indians
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and Chinese, who are mostly non–Muslims, are entitled to the citizenship.
However, after 1970s, the Islamic revivalism asserted the religious values as
another core value of the nation. The Islamic party clearly indicates in its
platform policy that its goal is to change Malaysia to be an Islamic State
with the Shariah applied. 60 The contestation between the secular and religious
orientation continues until the present time, whenever an issue surfaces and the
government needs to decide how to deal with it. This chapter takes the Thai–
Muslim insurgency in Thailand as a case study to examine how the
Malaysian government weighs the secular interests and the religious values in
setting its foreign policy, and how the religious factor affects Malaysia’s
relations with Thailand.

The situation
On the northern border of Malaysia is the south of Thailand. The majority of
Thai population are Buddhists, while 4-5% of Thai population is Muslims. 61
Most of them are of Malay descents, and speak Malay language. The Thai –
Muslims concentrate in Thai southern provinces, such as Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat, which border with Kelantan, the Malaysian northern states. This
means the Thai-Muslims in the three southern provinces share the religion,
ethnicity, and language with their Malay neighbors. Many of them actually
have relatives living on another side of border, and the ties between them are
still strong even after the British drew the border between Thailand and
59
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Malaysia.

The difference between them is that the border makes the Thai-Muslims
become minorities in their own home. Many Thai-Muslims insurgent groups
emerged to resist the governance of Bangkok, especially during the time that
the Thai central government implemented the nationalist policy during the year
1938–1944. 62 However, their resistance was suppressed, until the Thai
government changed its policy in 1990s. The government set up many
developmental programs in the south, granted the amnesty to the insurgents,
and many Muslims began to participate in the parliamentary system of
Thailand.

The three Thai southern provinces had been in peace for decades until 2004
when the violence erupted again with the gun robbery from the military camp
in Narathiwat province. 63 At that time, the Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin
Shinawatra, responded to the insurgency with the equal violence which
consequently affirms the perception of Muslim Malaysians that the Thai–
Muslim insurgency results from the oppression of the Buddhist government
against their “Muslim brothers.” In Malaysia, the Islamic Party of Malaysia,
(Parti Islam Se – Malaysia or PAS) and many Malaysians, compared the Thai–
Muslims living under the Buddhist government to the Palestinians under the
Israeli occupation. 64 They called for the boycott against Thai products, and held
the protests in front of the Thai embassy in Malaysia. PAS, the opposite and
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Islamic party took a role on rising the fund to donate for the Tha -Muslims
whose family members were killed or disappeared by Thai soldiers. 65

All these incidents inevitably exerted the political pressure on the Malaysian
government. The situation got complicated when Prime Minister Thaksin
claimed that the insurgents were trained and hid from the Thai authorities in
Malaysia. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, denied the
allegation. Both leaders exchanged the hot argument through the media, which
caused the tension and distrust on the bilateral relations. The relations reached
its bottom period when 131 Thai Muslim refugees fled from Thailand into
Malaysia, and Prime Minister Badawi decided to allow the officials of the
United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) to interview them
and did not arrange their return to Thailand as the Thai government
demanded.

The case of Thai–Muslim insurgency contains some religious aspect, which can
be seen in the Malaysians’ and PAS’s discourse revolving around the religious
values. In the same time, the Thai–Malaysian relations contribute to Malaysia’s
secular interests, since it promotes the Malaysian economic growth and
security. This chapter will study how the Malaysian government addressed the
issue based on its core values, and how the Malaysian government termed
with the complicated bilateral relations while maintaining the balance between
the secular interests and religious values in the country. Finally, the chapter
will conclude how the conflict affected the bilateral relations of the two
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countries whose religious beliefs are different.

Malaysia’s core values
According to the system of analysis of Muthiah Alagappa proposed in his
book “Asian Security Practice : Material and Ideational Influences, 66” a policy is
determined by the regime or the decision makers’ interests. The interests can
be the political interests, such as, the political advantages over the opposition
party or the expansion of its ideology. The interests can also be economic, such
as the prosperity of the country which will strengthen the status of the
regime. Or it can concern the national security which guarantee the regime’s
survival. But naturally, the regime or the decision makers will issue the policy
that will protect, fortify or promote their own interests. Some of the interests
do not change easily through time, for example, the survival of the country, the
territorial integrity or the national ideology. Muthiah Alagaapa calls these
indispensable interests the “core values.” They are permanent interests, no
matter how the governments change. Therefore, they must be always considered
as the priority when the government issues the policy.

Muthiah Alagappa suggests that the core values can be found in the key
foundations or policies of the country, such as the constitution and the long–
term economic or developmental plans which guide the direction of the
country. These policies reveal what is significant for the country, and what
would be its ultimate goals. And this will be the guideline on its policy
making and implementation. It will also be the main factor to indicate how
66
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the regime will deal with the rising issue.

In the Malaysian case, the government has been continuously led by the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) since its independence in 1957.
Hence, the direction of the policies of the country is relatively steadfast. To
indicate what would be the core interests of Malaysia, the thesis will study
the constitution of Malaysia, “New Economic Policy” or NEP, “ Vision 2020”
and “Islam Hadhari”.

A ) The Federal Constitution of Malaysia ( FC )
Not different from the constitutions of other countries, the Federal Constitution
of Malaysia sets the territorial integrity and its sovereignty as the priority of
the country. Article 1 and 2 of the Federal Constitution declares the territory
under the Malaysian sovereignty. But what is distinguished about the Federal
Constitution is that it emphasizes much on the national identity, or
“Malayness” in its multi–ethnic society.

Before gaining the independence, Malaysia was under the occupation of the
British. During the time of occupation, many Chinese and Indians immigrated
into Malaysia to trade or work as the labor of the British empire. At the time
of the independence, the non- Malays constituted 60 % of population in
Malaysia. 67 As a result, the Malay nationalists felt the vulnerability and
consequently the urgency to protect their “Malay identity” to the extent that
the constitution needs to define who is a “Malay.” In the Federal Constitution,
67
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Article 160 indicates that “… a Malay is a person who professes the Muslim
religion, speaks the Malay language, and practice the Malay customs.” Here, on
the process of nation–building, Islam becomes a part of the national identity.
Because Chinese and Indians can be Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, or Hindu.
But almost all Malays are Muslims. The religion involves deeply with the
sense of the national security in the case of Malaysia. It is noteworthy that
the qualifications of Malays indicated in the constitution are exactly the
qualifications of the Thai-Muslims.

When drafting the constitution, the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) which championed the interests of Malays initially denied the
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress
(MIC) to grant the citizenship for the Chinese and Indians. But after the
negotiation, also due to their realization of their common threat from the
Malayan Communist Party, the Chinese and Indians obtained their citizenship
in return for their recognition of some economic and educational privileges
granted to the Malays. This demonstrates some facts. With the proportion of
Malays which barely exceeded the half of the whole population, (and this
proportion has not changed much until today68), the Malays felt that their
identity must be protected to keep Malaya peninsula as the land of the
Malays. 69 And Islam was taken in, to identify the identity of a Muslim. In the
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same time, the Malays and non–Malays accepted that they must live together
in the multi–ethnic and multi–religious society.

The position of the religion in the constitution asserts the same ideas, - Islam
as the symbol of Malay identity, but operating within the multi – religious
context. Although Article 3 of the constitution indicates that “Islam is the
religion of the Federation”, (right after the first two articles which indicate the
territorial integrity and national sovereignty. This can also imply the
significance of the religion.), it reads further that “but other religions may be
practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. 70” In the same
time, Article 8 (1) and 8 (2) guarantees the rights of the minorities that “ …all
persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the
law… there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of
religion, race, descent, or place of birth… 71”

As for the judiciary, the Malaysian judiciary applies the dual system of both
Shariah and common law. Although the constitution grants the Shariah court
the wide sphere of authority beyond the interference of the State’s court, as
stated in Article 121 (1A) in 1988 that “The High Court shall have no
jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shariah
Courts,72“ in practice, Shariah applies to only Muslim Malays, and is referred
to when the lawsuit concerns the domestic affairs, such as the family and
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inheritance law. The UMNO, MCA which represented Chinese, and MIC which
represented Indians had an agreement that the position of Islam in the
constitution will not affect the civil rights of the non–Muslims. The Alliance
of the three parties gave the assurance to the Colonial Office that they did
not intend to establish a theocratic state and “Malaya would be a secular
state. 73”

However, the necessity to protect Islam appears in Article 3 (2) which requires
further that the ruler of each Malaysian state is also the “Head of the
Religion of Islam.” The law also prohibits Muslims to convert to other
religions, but allows the non–Muslims minors to convert to Islam without the
parental consent. 74

Likewise, the constitution requires the head of the state to protect the special
status of Malays. Article 153 (2) states that “… the Yang di–Pertuan Agong
shall exercise his function … to safeguard the special provision of the Malays
and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure the
reservation for Malays and natives … of the position in the public service …
and of scholarship, exhibitions and other similar educational and training
privileges or special facilities … and, when any permit or license for the
operation of any trade or business is required… “ 75
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Therefore, Shanti Nair contends that the Malaysian politics revolves around the
concept of protection, either protection of Islam, or protection of the Malays. 76
However, in spite of this protection and awareness of the pluralistic and
fragile character of the Malaysian society, the wide economic gap between the
Chinese immigrants and the local Malays brought about the racial riot on 13
May, 1969.
B) The New Economic Policy (NEP)
Before 1969, the economic sectors in Malaysia were separated based on the
ethnicities. The local Malays concentrated in the traditional agricultural sector,
while Chinese mainly worked in the commercial sector, which resulted in the
unequal benefits from the national economic growth. 77 In 1970, 65.9 % of
Malays and other indigenous groups lived in poverty, compared to 27.5 % of
Chinese Malaysians. 78 The wide economic gap brought about the racial riot
which not only ended the leadership of the Malaysian first Prime Minister
Tunku Abdul Rahman, it also threatened the national unity on a whole. The 4th
Malaysia Plan referred to this incident that “The May 13 incident …
demonstrated that any development effort that did not deal sufficiently with
the needs of the poor and the imbalance of the racial groups would lead to
growth without equity and resulted in a nation divided… 79”
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Therefore, the NEP which was introduced in 1970 set “creating a united
nation” as its number one challenge. The second challenge is eradicating the
poverty, then followed by correcting the economic imbalance. And expanding
the economy came as the fourth challenge of the plan. Since then, the
economy became a strategy of nation–building of Malaysia. 80
The Malaysian government diluted the economic sectors defined by the
ethnicities by generating the participation of Malays in the modern economy,
especially in commerce and industry. In the same time, it worked with the
private sector to correct the economic imbalance. 81 The quota preserved for
Malays in the education and employment in the public sectors also helped
relocating the occupations of Malays. 82

Whether the NEP achieved its goal is still controversial. But on the bottom
line, the achievement of NEP is necessary and considered as a part of
“national security.” Datuk Abdullah Ahmad, a Malay elite, perceived the racial
riot in 1969 as the “system breakdown” and this occurred when the
compromises and contracts achieved by the Alliance of the three parties,
(UMNO, MCA, and MIC which represented Malays, Chinese and Indians
respectively) in the time of Malaysian independence was violated. 83
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The racial riot in 1969 also demonstrated how Malays’ well- being and
security involves deeply with the Malaysian (or national) security. 84 And the
NEP and the following Malaysian economic plans were designed to protect
them, (or to say at least, to strengthen their capability in the economic
competition with Chinese.)

Some say that the NEP achieved its goal, considering from the higher
proportion of Malays in the manufacturing and service sectors. 20 % of the
shares in Malaysian corporation now belongs to Malays. 85 But some academics
question the achievement of NEP. Judith Nakata believes that the NEP can
dilute the career segregation based on the ethnicities, but the poverty still
persists in the Malays. 86 Vejai Balasubramaniam asserts that the NEP achieved
the economic growth and urbanization rather than the wealth distribution. He
points out that the Malaysian economic growth even raised the income
inequalities, and the racial riot between Indians and Malays breaking out in
2000 87 showed that the tension from the economic gap among ethnicities still
exists.

Furthermore, the NEP is designed to create the social harmony. But after 1969,
many Malaysians become more aware of the ethnic separation in the country.
The Malays consider the non–Malays as the threat, while the non–Malays
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believe that the Malays are obsessed with the race issue. 88

On the social angle, the 1969 racial riot was the best catalyst for the Islamic
revivalism. The Islamic revivalism started in the university campuses where
students perceived the hardship of Malay farmers as the national issue. They
believed that the Malays’ poverty was only a part of Malays’ problem. 89 As a
result, many student organizations, the Islamic Youth Movement or “Angkatan
Belia Islam” (ABIM) in particular, called for the social reform in accordance
with Islamic principles. Although the student organizations now have less
political and social implication, due to the Internal Security Act strictly
enforced, the demand of social reform based on the Islamic teachings still
goes on both in and outside political arena. In the political arena, the Islamic
opposition party (PAS) applies the Islamic teachings on monitoring the works
of the government. In the societal arena, the Islamic revivalism generated the
Dakwah movement. Although the movement is not homogenous, their common
feature is that they apply the Islamic ideology to analyze and suggest the
solution to achieve the better Malaysian society. However, the phenomenon
results in alienation of the non–Malays. 90

The incomplete achievement of the NEP and the perpetuated social
disharmony are the challenges which Vision 2020, proposed by the former
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad aimed to resolve.
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C) Vision 2020
Vision 2020 is the vision proposed by Dr. Mahathir Muhammad in 1991,
regarding on how Malaysia should be in year 2020. The former Prime Minister
aimed that Malaysia would be “a fully developed country” by year 2020. But
what interesting is that his “developed country” should not be measured by
the economic growth only. He envisioned that “[Malaysia] must be a nation
that is fully developed along all the dimensions : economically, politically,
socially, spiritually, psychologically, and culturally.” 91 Realizing Malaysia’s
inherited danger, Vision 2020 sets two goals for Malaysia, which are the
national unity and economic development.

To achieve the united Malaysian nation, Malaysia is designed to be a
liberated, democratic, matured, tolerant, and caring society. It must ensure the
prosperity with the economic justice. As for the economic goal, the Vision
2020 still has the similar goals with those of the NEP, (This proves that the
NEP has not totally realized its objectives yet.), which are the eradication of
the poverty and the diluting the specific race in economic sectors. Dr.
Muhammad stated that “… in all the major sectors of employment, there
should be a good mix of the ethnic groups that make up the Malaysian
nation … by the year 2020 to reach a stage where no-one can say that a
particular ethnic group is inherently economically backward and another is
economically inherently advanced.” 92
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It is clear that the two goals complement one another. The national unity
cannot be achieved without the overall economic prosperity, while the nation
cannot fully develop the economy without the social stability. It can be noted
here that although the Malaysian government emphasizes on the social
problem concerning the status of Malays, the way it approaches the problem
and the strategy to resolve are purely based on the secular thinking which is
opposite to that of ABIM and PAS.

After Dr. Muhammad left the office, his vision is still Malaysia’s main policy.
Although the succeeding Prime Minters, both Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and
Najib Razak, apply the different strategies. Prime Minister Badawi believed that
the privileges of Malays do not help to encourage Malays to compete with
other ethnicities. 93 In the same way, Prime Minister Razak believes that the
non–equal educational and economic opportunities among all Malaysian
citizens would hinder the entire national economic growth. 94 But both of them
still hold on with the objective of the social harmony and economic justice.

D ) Islam Hadhari
As mentioned above, the Dakwah movement both alienates the non–Muslims
and asserts some political pressure on the government which has the long
reputation on corruption and authoritarianism. Dr. Mahathir Mohammad termed
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with the Dakwah movement by the accommodation strategy, such as building
mosques, establishing the Islamic Bank and International Islamic University. 95
In the same time, the government promoted its own version of Islamic
interpretation as “authentic Islam,” and outlawed some threatening Islamic
organizations, for example, Darul Arqam. As a result, the Islamic teachings and
practices in Malaysia are relatively united. The influence of both Dakwah
movement and the government’s accommodation strategy also results in the
high religious awareness among Malaysians. In the international affairs, the
Malaysian government activated its role in the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), supported the Palestinians, and engaged more with the
Muslim countries in order to affirm its Islamic credential to Malaysian
constituencies. 96

However, after the end of Cold War, the religious perception increasingly
influences the foreign relations. According to the Prime Minister Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, “… many western countries have absorbed its misperception
about Islam to become part of their national strategic thinking that the Islamic
world is an adversary. 97” To promote its role as a modernized Muslim nation
toward both Muslim countries and the world community in general, Malaysia
promotes the idea of Islam Hadhari (Civilizational Islam), based on the belief
that Islam is compatible with modernization and globalization. Prime Minister
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Badawi interprets that creativity and rationalization are a part of Islamic
teachings, as seen consonant with the concept of Ijtihad. He believes that Islam
is universal concept. The national harmony is still paramount to Malaysia, and
Islam does not impede this goal of Malaysia in any way.

To demonstrate the idea of Islam Hadhari, the Malaysian government improves
its image as a leading country in the Islamic world. In the same time, it
declares the intention to co–exist peacefully with the western and non–Muslim
countries. Moreover, it unofficially positions itself as an authority which issues
the correct version of Islamic interpretation. As a result, it marginalizes the
extremists both in and outside the country.

Malaysia’s core values
To draw the conclusion from the study on the Malaysian constitution and its
main policies, Malaysia’s core values which must be its priority in foreign
policy setting can be described as follows,
A ) The national unity
The national unity of Malaysia does not cover the traditional meaning, such
as, the territorial integrity only, although it is surely its indispensable interest
as well. But the most possible threat against Malaysia’s security does not
come from military invasion. The former Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad
articulated that “The security is not just a matter of military capability.
National security is inseparable from political stability, economic success, and
social harmony. 98” Malaysia is a country with the high diversity of ethnicities
98
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and religion. Not to mention its naturally separated territory. Although majority
of the population speak Malay, but they speak with many different dialects.
The Malays, Chinese and Indian were able to reach the agreement on the
constitution and national principles in 1957, but at that time, they had the
common enemy, such as the British colonial rule and the Malayu Communist
Party. After both enemies were abolished, Malaysia is united owing largely to
the strength and the responsiveness of the central government. K.S. Nathan
gives opinion on Malaysia’s unity that “In Malaysia, the state has definitely
come before the nation. A major task of post–independence policy makers has
been to create a nation out of the pluralistic state. 99” He quoted that “In
Malaysia, authority and sovereignty have run ahead of self–conscious national
identity and cultural integration. 100”

B ) The economic growth
As mentioned earlier that the economic growth can mend the ethnic fractions
in Malaysia, since it decreases the Malays’ discontent against Chinese. However,
although the NEP helped to decrease the gap between Chinese and Malays, it
unintentionally increased the gap among Malays themselves. 101 Malays who can
raise their incomes are ones who access the educational and economic
privileges. But other Malays still live in poverty. Therefore, the economic
growth is still Malaysia’s core interest because it contributes to the national
unity.
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However, most of Malaysia’s income is from the export and tourism, 102 which
means Malaysia’s economy deeply involves with the world’s economy and its
international relation. Malaysia also needs a huge amount of foreign investment
to realize its goal of being the first industrial Muslim country in 2020. 103
Presently, the Malaysian government has burdened the budget deficits to
stimulate the growth of domestic industry, the construction and agricultural
sectors, and to improve the existing infrastructure. Therefore, the government is
facing the problem on credit rating, and needs the financial relief from the
foreign investment. 104

The economic growth on export and tourism also needs the energy security,
abundant labors, and most of all, the peace and stability in the country and the
region.

The Thai – Muslim insurgency and its impact on Malaysian core values
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia states seven objectives in the
pursuit of its foreign policy. Among seven objectives are,
1 ) Maintaining peaceful relations with all countries regardless of its ideology
and political system.
2 ) Forging close relations and economic partnerships with all nations,
particularly with ASEAN and other regional friends
3 ) Promoting peace and stability in the region through capacity building and
102
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conflict resolution measures
4 ) Projecting Malaysia as a leading example of a tolerant and progressive
Islamic nation 105
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia also states further that the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the cornerstone of
Malaysia’s foreign policy, because of many regional and sub–regional
cooperation under ASEAN context which all aim to accelerate the common
economic growth of the region. For example, ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA), the ASEAN Mekong Development Cooperation, and the Joint
Development Area (JDA). The Ministry affirms that “The peace, prosperity and
stability that Malaysia enjoys today are to a large extent, due to ASEAN’ s
role as an organization that fosters trust and confidence amongst its member
states. 106”

Furthermore, ASEAN guarantees the external security for Malaysia. Normally,
the Malaysian government allocates only 2–3 % of its GNP for the defense
budget, believing that the military forces is only a front of the whole defense
strategy. To defend the country comprehensively, Malaysia believes that the
mechanism of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation would be the best
guarantee for the regional stability. 107
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When the insurgency erupted in Thailand, the second core value of Malaysia
was immediately affected. Dato’ Nazirah Hussain, the Malaysian ambassador in
Thailand, explained that “ When you want to develop (the country), you want
first peace and stability. 108” Because people need to move around freely to
proceed on their international trade and tourist activities. According to her,
ASEAN members will become ASEAN Community in 2015, therefore, the
insurgency in the south of Thailand affects Malaysia’s national interests too.
When something happened, the foreigners, who are the potential investors or
tourists, look at the incident as a “regional problem” and avoid coming to the
whole Southeast Asian region. So, the ambassador viewed that “the insurgency
should not be taken as Thailand’s or Malaysia’s problem, because both
countries are actually in the same one community.” 109

Moreover, the insurgency in Thai southern provinces affected the energy
security of Malaysia, because Thailand and Malaysia have the bilateral energy
development project in the Joint Development Area (JDA). It is a project which
began since 1979 to solve the problem of overlapping claim of the two
countries over the offshore area. Instead of drawing a sea territory to separate
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the overlapping–claimed area, the two countries agreed to invest, explore,
extract the hydrocarbon resources, and share the expense and profits equally. 110
Now, Malaysia finished the constructing of the gas pipeline on its part, and
cannot risk wasting its investment on this project.

Likewise, the free mobility of foreign labor is necessary to the economic
development of Malaysia. The insurgency will obstruct the mobility of Thai
labors to Malaysia. Now, there are approximately 36,000 Thai workers in
Malaysian textile industry, furniture manufacturing factories, and agricultural
sector.111

The insurgency could also hinder the growing bilateral trade. At the time of
the beginning of the insurgency, the bilateral border trade alone valued around
8,090 Million US Dollars per year. 112 As for the rest of the bilateral trade, it
yearly valued around 15,506.25 Million US Dollars. 113

If the violence from the insurgency expanded crossing the border, it could also
threaten the territorial integrity and internal security of Malaysia. Although
most of the Thai–Muslim insurgent groups demand the independence of the
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three Thai southern provinces, their political ideology originates from the
concept of “ Malayu Patani Raya” or the Great Malay Patani, which believes
that the three Thai southern provinces and Kelantan State of Malaysia belong
to the same territory. 114 The propaganda of the insurgent groups which want to
establish an Islamic state may stimulate the extremists in Malaysia. Or
according to the concern expressed by Prime Minister Badawi in 2007, the
Thai–Muslim insurgency may attract the transnational terrorists to establish
their operational base in the region. 115 This is why Prime Minister Badawi
expressed the same concern on the Thai-Muslim insurgency that “We hope he
[Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra] will be able to manage the situation
without allowing the violence to spread. It is important he manages it. 116” At
the present time, the Malaysian government still faces the threat from the
regional terrorists. The arms in its military camp were robbed, 117 just like the
incident which started the insurgency in Thailand.

Malaysia’s policy toward the Thai – Muslim insurgency
Although the Thai-Muslim insurgency is portrayed mostly through the nationstate perspective as the Muslim minority against the dominating Buddhist
government, and its discourse contains some religious dimension, but the
conflict is not purely the result of religious difference. This could be the
reason that the Malaysian government, the religious groups and PAS, did not
express any religious solidarity for the Thai-Muslims in the beginning of the
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insurgency. Initially, the Malaysian government tried and seemed to be able to
keep the good relationship with Thailand.

After the gun robbery in the Thai military camp in Narathiwat province,
Prime Minister Badawi visited Thailand to confirm the Malaysian cooperation
on containing terrorists in the region. The two countries set up the joint
border committees 118 which will work to relieve the discontent of the Thai –
Muslims, based on Malaysia’s belief that their resentment stemmed from the
unequal development. Therefore, Prime Minister Badawi proposed the 3 E
strategy to solve the problem of insurgency in the long run, which required
the Thai government to improve the education, employment and
entrepreneurship for the Muslim people in the South.119 (It can be seen here
that the Malaysian government omitted the religious aspect, and demonstrated
that Malaysia, as a Muslim country, can work with the Thai Buddhist
government to solve the problem. Most of all, the Malaysian government
interpreted that the insurgency was not a religious problem.)

More interestingly, even after the Kreu-Sae incident on April 28, 2004 in
which the Thai police followed the insurgents into the ancient Kreu-Sae
mosque and killed 30 insurgents inside, none of the religious solidarity was
voiced from Malaysia. But some problems concerning the Thai-Malaysian
cooperation on the security surfaced. Sometimes the Malaysian government
denied to extradite the separatists whom the Thai government identify, because
they held the Malaysian nationality, and this became the matter of
118
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sovereignty. 120

However, after the insurgence went on with more violence for 10 months, the
turning point was after Tak-Bai incident. On October 25, 2004, thousands of
Thai – Muslims protested in front of the police station in Tak – Bai district,
Narathiwat province of Thailand, as the police had arrested their community
leaders. The soldiers arrested some of the protestors and removed them to the
military camps with the trucks. During the removing, 78 of the detainees were
dead due to the suffocation, because the soldiers forced them to lie down,
piling up on each other in the trucks, with their hand bound. 121

The Malaysian reaction came in two directions, either suggestions for the
solution on the insurgency or critics against the Thai government. The first
who responded on the incident was the former Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad who had a personal dispute with the then Malaysian Prime Minister
Addulalh Ahmad Badawi at that time. He took a political opportunity to show
off his leadership over Prime Minister Badawi by publically suggesting the
solution for the insurgency through the Malaysian newspaper, Utusan, that the
Thai government should allow the autonomy for the three southern
provinces. 122 After Mahathir Muhamad, Lim Kit Siang, parliamentary opposition
leader, suggested that Malaysia and ASEAN send the fact-finding missions to
the Thai southern provinces.

As for Anwar Ibrahim, the Malaysian key opposition who fought to change
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the regime after he was jailed for the homosexual-behavior allegation,
criticized the Thai Prime Minister that his aggressive solution would only
lead to more terrorist acts.123 All this pressured Prime Minister Badawi to
expressed his concern on the insurgency too, but he conveyed only the
moderate massage, “If there is anything that we can do to help, we will. If
not, we wish that the Thai government will be able to manage this crisis so
that it will not spread and cause further violence. We want the Thai
government to take the firm action. 124”

The compromising statement of Prime Minister Badawi opened for the
political attack from PAS, the Islamist opposition party whose political base is
in Kelantan, the Malaysian northern state bordering the three Thai southern
provinces. Kamarudin Jaafar, a PAS central committee member, criticized that
Prime Minister Badawi’s statement was ambiguous, and implied that he agreed
with the Thai security force. “If he meant that the Thai government had to
take even stronger action and sacrifice more lives, that would be
regrettable. 125” Meanwhile, PAS members both launched the activities to
support the Thai-Muslims and strongly criticized the Thai government. The
PAS youth wing handed a protest memorandum to a Thai consulate in
Kelantan, saying “We appeal to Thailand to act fairly towards the minority
Malay community in south Thailand, … so that no group feels oppressed. 126” It
also launched a fund to help the families of the victim killed or injured by
123

Sian Archives, Vol. 29, November 2004, p. 1921.
Anil Netto, “Malaysia Rages over Muslim Killings,”
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FJ30Ae02.html, October 30, 2004.
125
Anil Netto, “Malaysia Rages over Muslim Killings,”
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FJ30Ae02.html, October 30, 2004.
126
Anil Netto, “Malaysia Rages over Muslim Killings,”
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FJ30Ae02.html, October 30, 2004.
124

86

the Thai soldiers. Badrulzzaman Yusuf, the secretary of PAS’ s Ulama linked
Tak-Bai incident with the religion. “The tragic deaths showed that the Thai
authorities had no respect for the holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims
practice fasting. 127”

As for the religious organizations, they protested against the Thai government
too. The Malay Initiatives Network, the Secretariat for Asian Ulamas, the
Institute for Community Progress and Development, and the Institute for the
Research and Development for Syariah issued a statement calling for a
sanction against Thailand, “The Thai government is not being sincere in
handling the problem, and Islamic nation worldwide must stop trade relations
with it until they succeed in resolving this issue peacefully. 128” It is
noteworthy that PAS, as an Islamic party, and the Islamic organization’s
discourse were similar in implying that the insurgency resulted from the
oppression of the Thai government against the Muslims. On the contrary, the
non-religious political figures’ comments were suggestions for the solution (as
presented above) rather than the direct critics against the Thai government.

The Thai-Muslim insurgency became the issue that Malaysian politicians
exploited to gain the popularity. Therefore, although the Islamists’ discourse
focus on the religious solidarity for the “Muslim brother”, in the end, if the
Malaysian government really expressed some concern for Thai–Muslims, it
would not be driven from the will to protect the religious values. The
127
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Malaysian government just wanted to appease their Muslim constituencies. This
means even if the Malaysian government had referred to the Islamic values,
the real agenda of its policy was not religious. Rather, it was for the political
supremacy of the regime.

To decrease the pressure from the Muslim Malays, the Malaysian government
allowed all the popular protests against the Thai government and their
campaigns on boycotting the Thai products. Although the Thai government
issued the statements against the Malaysian organizations, and some Thais
protested in front of the Malaysian embassy in Bangkok in response, the
Malaysian government insisted that as a democratic country, it could not
forbid the movement of the Malaysian NGOs, as long as it did not violate the
law. It also warned the Thai government that it should be more mature and
less narrow-minded, not letting the political dispute to disturb the economic
relations, because as the neighboring countries, such dispute could happen
sometimes. 129

When Salahudeen Ayoob, a PAS representative initiated the debate on Tak-Bai
incident in the Malaysian Parliament, the governmental representatives needed
to play along. The Parliament decided to condemn Thai government for its
excessive use of force in Tak-Bai incident. 130 In the regional level, Prime
Minister Badawi was about to raise the incident to discuss during the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Laos in
November 2004, but Prime Minister Thaksin threatened to walk out from the
129
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meeting, if any country brought up the issue. 131

In the same time, to affirm the Malay-Muslim constituencies that their
government did not ignore the sufferings of the Thai-Muslims, and to avoid
the religious influence on Malaysian politics and its foreign policy, the
Malaysian government held with the interpretation that the Thai-Muslim
insurgency was the outcome of the unequal development. The Malaysian
government chose to deal with the political pressure from the Islamists
through the non-religious discourse. It presented itself as the one who can
“help” if the Thai government allowed. And its helps revolved around the
economic development and educational improvement in the three provinces. But
in general it refrained from criticizing the Thai government through the
religious aspect which is based on the dichotomy of the Buddhists
(government) against the Muslims which could lead to the confrontation
between the two governments.

This policy went in line with the Islam Hadhari idea which positions
Malaysia as a moderate Muslim country which can work with other nonMuslim countries in the regional and global level. In turn, it put PAS on the
defensive position, because since 9/11 PAS leaders were suspected on their
links with the radical Muslims in the region. There were some allegations also
that some PAS members funded the separatists in Thailand. 132 Hence, PAS had
to be careful on its position too, when it called for the justice for the Thai131
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Muslims.

However, in spite of the cooperative policy of Malaysia, the uncontrollable
insurgency increased the Thai suspicion against Malaysia. Few months after
Tak-Bai incident, Prime Minister Thaksin claimed that the insurgents were
trained in Kelantan State of Malaysia, 133which caused Prime Minister Badawi
to quickly responded that Malaysia was not a base for any group to resist
other country. And if Prime Minister Thaksin had any information which
Malaysia did not possess, he should have submitted it to Malaysia rather than
speaking to the media. 134 Likewise, the deputy Minister of Defense of Malaysia
kept on demanding Thai government to show the evidence of the allegation, 135
which the Thai government was unable to do so.

Despite the lack of evidence, the Thai government’s mistrust against Malaysia
did not fade away. In year 2005, General Dhammarak Isranggul, the Defense
Minister of Thailand claimed that the Thai–Muslim insurgents used Lankawi
Island of Malaysia as a place to plan on their sabotage.136 The succeeding
Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont claimed as well that Thai–Malays
working in Malaysia set up a restaurant network to launder money and
transfer it to the Thai insurgents. 137 As usual, the Malaysian Ministers denied
the allegations and demanded for the evidence.
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The continuously surfacing allegations, in spite of the lack of a clear evidence,
showed the Thai government’s distrust against Malaysia. The argument between
two countries could be interpreted as the sour relations. But on the other
hand, the Malaysian government needed to protect its reputation as a moderate
Muslim country. It should be noted here too that the Malaysian reaction this
time was to protect the country’s reputation, not for the religious values.

The geographic proximity brought Malaysia another incident which proved the
Malaysian religious solidarity. In September 2005, 131 Thai–Muslim refugees
fled into Malaysia, claiming that they were afraid for their uncertain security
living in Thailand. The first thing that Malaysia did was stating that Malaysia
allowed the refugees to live in Malaysia for humanitarian reason, and it will
not interfere in the Thai domestic affairs. 138 The Malaysian government allowed
the officials of the United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees
(UNHCR) to interview the refugees, but in the same time, it allowed Thai
authorities to meet them afterwards as well. In the meantime, Datuk Najib
Razak, the then Minister of Defense of Malaysia, asked the Malaysian media
not to intervene in the Thai domestic conflict which could lead to the
misunderstanding between Thailand and Malaysia. 139

When Prime Minister Thaksin demanded Malaysia to send the refugees back
to Thailand, claiming that some refugees were collaborators of the separatists,
it put the Malaysian government in difficulty. If the Malaysian government
sent them to Thailand, it could not avoid the wrath of the Muslim–Malays.
138
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But if the Malaysian government allowed them to stay, it would risk
alienating the Thai government.

As a result, the Malaysian government applied the half–way policy. While the
incident was in the media’s attention, it allowed the officials of the United
Nations High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) to conduct the interview,
and in the same time, repeated their affirmation to Thailand on their non–
interference policy. Syed Hamid, the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs
stated that Malaysia would return the refugees to Thailand only if Bangkok
can guaranteed their safety and human rights. 140 But few months later, when the
incident gained less media’s attention, the Malaysian government sent one of
refugees whom Thailand identified as a insurgent back to the Thai authority. 141
Although the Malaysian government did not send all refugees to the Thai
authority, it allowed the Thai officials to meet with them regularly, and
affirmed that it is ready to send them back whenever they are willing to
return to Thailand.

The half – way policy of Malaysia is an example of the Malaysian
government’s attempt to strike the balance between maintaining the good
relations with Thailand and calming the discontent of Malaysians who
expected their government to protect the Muslim fellows. Considering
Malaysia’s policy, this is one of the few times that the Malaysian government
protected the Thai–Muslims. And it did not do so for the sake of Islamic
values. Rather, the Malaysian Government tried to avoid the wrath of the
140
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Muslim-Malays in order to survive in the political game. This indicates that
the religious values may sometimes influence the Malaysian policy. But it is
not actually the national core value which is always necessary for the
government to protect.

During November 2004 (after Tak-Bai incident) to December 2005 (after 131
Thai-Muslim refugees fled to Malaysia) was the period that the ThaiMalaysian relations became most problematic, mainly because of the Thai
government’s blame on Malaysia for the insurgency, rather than because of the
Malaysian interference in the insurgency. Furthermore, the insurgency was
politicized by the Malaysian Islamists, therefore, the verbal response from the
Malaysian government was actually intended to be heard by its domestic
audience. (And it was the same on the Thai side.) Hence, the heated argument
exchanged through the media cannot really indicate the level of relations.
Dato’ Nazirah Hussain, the Malaysian ambassador in Thailand commented that
just because the argument of the country leaders rose in the media, did not
mean that the bilateral relation went downhill. She reminded that the two
countries are very close to one another. It is unavoidable to have some
arguments. 142 Malaysia did not regard the argument as a bilateral conflict.
Rather, it was just an issue to resolve.

Moreover, most of the leaders’ argument happened during Thaksin’s
administration. After Prime Minister Thaksin was ousted from the position, the
relation improved. Badaran Kuppusamy cited the undiplomatic words of a
142
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political analyst to conclude the situation, “The problem is not Thailand, but
Thaksin. 143”

Furthermore, the real policy of Malaysia should be judged from its real
practices. And during the period of the strong argument between the two
countries’ leaders, the bilateral cooperation in every fields still proceeded as
normal. To preserve the bilateral relations with Thailand which contribute to
the Malaysian national interests, the Malaysian government tried to maintain
the mutual trust, bilateral trades and other cooperation. Through the period of
intense relations, the two Malaysian Prime Ministers, both Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi and Najib Tun Razak, still visited Thailand yearly, and sometimes
joined the trip to the southern provinces with Thai Prime Minister to
diplomatically express Malaysian recognitions on Thai sovereignty over the
southern provinces.

In addition to the regular visits of the country leaders, both countries
frequently exchanged the visits of the military leaders, the police, and senior
bureaucrats, to strengthen the bilateral trust and improve the cooperation,
especially on the security, aside from their regular meeting under the context
of the bilateral joint border committee and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) cooperation. Malaysian leaders also repeatedly affirmed their
respect on the Thai sovereignty and hold on with the non–interference
policy. 144
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Concerning the economic solution for the Thai–Muslim insurgency, both
countries set up the Joint Development Strategy (JDS) as a sub–regional
project to develop the economy of the Thai southern provinces and Malaysian
northern states. Despite all the disputes between the Prime Ministers, the JDS
was accelerated to merge with the Southern Seaboard Development Project of
Thailand, and its strategy was set to be complementary with the existing
development projects, such as the Indonesian–Malaysia–Thailand Growth
Triangle (IMT-GT), focusing to develop the transportation, tourism, fishery, and
human resource in the covered provinces. 145

On the security, the Malaysian government also exchanged the information of
census database to identify the people who held the dual–nationality. 146 The
Thai–Malaysian General Border Committee (GBC) met annually as usual. In
fact, they initiated the new cooperation as responses to the insurgency, such as
the joint patrol unit, 147 the intelligence cooperation and joint training of lawenforcement units. 148 The police department of the two countries increased the
cooperation on the drugs trafficking, illegal immigration, 149 human trafficking,
and illegal weapon trade.150 On the economy, both countries started the project
which aims to be the Halal food center of the world by utilizing the Thai
skill on food production and Malaysian marketing base in the Muslim
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countries.

In spite of some boycott against Thai products, the value of the Thai export
to Malaysia increased. In year 2004 when the insurgency started and was
followed by Tak–Bai incident, Thai export to Malaysia valued 5,789 Million
US Dollars, compared to 3,829 Million US Dollars in the previous year. And
after that the value of Thai export continuously rises to be 6,058 Million US
Dollars in 2005, and 7,159 Million US Dollars in 2006. 151 The value of
overall bilateral trade in 2004 increased as well, from 9,675 Million US
Dollars in 2003 to 12,130 US Dollars in 2004, 152 and rose to be 15,506
Million US Dollars in 2005, and 16,035 Million US Dollars in 2006. 153

On the transportation, the two countries also opened the second friendship
bridge which links Narathiwat province of Thailand with Kelantan State of
Malaysia. Namely, it links the sensitive areas of both countries together. 154 They
also opened the new border crossing point in Songkhla province of
Thailand, 155and opened the permanent border checkpoint through 24 hours in
Yala province. 156 The decision to facilitate the circulation of people and trade
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in this area shows the mutual confidence of the two countries.

In the end, to measure systematically whether and how much the Malaysian
policy was affected by the religious factor, the thesis adopted the indicator
from Joseph S Nye, Jr.’s book “Understanding International Conflicts : An
Introduction to Theory and History.” The indicator measures the degree of
interference by classifying the interference into eight levels. If Malaysia
interfered in the Thai-Muslim insurgency in favor of the Thai-Muslims in the
expense of the risk of the deteriorated bilateral relationship, the thesis takes
the action as affected from the religious factor, and the degree of the
influence of the religious factor is according to the degree of interference.

If measure with the indicator of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., through the years of the
Thai-Muslim insurgency, the Malaysian government’s policy could be
considered as interfering in favor of the Thai-Muslims only one time, which
was the condemnation of the Malaysian Parliament on Tak-Bai incident. And
the degree is the first level (speech).

Speeches
Low Coercion

Broadcasts

(high local choice)

Economic Aid
Military Advisers
Support Opposition
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Blockade
Limited Military Action
High Coercion

Military Invasion

(low local choice)
Source : Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts : An Introduction to
Theory and History, (New York, San Francisco, Boston : Longman, 2002), p. 154.

The Malaysian government protected the 130 Thai-Muslim refugees, (and
extradited one of them to the Thai authority). But according to the indicator, it
is not considered as the interference. Or at most, the Malaysian statement
insisting that it would return the refugees to Thailand, only when the Thai
government guaranteed their safety, which implied the Thai suppression against
Muslims, could be considered as interference, but it was only the first level of
interference.

The argument between Prime Minister Thaksin and Badawi on the Malaysian
involvement in the insurgents’s training could demonstrate the bilateral
conflict, but the Malaysian verbal response was not actually the interference,
because it reacted to protect Malaysia’s reputation itself. Most of all, it was
not intended to protect the Thai-Muslims. Thus, it cannot indicate the religious
factor on the Malaysian foreign policy.

In sum, if measured by Nye’s indicator, the Malaysian policy barely got the
influence from the religious factor, because it interfered in the insurgency to
protect the Thai-Muslims only once (or twice if consider the statement
concerning the refugees as interference) in the low degree.
98

On the other hand, the progress of the bilateral cooperation proves that the
Malaysian government pursued its policy in accordance with its national
interests which aims to foster the economic growth and regional stability, in
order to achieve the Malaysian national unity. With the convergence of
interests of the two countries, especially on economy and security, the basis of
the bilateral relations is still strong. Although the Malaysian government was
under pressure from PAS and other religious groups, it mainly chose to
preserve the relationship with Thailand which contributes to Malaysian core
values. Dato’ Nazirah Hussain, the Malaysian ambassador in Thailand, explained
that PAS can criticize the government, but the Thai–Muslim insurgency is the
political issue only in the Kelantan state, not the issue for the Malaysian
constituencies to consider in the national level. And in the end, “Whatever the
Malaysian government does, it must do for the national interests.” 157

Conclusion
The rage of some Malays (but not Malaysians) against the Thai government
stemmed from their religious and ethnic ties with the Thai-Muslims whom
they believed were suppressed. However, this does not mean that the Malays
in Malaysia still exactly hold on with the traditional identity which is based
on the religion and the ethnicity. The solidarity does not merely come from
the commonality of the religion and ethnicity. But it is how the religion and
the ethnicity are re-produced and presented under the paradigm of the
modern nation-state which made the Malays strongly feel that these identities
157
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need to be protected, because the identity relate to who they are, who belong
to their group and who are “others.” As discussed in the last chapter,
nationalism is actually about inclusion and exclusion, the framework that
defines a group of people as different from their neighbors. 158 The
commonality of the traditional identity under the thinking framework of
modern nation-state, makes the Malays consider the Thai-Muslims as the same
group of people (Muslims with Malay descents, speaking Malayu), although the
border of nation-state separated them apart.

After the establishment of nation-state of both Thailand and Malaysia, namely
after the borderline was drawn in 1909, the people of the two countries are
inculcated by the states to think of themselves as citizens of their nations. The
problem is in the Malaysian case, where Islam intertwines deeply with the
thinking framework of nation-state. The nationalism in Malaysia with the
Muslim-Malays as the core of the nation is also strongly promoted due to the
great influx of foreigners before its dependence, which is very recent when
compared to the long history of the country. So, when Islam and Malay
ethnicity associate with the Malay identity, even Malays perceive the situation
through the modern nation-state paradigm, they can still feel the religiousethnic ties with the Thai-Muslims, rather than the separated affairs between
“Thai” and “Malaysian” people.

On the other hand, with the identity of the citizen of a Malaysian nation-state,
the Muslim-Malays are reminded of their national interests too, even when
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they expressed the solidarity for the Thai-Muslims. Most of all, under the
framework of nation-state, Malaysians delegate their government the authority
to pursue the foreign policy for the country. And the Malaysian government, as
an agent which pursues the policy, appropriated the Islamist demand in the
balance with the other national interests, because preservation the national
interests in turn can judge the survival of the government. Furthermore, as
found in the part of Malaysian core values, Malaysia is not the nation of
Malays only. Almost half of the population comprises of Chinese, Indians, and
indigenous people. The utmost national interest, as a new-born nation with the
racial complex is the social harmony, which is achieved, according to
Malaysia’s strategy, through the equally-distributed economic development. The
internal security is also another Malaysia’s interest. Therefore, the peace and
stability in the region and the economic ties with Thailand need to be
maintained.

Therefore, when the issue of the Thai–Muslim insurgency rose, despite that the
issue was related to the Muslim solidarity, the Malaysian government weighed
the national interests, such as the economic growth, over the religious value.
However, when the Malaysian government maintained the close relationship
with Thailand, providing the security cooperation with the Thai government, it
had to balance the pressure from the religious groups. Therefore, the strategy
of the Malaysian government, as a Muslim country, toward the Thai-Muslim
insurgency was to “help” the Thai government to decrease the discontent of
the Thai-Muslims through the economic and educational programs. With this
strategy, the Malaysian government can claim that it somehow helped both the
Thai-Muslims and the Thai government. It imposed its own Islamic worldview
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that a real Muslim country can peacefully work with non-Muslim countries.
The Malaysian government’s discourse tried to dissolve the dichotomous
perception of the Malays on the situation in Thailand as the Buddhist
government against the Muslim minority. And the areas which it reached out
to provide the helps were mainly economy which conveyed the message to
the Malays that the insurgency is not purely a religious conflict.

This shows that the religion is actually neutral. But the politicians themselves
politicize the religion, giving it the political values. When the state imposed
nationalism to protect the Malay identity, a set of the religious interpretation
was affirmed. But when the state evolved, and needed the social harmony in
the domestic level, and the international cooperation in the regional level,
another set of the religious interpretation, such as Islam Hadhari, is promoted.
It means the religion and its influence on the policy is fluid according to the
changing domestic situation. And it is not the static independent variable on
setting a policy.

To conclude the finding, in the Malaysian case, the indispensable national
interests of Malaysia are the national unity and economic development which
the peace and stability in the region and the relations with Thailand contribute
to. Malaysia, as a new nation still has a problem on the national unity.
Therefore, the Malaysian government pursued the policy toward the ThaiMuslim insurgency by maintaining the close relations with Thailand, and
proceeding all cooperation as normal in order to preserve its own national
interests. In the same time, to cope with the Islamists, the Malaysian
government let them protest freely and interpreted the insurgency with the
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non-religious discourse. According to the indicator, overall the religion barely
affected the Malaysian policy, because the Malaysian government lowly
interfered in the Thai domestic affairs a few times only when the basic rights
of the Thai-Muslims were clearly violated. Hence, in the Malaysian case,
although the religion and ethnicity have their role on the foreign policy
sometimes, the Malaysian government, which is the agent to pursue the foreign
policy, appropriated the religious and ethnic factor with the framework of
nation-state which requires the foreign policy to respond to the national
interests as a whole, rather than to a specific ethno-religious group. And with
this framework, the national interests were prioritized over the religious factor
in pursuing the foreign policy.

CHAPTER 4
INDONESIA’ S POLICY TOWARD
THE THAI–MUSLIM INSURGENCY

Indonesia is the biggest Muslim country, with 177.5 Millions of Muslim
population. 159 But Islam in Indonesia is different from Islam in Malaysia in
term of the diversity and its implication on politics. Islam came to Indonesia
in the 14th century through the Arab, Persian and Indian merchants. 160 At that
time, Buddhism and Hinduism had been already practiced by the local people.
Therefore, when they adopted Islam, it was blended with the existing religions,
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including atheism and local traditions. Moreover, the archipelagic geography
made Islam observed differently in Indonesia, ranging from the strict Muslims
in Aceh to Sufi Muslims in Papua. Hence, Islam cannot effectively be the
common identity and ideology which binds Indonesians together as a nation
like the Indonesian Islamists assert. Moreover, Islamist parties have long been
suppressed under President Sukarno’s and President

Suharto’s regime.

However, the religion still exists in the society, therefore, it can influence
people’s worldview and political ideas.

Just like the Malaysian case, when the issue rises, the Indonesian government
has to assess the situation, weigh the interests, and issue the policy. This
chapter studies how the Indonesian government, as the biggest Muslim country,
deal with the Thai–Muslim insurgency, and how the religious values affect
the Thai–Indonesian relations.

The situation
When the Thai–Muslim insurgency broke out, Malaysia was the country which
the Thai government turned to most in an attempt to solve the problem, due
to the strong ties between the Thai–Muslims and Malay-Muslims in the area
and the geographical proximity of the two countries. Indonesia does not share
the border with Thailand. But after the violence intensified, Indonesia began to
involve.

On 28 April 2004, the Thai–Muslim insurgents attacked the police’s checking
point in Kreu–Sae district in Pattani province of Thailand. The police fought
against them and followed them to Kreu–Sae Mosque where they fled to hide
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inside. When the insurgents denied to surrender, the police opened fire into the
ancient mosque, and killed 30 insurgents inside. 161

As a response to the incident, 50 Indonesian Muslims met up with the Thai
ambassador in Jakarta to inquire about another 75 “lost” Muslims during the
clash at the mosque. They also asked for the permission to send the delegates
to observe the situation in Thailand. Some news agencies reported that they
declared to come to Thailand in order to launch “Jihad” to protect the Thai–
Muslims. But the Thai ambassador denied this part of the news reports. 162

When Thai soldiers arrested and piled up the bodies of the Thai–Muslim
protestors in the trucks which caused 78 of them to die from suffocation, the
Indonesian Islamic organizations condemned Thai authority’s excessive use of
force, and demanded the Thai government to investigated the incident.163 The
Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Malaysian Prime
Minister intended to question Prime Minister Thaksin about the incident
during the ASEAN Summit in 2004 in Laos, but Prime Minister Thaksin
threatened to walk out from the meeting. For that reason, the two leaders from
Muslim countries had to drop their questions. 164

Then Prime Minister Thaksin expressed his suspicion against Indonesians
travelling to Thailand. This suspicion was partly derived from the recent series
of terrorist acts in Indonesia, including the Bali Bombing in October 2002.
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Also in August 2003, the mastermind of the Bali Bombing and the Southeast
Asian leader of the al – Qaeda network, Riduan Issamuddin, or Hambali, was
arrested in Ayuthya, - the central province of Thailand, with the cooperation of
intelligence agencies from at least four countries, - the United States, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Thailand. 165 Later in November 2004, Thai police arrested another
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member, Usman U - Seng and his Indonesian wife in
Yala province of Thailand. 166

Prime Minister Thaksin began to link the Thai–Muslim insurgents with
Indonesia as the militants’ hiding place, after Malaysia. 167 He claimed further that
the Thai–Muslim insurgents learnt to use the violence as the fighting strategy
from Indonesia. Although Prime Minister Thaksin did not blame the Indonesian
government directly, (Rather, his suspicion was against the terrorists based in
Indonesia), his allegation tarnished Indonesia’s image for being the regional
base for terrorists.

Although the dispute of the two leaders was not as severe as the Thai–
Malaysian case, the Indonesian government was in the similar position with
the Malaysian government in the sense that its constituencies clearly expressed
the anger against the Thai government for oppressing the Thai–Muslims, while
the Indonesian government had its interests in maintaining the good relations
with Thailand, both on the bilateral and regional level. To decide what policy
Indonesia should pursue, the Indonesian government needed to estimate first
165
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how the situation affected its indispensable interests or core values.

Indonesia’s core values
To identify the core values of Indonesia, this chapter will study the Pancasila
ideology, the Indonesian Constitution, the Indonesian Medium–Term
Development Plan, and the Indonesian White Paper or its defense plan.
A ) Pancasila
Pancasila is Indonesia’s national ideology. It is the basis of every following
national policy and plan. In the same time, it reflects the contestation between
the secular nationalists and the Islamists appearing since the country was
established in 1945.

Under the Dutch colonization, “Sarekat Islam”, the Indonesian Islamist and
nationalist organization, was the first group which led the mass to demand for
Indonesia’s independence. The group combined nationalism and Islam together
with the belief that Islam could transcend all ethnicities and classes, and bring
about the national unity on fighting with the Dutch for their independence. 168
(It is noteworthy that according to the initial belief of Indonesian Islamists,
Islam can be a tool to serve the political purpose. They accepted the concept
of nation–state.)

Although Sarekat Islam disintegrated very soon because of the ideological
difference of its leaders, the next generation of Indonesian Islamists carried on
the idea of using Islam to unite people and establishing an Islamic State.
However, the secular Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai National Indonesia or
168

Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, (Athens : Ohio University Press, 2003), p. 16.

107

PNI) which emerged later, led by President Sukarno, disagreed with the
Islamists. He stated that “If an Islamic state is created in Indonesia, then … the
problem of minorities will arise, the problem of small religious groups, of
Christians and others … small religious groups will certainly not be able to
feel involved in the state. 169”

But President Sukarno did not mind working with the Islamists to establish
the independence Indonesia, hence, he proposed Pancasila as the compromise
between the two trends of ideologies. Pancasila does not directly mention
Islam, but it contains the Islamic essence in its principles. Five principles of
Pancasila are
1 ) Belief in One Supreme God
2 ) Just and civilized humanity
3 ) The unity of Indonesia
4 ) Democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom of its leaders
5 ) Social justice for the entire people of Indonesia 170

The first principle of Pancasila includes both Islamic and Christian beliefs
which together constitute more than 90 % of all Indonesian population. 171 Other
principles lay down the ideology needed for creating the harmonious society
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composed of many ethnicities and religions.

President Sukarno disagreed with the Indonesian Islamists because of the
religious difference in the country, but the diversity among Indonesians is not
just the religion. The country consists of 17,800 islands. People of more than 5
ethnicities 172 (categorized into more than 500 sub–ethnic groups173), speak over
525 languages. 174 As mentioned earlier that even among Muslims themselves,
they practice Islam differently. Islam spread through Indonesia via the marine
route from the West to the East, beginning the first contact in Aceh.
Therefore, Muslims in the Eastern provinces, like Aceh, tend to observe
Islam more strictly than Muslims in the eastern provinces. 175 And Muslims
living in the coastal areas are more exposed to Islam than ones who live
deep inside the islands. 176 Islam is also observed in combination with
Buddhism, Hinduism, and local traditions. As a result, Indonesian Muslims
comfortably venerate some apostles (wali), the supernatural power of some
individuals, and the magical power. 177
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In the general analysis, Indonesian Muslims’ engagement in politics are
described through the Abanagan-Santri dichotomy. “Abangan” Muslims are
nominal or less serious Muslims, for example, President Sukarno and President
Suharto who both comes from the military background. As for “Santri “
Muslims, they are traditional Muslims who tend to hold on with the
fundamental and legal requirements of Islam 178, for example, President
Abdulrahman Wahid.

With the high linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity of Indonesians, the
objective of creating a plural society which will guarantee the national unity
reflects in Pancasila ideology. Likewise, the Indonesian national motto is
“Bhinnea Tunggal Ika” which means “Unity in Diversity.” 179

However, not all Islamists accepted Pancasila. Sekarmadji Maridjan
Kartosuwirjo was a Javanese Islamists who denied Pancasila, and declared the
Islamic State of Indonesia in August 1949, with the Shariah–based constitution.
He provoked Muslims to declare Jihad under “the Darul Islam Movement” in
177
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Western Java. Although the movement was heavily suppressed by the
government, and he was executed, his idea lives on, and evolves to be
Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) today. 180
B) The Indonesian Constitution
Regarding the foreign policy analysis, the Indonesian Constitution can signify
the country’s outlook on what could be the threat, what is its core values and
how it wants to position itself in the world community.

With the bitter experience from the Dutch colonization, the Indonesian
government has strong will to preserve its sovereignty. In the preamble of the
Constitution, it reads, “all colonialism must be abolished” The will to preserve
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity states in the first article. Article
1 (1) reads “The State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state in the form of a
republic.” And Article 1 (2) reads “Sovereignty is in the hands of the people
and is implemented according to this Constitution.” This idea becomes the key
principle of Indonesian foreign policy, which is “Bebas – Aktiv”, or
independence and active.

The country denies to be destined by other countries. Mohammad Hatta who
was the first vice president and declared Pancasila with President Sukarno
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said that this principle is the “unchallengeable doctrinal basis of foreign
policy.” 181

Due to Indonesia’s archipelagic geography, in which the foreign forces could
easily penetrate into its territory, and its local province could possibly separate
itself from the central government, the territorial integrity becomes Indonesia’s
another core value. Article 25 E states that “The Unitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia shall be an archipelago nation with the concept of Nusantara in
character that has a territory with borders and right regulated by laws 182” This
principle of Nusantara in the Constitution later opened for Indonesia to
declare the “Archipelago Concept” as another principle of its foreign policy.
The Indonesian government declared that “all waters, surrounding between and
connecting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension of breadth, are
integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and, therefore part of the
internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the
Indonesian state. 183” In 1973, Indonesia affirmed its sovereignty over the sea
territory again when the Indonesian Assembly passed “Wawasan Nusantara” or
“the Archipelago Outlook” which deems the seawater and the land as one
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entity. 184 Hence, it provides the Indonesian government the jurisdiction claim
over all straits and sea–route between the islands.

Concerning the territorial integrity, although the Constitution sets Indonesia to
be a republic state, Article 18 (5) of the Constitution binds the regional
authorities to the central government, stating that “the regional authorizes shall
exercise wide–ranging autonomy, except in matters specified by law to be the
affairs of the central government.” In the same time, with the guideline of
Pancasila which seeks for the national unity, the Constitution requires the
central government to recognize the diversity and exclusivity of its regional
provinces. Article 18 B states that “The state recognizes and respects traditional
communities along with their traditional customary rights as long as these
remain in existence and are in accordance with the societal development and
the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.” It is
noteworthy that the constitution repeatedly refers to the country as “the
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.”

As for the status of the religion in the state, Article 29 of the Constitution
complies with Pancasila principle by not directly stating the Islamic religion.
But it affirms the recognition for theism. Article 29 (1) reads “The State shall
be based upon the belief in the One and Only God.” In the same time, Article
184
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29 (2) accepts the freedom of religious beliefs. It reads “ The State guarantees
all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or
belief.” Therefore, Indonesia positions itself as neither theocratic nor secular
state 185 as a result of the compromise between the Abagan nationalists and
Satri Islamists.

However, there is another compromise on the status of religion which causes
the political conflict until today. When the preamble of the Constitution was
drafted, the first principle of Pancasila was initially declared along with the
Muslim obligation to Shariah as follows “Belief in One Almighty God with
the obligation to implement the shariah for adherents of Islam. 186” The
Constitution also initially required the president to be Muslim. But due to the
objection of the Protestant and Catholic leaders, the nationalists decided to
omit the clause requiring Shariah to be enforced (printed in italic letters
above) and omit the requirement on the religious qualification of the President.
The dismissal of Shariah implementation resulted in the disappointment of
Islamists. Nowadays, although the Islamic parties give up on the idea of
establishing an Islamic state, they still demand the revival of the clause 187
185
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which is known as the Jakarta Charter.

The reason behind the compromise reveals another core value of Indonesia.
Muhammad Hatta, the first Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, who along
with President Sukarno, decided to omit the clause, explained that, in spite of
the risk of the anger from the Islamists, the change was necessary to preserve
the unity of the nation composed of many different adherents. 188 The adjusted
version of the Constitution would be more acceptable for the non–Muslims
in the country. President Sukarno himself rejected to adopt Islam as the
basis of the State, because “the state we are building … is a national state
consisting of all Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas
whose population is not Muslim will secede. 189”

Hence, to conclude from the study on the Indonesian Constitution, the core
values which Indonesia needs to protect and become the priority on deciding
the policy, are the sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the national unity,
which are not different from other new–born states where the process of
nation–building is not completed.

C ) Indonesia’s Medium Term Development Plan 2004–2009
188
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For the new nation-state, the possible threats can originate from inside due to
the lack of the sense of the unity, especially the country with high diversity
like Indonesia. Even today, Indonesia still faces security problems from
separatists and religious fanatics. The government believes that the
secessionism results from the unequal economic development. In return, the
legitimacy of the central government is based on its performance on
improving the well–being of the people as well. 190

Hence, to achieve the national unity and the territorial integrity, the Indonesian
government sees the development as a strategy. 191 As a result, the development
plan of Indonesia does not focus on the economic growth only. It envisions
how the Indonesian society should be and plans to develop the rural area,
such as Aceh, rather than the center of the country.

When the Thai–Muslim insurgency began, Indonesia was implementing the
National Medium–Term Development Plan (RPJMN) for 2004–2009. This plan
pursues the goal of the National Development Programme for 2000–2004
which aims Indonesian society to be “peaceful, democratic, just, competitive,
advanced and prosperous.192” With the recognition on the security threats in
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Aceh, Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Papua, 193 “Developing a democratic
political system and maintaining national unity 194” is set as the first priority of
the National Development Programme for 2000-2004.

As for the Indonesia’s Medium – Term Development Plan 2004 – 2009, it sets
three agendas as the goals, which are
- Creating Indonesia that is safe and peaceful.
In order to resolve the regional and sectarian conflicts, Indonesian government
plans to work with the civil society to outline the conflict resolution strategy.
- Establishing justice and democracy for all citizens
In order to create the communal trust in the government, and the law–
enforcement in particular, the government aims to pursue the judiciary and
bureaucracy reform to eliminate the corruption.
- Improving the welfare for all citizens and dealing with economic and
social sector policies and programs
In order to improve the administration, the government will clarify the duties
of the central and regional governments, while strengthening the governmental
and legislative institutions in the regions and seeking for the public
participation in the political process. 195
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With regard to the economic development, the plan aims to create more jobs
through the investment, export, tourism, and human resource improvement to
achieve the sustainable poverty eradication. However, the main agendas of the
development plan turns to concern more on the political dimension, especially
improving the relationship between the state and its citizens.

The central government’s effort to outreach to its citizens in the remote areas
is obvious in the plan. The difference on the strategies of the present
government and the authoritarian government in the past is that the present
government adopts the more democratic strategy, such as the co–operation with
the civil society, in order to win people’ s heart, however, the utmost objective
is still the same which is to maintain the national unity and territorial
integrity.
D ) The White Paper of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia
The White Paper indicates the main threats against Indonesia. And its
perspective goes in line with the development plan in the sense that the
majority of its threats are non–traditional threats, either domestic or
transnational, such as, separatism, terrorism, radicalism, cross-border crimes, and
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communal conflicts. 196 (Also, some of these problems are recognized in
Pancasila Principle and the Constitution.)

The White Paper foresees that the traditional threat, like the invasion from
other countries, is very unlikely. Rather, it clearly expresses its concern on its
own “radical” people, and believes that the globalization can influence the
people to stray from Indonesian societal norms, and eventually weaken the
unity of the nation. 197 Consequently, based on these urgent threats, the White
Paper defines that Indonesia’s national interests is to guarantee the welfare
of all Indonesian people 198 in order to affirm the legitimacy of the central
government. Thus, the Indonesian Defense Plan indicates the unity of the
nation and its sovereignty as the permanent national interests or the core
values as well.

The White Paper addresses the modern threats, such as terrorism, and relates it
to both external and internal factors. Therefore, as a part of defense policies,
Indonesia needs to establish the good relationship with other countries 199 to
consolidate the mutual trust, foster the co–operation on resolving the security
problems, and enhancing the global and regional stability. And to maintain the
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good relationship with the neighbors in the region, Indonesia needs to hold on
with the principles of equal rights, mutual respect and non–interference. 200
Indonesia’s core values
To draw the conclusion from the study on the Indonesian ideology,
constitution and its development and defense plans, Indonesia’s core interests
which must be its priority, when a foreign policy is designed, can be described
as follows,

A ) The national unity and territorial integrity
The problem of national unity emerged since the birth of the Indonesian
nation–state. As mentioned earlier that although majority of the nationalists and
Islamists accepted Pancasila Principle as the political compromise, some
Islamists totally rejected the principle and declared the Indonesian Islamic
state against President Sukarno’s government.201 Furthermore, the Islamists, led
by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, had their own armies, which launched
the fight against the government longer than a decade.

In addition to the resistance from the Islamists, the Indonesian government
also continuously confronts with the separatists in Aceh (Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement or GAM), separatists in West Papua (Free
Papua Movement), and when Indonesian government annexed East Timor in
1975, it faced with the resistance from Fretilin.
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As for the internal religious conflict, clashes between Muslims and Christians
always erupted in Sulawesi. Although the government set up the Inter–
Religious Consultation Forum in 1967 to hold the discussion between the
religious leaders, 202 the problem has never been completely resolved. Concerning
the internal racial conflict, many Chinese living in Indonesia were doubted for
their loyalty. Just like in Malaysia, the local Indonesians were uncertain to
grant the citizenship to them. 203 After the Communist Party of China expanded
their political influence into Southeast Asia, many Chinese Indonesians were
the member of the Communist Party in Indonesia which, along with
Indonesians’ resentment against the dominant economic role of Chinese
minority, brought about the worst racial riot against Chinese in 1965, 204 right
after President Suharto had seized the power from President Sukarno. Even
now, Chinese are still the victims in many riots, as seen during the national
disorder after President Suharto resigned in 1998.

With the security threats from the Islamists, secessionism, and the internal
conflicts, so far, Indonesia can exists as a unitary nation–state owing largely
to the dictatorial governments under President Sukarno and President Suharto’s
administration. During the era of the both presidents, the troop suppressed the
separatist groups. All civil servants were required to be members of Golkar,
the governmental party, and it was the only party which was allowed to
operate below the district level. 205 President Suharto forced the few existing
202
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Islamic parties to merge into one party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(PPP or the United Development Party) which had no real political influence
on the government. 206 Later, he required all Islamic organizations and party to
adopt Pancasila as their basis, in return for not being banned, 207 to make sure
that the organizations would not done anything against the regime.

Because all political agencies had been under the strict control of the regime,
when the regime’s suddenly broke down in 1998 after the Asian financial
crisis, Indonesia was close to be a failed state. Losing East Timor was a clear
example. After that, the Indonesian government has to struggle hard to keep
the country united. Although the political situation is now stable, the objectives
of Indonesian development and defense plan proves that the national unity and
territorial integrity are still Indonesia’s core values.

B ) Sovereignty
As mentioned already that Indonesia has high concern on its sovereignty,
because of its bitter history under the Dutch colonization and its archipelagic
geography which makes the country easy to be penetrated. As already
happened in the past, Malaya (presently, Malaysia) and Singapore provided the
financial and arms assistance and the operational base to the Indonesian rebels
against the Indonesian government. 208 Although now the Indonesian relations
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with its neighbors improves, the Indonesian government still acknowledges its
disadvantaged geographic features. Moreover, Indonesia is located on the main
sea–route of the world which means it cannot avoid thousands of foreign
ships navigating through its territorial water daily.

To protect its sovereignty over the sea territory, the Indonesian government
declared the “Archipelago Concept” since 1957 to claim its sovereignty over
the territorial water between and around its islands equally with its
sovereignty over the land. As for the domestic level, Indonesia issued the
Indonesian Territorial Law in 1960 and the Continental Shelf Law in 1969
which secure the 3,166,163 square kilometers of the sea territory under
Indonesia’s sovereignty. 209

In addition to the legislative measures, the Indonesian government also
strengthen the bilateral relations with its neighbors and participate in the
regional cooperation in order to secure its own border. When Malaya
(presently, Malaysia) was firstly established, President Sukarno perceived it as a
threat, because both countries had the overlapping claims on the sea and land
border. But after President Suharto became the president, both countries solved
the problem through the diplomatic relations, and they achieved the Border
Crossing Agreement in 1967 210 which set up the bilateral cooperation on the
checkpoints at the border.

209

Leo Suryadinata, Determinants of Indonesia’ s Foreign Policy : In Search of an Explanation,
Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1993, pp. 15 - 16.
210
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice : Material
and Ideational Influences, (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 507.

123

In the regional level, the Indonesian government asserted its agenda through
ASEAN to preserve its sovereignty. Through the Bangkok Declaration which
established ASEAN in 1967, the Indonesian government, along with other
founding members, laid the codes of conduct of ASEAN, by which the
member countries shall interact with each other. And the main principles are
non–interference in each other’s domestic affairs and mutual respect on the
members’ territorial integrity and sovereignty. 211 Thus, the assistance from
Malaya and Singapore for the Indonesian rebels was subdued. To resist the
western imperialism, the Indonesian government also insisted in the Declaration
that the foreign military bases can exist in the region with only the consent
of the host country, and they can stay only temporarily. Most of all, these
bases cannot be used against any ASEAN members. 212 In 1976, the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) under ASEAN context abided the member
countries not to use force against one another, when the conflict arises, 213 in
order to guarantee the regional stability.

With the long diplomatic works of the Indonesian government, nowadays, it is
almost impossible that Indonesia would face the direct invasion from its
neighbors, but sovereignty is still its permanent core value in pursuing the
foreign policy.

C ) The economic development
As mentioned above that since the era of New Order under President
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Suharto’s administration, the Indonesian governments believe that the
separatism is the result of the uneven economic development. Therefore, the
government tends to emphasize the development in the areas where the
political conflicts persist. Although the Indonesian economy recovered from the
Asian financial crisis in 1997, the unemployment rate and inflation rate are
still high. 214 The oil’s price control policy causes the foreign debt to reach
75,000 Million US Dollars in 2005. 215 The terrorism also hinders the growth
of the tourism and the foreign investment.216 Although the GDP of Indonesia
grows continuously, the percentage of people living in poverty is still high. A
year before the Thai–Muslim insurgency erupted, around 37.2 Million of
Indonesian (17.4 % of the whole population) living in poverty. 217 In 2009, the
figure slightly declined, which is 14.2 %, but this means the development plan
failed to achieve its goal which aims to reduce the poverty rate to 8.2 %.218
The perpetuated national poverty and the on–going threat from the separatist
groups make the development another core value of Indonesia.

D ) The internal security
After 9/11 incident, the internal security in Indonesia dramatically changed. In
October 2002, two nightclubs in Bali Island were bombed which killed 202
foreign tourists. But the lawsuit took 6 years to execute the wrongdoers 219 due
to many appeals and the political–religious pressure in the country. Likewise,
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Abu Bakar Bashir, the religious teacher, who was alleged as a spiritual leader
of Jamaah Islamiya or JI, which was the group that planned the bombing, was
arrested, but his term of punishment was reduced many times. 220 Finally, he was
released after only two years of imprisonment. 221

In the past decade, Indonesia has suffered from many terrorist acts. In 2003,
JW Mariott Hotel in Jakarta was bombed by JI members. 222 Few years later,
the Australian embassy in Jakarta was bombed again by the same group. 223
And Bali was bombed again in October 2005 by the former JI member who
separated himself from the group.224

The on–going sabotages in Indonesia can deteriorate the national security,
economic growth, and human security. Therefore, the government issued the anti
– terrorism law in 2002, and adjusted it many times to provide more authority
for the police and the soldiers 225 to fight with the terrorist groups. President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono himself aims to fight with terrorism on both
domestic and international level. 226 However, JI cells still subsist in the country
and intimidate the national security, as the Defense Plan indicates above.

The Thai – Muslim insurgency and its impact on Indonesia’s core interests
Coincidentally, the problem of the Thai–Muslim insurgency of Thailand can be
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related to the security problem of Indonesia. Both the Thai–Muslim insurgents
and Jamaah Islamiya have the same ideology which is the establishment of
the great Islamic state in the region. The territory of the Islamic state,
according to JI, would include Indonesia, Malaysia, the south of the Philippines,
Singapore, Brunei, and the south of Thailand. 227 This is why the members and
the operational areas of JI expand in many Southeast Asian countries. In the
same time, the Great Malay Patani of the Thai–Muslim insurgents composes of
the three Thai southern provinces and Kelantan State of Malaysia. 228 With the
similarity of their ideology and objective, the military capacity of each group
could inspire or encourage the member of other groups in the region. With
this convergence of the security interest, the Indonesian and Thai governments
have long cooperated on combating the terrorism in the region.

In addition to the security dimension, the Thai–Muslim insurgency could affect
Indonesia’s economic core values. The expansion of violence from the south
of Thailand can destroy the peace and stability in the region which definitely
harms the economic growth of Indonesia. The expanding insurgency would
discourage the foreign investors, obstruct the intra–regional trade, drive away
the tourists, and intimidate the safety of sea–route of Southeast Asia.

The suspicion of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra against Indonesians
can also sour the bilateral relationship through which both countries have
enjoyed the growing bilateral trade and investment, the energy cooperation, the
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educational exchange, and the sharing on the economic and security
information.

On the other hand, the Indonesian government relies on Muslim constituencies.
And some Indonesians clearly expressed their discontent by protesting against
the Thai government after Kreu–Sae Mousque and Tak–Bai incidents. The
Indonesian government could step up to protect the Thai–Muslim fellows in
order to affirm its Islamic credentials, but it would be on the expense of the
bilateral relationship of Indonesia and Thailand.

Indonesia’s policy toward the Thai–Muslim insurgency
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia addresses three primary
objectives on setting its foreign policy. These primary objectives are,
1 ) To support national development with priority on economic development,
as set out in the Five–Year Development Plan
2 ) To preserve internal and regional stability conductive to national
development
3 ) To protect the territorial integrity of Indonesia and safeguard the people’s
place of abode 229

It is noteworthy that although Indonesia positions itself as neither theocratic
nor secular state, the objectives of its foreign policy can speak for itself that
Indonesia is a very secular state. Two of the three objectives seek to promote
the national development. And none of them mentions the religious values.
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To achieve the three objectives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lays eight
outlines of foreign relations. Among the eight outlines are, for example
1 ) Foreign relations shall be conducted on the basis of the independent and
active foreign policy and dedicated to the national interest, especially to
supporting national development
2 ) International relations should aim to strengthen international and regional
friendly relations and co–operation through various multilateral and regional
channels, in accordance with the national interest and potentials
3) Any international developments and changes shall be watched carefully
in order that the appropriate steps can be promptly taken to protect national
stability and development from any possible negative impact
4) Indonesia’s international role in promoting and strengthening friendly
relations and mutual beneficial co–operation among nations should be
intensified. 230
Again, the outlines of the foreign policy revolve around the national interests,
especially the national stability and development. When the issue of the Thai–
Muslim insurgency rose, the Indonesian national interests were harmed,
especially the internal security and the economic growth. As discussed above
that Indonesia and Thailand have the common interests on the regional
security and economic development, therefore the Indonesian government
230
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generally chose to maintain the good relationship with Thailand. But the
Indonesian government also had to balance the policy with the religious factor
sometimes.

In the beginning of the insurgency, the Thai army suppressed the insurgents
with the violence. The killing at Kreu-Sae mosque led to the protest by 50
Indonesians to the Thai ambassador in Jakarta. 231 Just like the Malaysian
government, the Indonesian government allowed the Indonesians to protest
freely. But in the same time, the Indonesian ambassador in Bangkok joined the
trip held by the Thai government to visit the southern provinces of Thailand 232
which demonstrated the Indonesian diplomatic recognition for the Thai
sovereignty over the southern provinces.

After Tak-Bai incident, the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
along with the Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, intended to
inquire the Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Sinawatra about the incident during
the ASEAN Summit in Laos. But Prime Minister Thaksin threatened to walk
out from the summit if a question about the incident was risen, consequently
the question was dropped.233 But Indonesians knew that the inquiry would not
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be serious. Their president just acted politically to respond to the sympathy of
Indonesians for the Thai-Muslims. Jakarta Post, the influential newspaper of
Indonesia, commented about the inquiry that “If Thaksin had simply briefed
the summit for a few minutes … , there is little doubt that the meeting would
have come out with a statement of regional support for Thailand’s effort to
resolve the matter.234”

The bilateral relations was affected once more when Prime Minister Thaksin
claimed in his radio show that the Thai–Muslim insurgents adopted the use of
violence as the political strategy from Indonesia. 235 This prompted Juwono
Sudarsono, the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia to demand Prime Minister
Thaksin to provide the evidence on the allegation, otherwise the Indonesian
government would submit the objection to the Thai government. He
complained that the Thai Prime Minister should not have associated Malaysia
and Indonesia with the insurgency, because the separatists exist not merely in
Thailand and Indonesia, but also in other parts of the world. 236 However, it
should be noted that, not different from the Malaysian case, the argument from
Indonesian politicians was to protect the country’s reputation and government’s
popularity, rather than the religious values.
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But after the conflicts passed, the Indonesian government continued the even
closer relationship with Thailand. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited
Thailand in December 2005, 237 (when Prime Minister Thaksin, whose
administration was responsible for both Kreu-Sea mosque and Tak-Bai
incidents and who alleged against Indonesia about the insurgency, was still in
the office.) In return, President Yudhoyono welcomed three Thai Prime
Ministers during the time of the on-going insurgency. 238

Not different from the Malaysian government, the Indonesian government
interpreted the insurgency with the non-religious discourse. It positioned itself
as one who can help both the Thai government and the Thai-Muslims. And its
situation is much easier than that of the Malaysian government, because the
Islamic organizations in Indonesia presented themselves as the moderate
Muslims in the global level, and they actually worked with the Thai
government to “correct” the Islamic education in Thailand.

With the Thai government’s initiative, Hasyim Muzadi, the leader of Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), the biggest Muslim organization in Indonesia, was invited to visit
the Thai three southern provinces and talk with the clerics, local leaders,
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people, and governmental officials there. When he returned to Indonesia, he
addressed the poverty and education as the causes of the insurgency, not the
religion. According to him, “ … there were parties who wanted to give the
conflict a religious color. True religion-based conflict is rare. Actually, what
usually happens is a misunderstanding of a religion’s teachings and the misuse
of it. It would be better to improve the education and address poverty in the
south as well as uphold social justice. 239” Most of all, he objected the use of
violence. He urged both the Thai government and the clerics in the southern
provinces to stop violence, as acts of terror only invite more terror. 240

As for Muhammadiyah which is the second largest Muslim organization in
Indonesia, Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of the organization, was invited to
Thailand in 2007, and he returned to Indonesia with the perception similar to
that of NU leader. He insisted not to interfere in the Thai domestic affairs, but
his organization can “help” to empower the Thai-Muslims on the education,
health and economy. Again, he did not believe that the religion is a root-cause
of the conflict. He said “… it should come along with efforts to reduce the
wealth gap … conflicts do not always have religious motives, but more social
and political factor. Sometimes, religion is only used as a justification. 241” Later,
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he sent the rectors of six Muhammadiyah universities to visit the Thai
southern provinces, and offered scholarships to Thai-Muslim students to study
in the organization’s universities 242 in order to improve the Islamic
understanding in Thailand.

The media in Indonesia also presented the news in the way that helped the
government pursue the constructive policy easier. While “Berita Harian” a
major Malay-language newspaper carried a banner “World condemns Thailand :
Excessive use of force against Muslim 243” and another Malaysian newspaper,
reported “the Thai government now surpasses Israel’ s record of aggression
against Muslims, 244” the Indonesian media reported the incident with the softer
tone, such as “Moderate Muslims fight radicalism in Thai South245” which
reported on how a Thai Islamic teacher tried to fight with the radical
Muslims through the education. Another report “Southern Thailand Conflicts : A
Rare Perspective” found that a member of Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) faction
really went to the southern provinces of Thailand to expand the organization’s
241
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operational area. 246

The stance of both the Islamic organizations and the media did not put the
pressure on the Indonesian government at all. Therefore, the government barely
needed to balance between the religious factor and the national interests. The
reason is revealed when compare between Islam in Indonesia and in Malaysia.
Islam in Indonesia has the different character and function. Not only it is
more diverse than in Malaysia, but also it is not a part of Indonesian
nationalism. As already discussed in the last chapter that the Malays countered
with the great influx of the foreign immigrants before its independence,
therefore, they felt the urgency to protect the Malay identity. Since the Islamic
religion and Malay ethnicity are used to symbolize the national identity, the
Malaysian politics, as Shanti Nair suggests, revolves around the concept of
protection, either protection of Islam or protection of Malays. 247

On the contrary, in Indonesia the ethnicities are very various through the
archipelago. A person’s identity is based on their place of origin and mother
tongue rather than on physical traits or religion, as in Malaysia. 248 Although the
Islamic beliefs lay the ground for Pancasila, the Indonesians do not feel as
246
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strongly as Malaysians that Islam is a part of their national identity, and
accordingly needs to be particularly protected. Moreover, the diversity of the
religious practices in Indonesia moulds the Muslim-Indonesians to be
tolerant. 249 Rizal Sukma noticed that with this social circumstances, Islam in
Indonesia works as the constraining factor on the government’s policy rather
than as a motivation or goal of the policy. 250

Most of all, Indonesia was, (and perhaps is) in the same position with
Thailand. As discussed above that the core values of Indonesia are sovereignty
and national unity. The biggest concern of the Indonesian government (and
Indonesians who believe in their nation-state) was the Aceh separation. Both
Indonesian media and politicians always referred to their Aceh case when they
discussed on the Thai-Muslim insurgency, for example, Yuri Thamrin, the
Indonesian Foreign Ministry director for East Asia and Pacific Affairs,
expressed the support for the peace solution of the Thai government, “We will
support a peaceful solution within the framework of Thailand’s territorial
integration as we have had some similar experience, such as finding a solution
to the conflict in Aceh. 251”
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Furthermore, the Indonesians cannot fully condemn the Thai government for
the unequal development in the south or even violating the human rights of
the Thai-Muslims, because the Indonesian government actually has done the
same thing to Acehnese, Papuans and people in other far provinces. The worst
is that in the Indonesian case, the government of the most populous Muslim
country deprived of the natural resources and suppressed against the fellow
Muslims themselves. Hence, with the separatists in many provinces, Indonesians
tended to be more understanding in Thailand’s complicated situation than
Malays did, and they perceived the separatist problem through the politicoeconomic worldview, rather than the religious approach.

Thus, in the time that no severe human rights violation occurred in the South
of Thailand, the Indonesian stance turned to be consultative. The Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono advised the Thai Prime Minister,
Surayud Chulanont, that from Indonesian experience in Aceh, he learnt that the
military forces would not solve any problem. 252 The president also informed
the succeeding Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva that Indonesia set up the
committee which can help on the Thai government’s project regarding the
professional training in the south, or provide the scholarship for the Thai–

252

Supapan Tuangtrongpirote, “The Republic of Indonesia,” in Asia Yearbook 2007/2550, ( Bangkok
: Chulalongkorn University Press, 2007 ), p. 196.

137

Muslim students. 253

Moreover, the Indonesian Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, mediated the talk between
the representatives from the three Thai provinces and General Kwanchat
Klaharn, the former chief of the Thai fourth Army and the former consultant
of the Thai Minister of Defense, at the presidential palace in Bogor, Indonesia,
in September 2008.254 However, the talk did not achieve any result, because it
was reported on the local and world media before all the talk sessions would
be completed.

As stated above that the real policy would reveal through the real practices.
The continuation of the cooperation between Thailand and Indonesia confirms
that the relations of both countries was strong, and the Indonesian government
pursued the policy to preserve its national interests, especially the economic
development and internal security, with the slight effect from the religious
factor.

One year after Tak–Bai incident, while Prime Minister Thaksin was still in the
office, President Yudhoyono visited Thailand, and seek for more bilateral
cooperation, such as, more Thai investment on the Indonesian natural gas
development, the medical information exchange on the bird flu and the
253
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vaccine, the security cooperation against the transnational crimes and pirates on
the sea–route, and increasing the value of bilateral trade and investment. The
Indonesian and Thai governments also reached the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on the agricultural cooperation. The Indonesian
government also extended the concession for Thai fishery in the Indonesian
sea territory. 255

When Thai Prime Minister Samak Sudharavej visited Indonesia, President
Yudhoyono agreed to import more rice from Thailand, allowed Thai fishery in
Indonesia, and granted scholarships for 400 – 500 Thai Muslim students. In
return, the Thai government agreed to buy LPG gas from Indonesia for one
million tons per year, and invest on the sea food processing factories, including
transferring the technology in this field to Indonesia. 256 After the succeeding
Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva visited Indonesia in March 2008, he
came back with the agreement on the intelligence cooperation with
Indonesia. 257

In 2010, despite the on-going fighting in the south of Thailand, the ThaiIndonesian relations got stronger. The Joint Commission of both countries
concluded the MOU on fishery cooperation, the bilateral trade agreement,
255
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setting up the universities’ network, and intelligence sharing. 258

As for the bilateral trade, it got no interruption from the Thai–Muslim
insurgency either. In 2004, when the Thai–Muslim insurgency erupted, and the
Thai government suppressed it with violence, Indonesia imported more Thai
products than the previous year for 62.9 %. Namely, in year 2003, the value of
Indonesian import from Thailand was around 1,701.7 Million US Dollars, and
it increased to be 2,771.6 Million US Dollars in 2004. It continually increased
to be 3,447 Million US Dollars in 2005, and slightly dropped to be 2,983
Million US Dollars in 2006. 259 As for the investment, Thai investment in
Indonesia boosted to be 200 Million US Dollars in 2010, and is predicted to
triple within the next five years. 260

In the global level, the Indonesian representative in the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) helped the Thai representative team to negotiate with other
Islamic member countries to agree that the insurgency did not result from the
religious conflict. The Conference supported the Thai government and insisted
not to interfere in the Thai domestic affairs. 261
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In sum, if measure the influence of the religion on the Indonesian foreign
policy by the indicator (please refer to the table on page 22 of the first
chapter), considering any interference in the Thai domestic affairs in favor of
the Thai-Muslims on the expense of the bilateral relations as the result of the
religious factor, then it is found that the Indonesian foreign policy was even
less affected by the religious factor than the Malaysian foreign policy.

The Indonesian President intended to inquire the Thai Prime Minister on the
Tak-Bai incident, but he drop the question. He discussed and advised about the
insurgency with many Thai Prime Ministers, but according to the indicator, the
lowest level of interference is launching the speech against other state, which
the Indonesian government did not do so in this case. The Indonesian
objection on the Thai allegation claiming that Indonesia was a source of the
radicals cannot be considered as the interference driven from the religious
factor, since the reaction was actually to protect the country’s reputation as a
moderate Muslim country. Therefore, to conclude based on this indicator, the
Indonesian policy toward Thailand was not affected by the religious factor.

On the other hand, if consider from the continuation of all bilateral projects, it
can be concluded in the same way that the Thai–Indonesian relations were
not affected by the Thai–Muslim insurgency. This is because the bilateral
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relations are necessary to promote Indonesia’s national interests, especially the
economic development. Furthermore, Indonesia needs to hold on with the non–
interference principle of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
because the principle is the shelter to protect Indonesia’s own sovereignty as
well. Consequently, the Thai–Muslim insurgency did not affect their bilateral
relationship.

Conclusion
When compare Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Thai–Muslim insurgency
with Malaysia’s policy, one common finding is that the role of the religion on
their foreign policy is influenced by the domestic circumstances, for example
the position of the religion in the society and the domestic political
conditions. Although both countries reacted on the same situation (the ThaiMuslim insurgency), they reacted very differently, despite that both countries
position themselves as the moderate Muslim countries. As discussed above that
the main factor for this difference is how they re-produce and interpret the
religion as a part of nationalism under the framework of the modern nationstate. It is not merely that the religious ties remains from the pre nation-state
era. Prior to that age, although people felt the religious similarity or
difference between groups, there was no war or interference to save the coreligionists in Southeast Asia. Even though it happened in Europe, it was the
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affairs of the elites only. However, after the idea of nation-state spread, the
religion or ethnicity became the popular affairs, - the affairs of the nationals.
The religion and ethnicity are given values as they are the symbol of the
group’s existence. And it provides a claim for a group of people to establish
a nation-state, and protect themselves from an outside threat. (Before the era of
nation-state, there was no clear separation between the “interior affairs” and
“outside threat.”)

When Malays (but not Malaysians) give values to Islam and the Malay
ethnicity, the solidarity with the Thai-Muslims is created through the similarity
of this qualification. Furthermore, in the case of Malay-Muslims in Kelantan of
Malaysia, they really have had the bond through the family ties with the ThaiMuslims before the nation-state was set up. Therefore, they particularly feel the
strong solidarity with the Thai-Muslims.

On the contrary, Indonesians have the common religion with the Thai-Muslims,
but they are of the different ethnicities. No family ties, nor geographic
proximity to link them together. Most of all, with the influence of the thinking
under the framework of nation-state, Indonesians specially sensed the threats of
the separatists and the radical Muslims who use violence as the political
strategy, because their country has experienced this trouble and still struggles
with it. As analyzed in the part of core value, Indonesia’s prime problem is
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the sovereignty and national unity, and this affected much on how the
Indonesians perceived the Thai-Muslim insurgency. With the Indonesian
national experience, they understood the danger of the separatism against the
existence of the Thai state. Not only that the Indonesians had less sympathy
with the Thai-Muslims, when compared to the Malays, but they also perceived
the separatism as the political-economic problem rather than the result of the
religious conflict.

On the other hand, the relationship with the Thai government consolidated the
Indonesian national interests, especially the economic development and internal
security. Also, the Thai and Indonesian governments have long established the
good relationship. They recognize and respect one another’s sovereignty which
is the key of the regional relations in Southeast Asia. Hence, the interference
is always avoided, if the government is not really under the domestic pressure.

But after Kreu-Sae mosque and Tak-Bai incident, it was inevitable for the
Indonesian government, as the government of the Muslim country, to be
pressured from the religious groups. As a result, it decreased the pressure by
letting the religious groups protest as they wanted, while the government
cooperated with the Thai government to “correct” the Islamic teaching in the
South of Thailand. The Indonesian government also provided the consultation
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on the insurgency with the political approach. Further, it was also the mediator
between the Thai government and the representatives from the tree southern
provinces. With the strategy which was similar to that of the Malaysian
government, the Indonesian government affirmed its position as a moderate
Muslim country in the regional and global level, strengthened the relationship
with Thailand, avoided the religious factor in its foreign policy which would
obstruct its relations with the non-Muslim countries, and demonstrated to its
constituencies that it did help the Muslim fellows in Thailand. And in this
meantime, the Indonesian government did not forget to continue on the
cooperation with Thailand in many fields without the effect from the religious
factor.

The domestic political circumstances made it easy for the Indonesian
government to pursue its policy, because the religious parties had long been
marginalized. As a result, they were too weak to argue with the government.
The religious organizations which are more influential in the society than the
religious parties also supported the government’s policy. Furthermore, President
Yudhoyono himself comes from the military background, and has long fought
with the terrorism and separatism. 262Therefore, his policy tended to focus more
on the national interests.
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If measure by the indicator, which considers the Indonesian interference in
favor of the Thai-Muslims on the cost of the bilateral relations as the result
of the religious factor, then it can be concluded that the Indonesian foreign
policy was not affected by the religious factor, because it did not interfere in
the Thai domestic affairs even in the lowest level (speech).

To conclude the finding, the comparison between the Malaysian and
Indonesian cases shows the influence of the religion on the foreign policy
depends much on how it is positioned under the framework of the nationstate. The national interests also plays the main part on the decision on the
policy. The relationship with Thailand helped on promoting the Indonesian
economy and internal security. Therefore, the Indonesian government prioritized
the bilateral relations with Thailand over the religious factor. Although it had
to balance with the pressure from the religious groups, it was very little, due to
the socio-political circumstance of Indonesia itself.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PHILIPPINES’ POLICY TOWARD
THE DEMAND FOR THE INDEPENDENCE IN EAST TIMOR

The Philippines is a Catholic–predominant country. And its Catholic Church
actively engages in politics. It significantly participated in the “people power”
in 1986 to end the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos, and once again
in 2001 to depose President Joseph Estrada. Expectedly, in the international
level, the Philippine Catholic Church engages in the foreign policy as well.
There are only two Catholic-predominant countries in Southeast Asia. Other
than the Philippines, another country is East Timor. In 1975, East Timor was
invaded by Indonesian troops, and was under Indonesian occupation since then
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until 1998, when the referendum on the country’s independence was held.
Before and after the referendum, around 2,000 Timorese were killed by the
Indonesian troops and the Pro–Jakarta militias. 263 Archbishop of the Philippine
Catholic Church, and other Philippine Catholic institutes openly denounced the
human right violation in East Timor. On the contrary, the Philippine
government stayed silent on their Christian fellows’ sufferings. It is clear that
the Philippine government chose its relations with Indonesia over the religious
values. This chapter explores the reasons why the Philippines opted for this
policy.

The situation
Timor is the Island, located in the Indonesian archipelago. The Portuguese
seized Timor in 1642 to be their trading port on their Southeast Asian sea–
route. 264 Then the Dutch colonizers came to the Indonesian archipelago in 18th
century and fought with the Portuguese to occupy Timor. The result was the
both countries separated Timor into the eastern and western parts. The Dutch
occupied the western Timor along with all other islands of Indonesia, while
the Portuguese occupied East Timor since then. Actually, at that time,
Timorese had not developed their national identity. But owing to the shared
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experience under the Portuguese colonization and the wide conversion to
Catholicism, East Timorese gradually developed the common history as a
foundation of their nation. However, when the Portuguese government planned
to relinquish its occupation over East Timor, the East Timorese nationalists
could not agree yet on the prospect how their nation should be. 265 And this
caused the political chaos in the time of transition.

In 1975, there were three main East Timorese political parties. “Fretilin” party
demanded the immediate independence from Portugal. But UDT party wanted
the progressive autonomy under the Portuguese protection, while “Apodeti”
party wanted to be a part of Indonesia due to their historical and ethnic
relations. 266 The political disunite in East Timor caused Indonesia’s concern on
the possible consequence after the establishment of a new weak state in its
archipelago, while Indonesia itself had the problem of the national unity from
the beginning. The chaos in East Timor could bring about the repercussion of
territorial instability to the nearby provinces of Indonesia. Therefore, the
Indonesian government began to interfere in East Timor’s domestic politics,
and later planned for the invasion. 267 Fretilin actually knew the Indonesian
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government’s plan, and therefore, informed the General Secretary of the United
Nations (UN) that Indonesia was about to invade East Timor. 268(At the
time, both the United Nations and Portugal acknowledged the right of self –
determination of East Timor, including the independence. 269)

Meanwhile, the fighting between the groups throughout East Timor expelled
hundreds of refugee into Dili, capital of East Timor, and into Indonesia. When
Portugal cannot control the situation any longer, it withdrew all Portuguese
armies, and consequently ended its occupation, in East Timor. As a result,
Fretilin declared the independence of “The Democratic Republic of East
Timor” on 28 November 1975, but the Anti–Communist Movement in East
Timor declared East Timor as part of Indonesia on the next day. 270 The
Indonesian government took this opportunity to invade East Timor on 7
December 1975 271 and ignored the United Nations’ call for its withdrawal.
The Indonesian government declared East Timor as its 27th province in year
1976. 272 It tried to gain the international recognition on its sovereignty over
East Timor by inviting 23 embassies in Jakarta to send their observers to a
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People Assembly in Dili. But only seven embassies accepted the invitation.
Among the embassies which did not answer the invitation were, the United
States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. 273

The Indonesian government can keep East Timor under its occupation owing
largely to its military force. Therefore, when the Indonesian government lost its
strength after the financial crisis in 1997, thousands of East Timorese
demonstrators called for their referendum with the choice of being
independent. In this meantime, the United Nations General Secretary, Kofi
Anan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal discussed with
Indonesian President B.J. Habibie until they reached the agreement to hold the
referendum on the independence of East Timor.

However, the agreement did not decrease the clashes breaking out through
East Timor. The fighting between the pro–independence East Timorese and the
pro–Indonesia militias forced tens of thousands of the East Timorese to leave
their home. 274 The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was
established and sent into the disputed territory to calm down the violence. But
the killing continued, and even increased after the result of the referendum
was declared, by which 78.5% of East Timorese voters opted for the
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independence. 275

To effectively stop the violence, the UN urged the Indonesian president to
accept the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), which would
employ the multinational armed force through East Timor, and to withdraw the
Indonesian armed forces from the disputed area. Aside from employing
INTERFET, the UN further sent the United Nations Transnational
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The presence of both UN teams and
the withdrawal of Indonesian troops finally recovered peace in East Timor.
Through the time of chaos in East Timor, before and after the referendum, the
Philippines held on with the non–interference policy. It got involved only after
Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly had recognized the result of the
referendum. 276 Then when the UNTAET was set up, the Filipino general took
the position as the commander of the force. On the contrary, the Philippine
Catholic Church, under the leadership of Archbishop Jaime Sin, stood side by
side with East Timorese since the time of the Indonesian occupation. The
Philippine Catholic Church had long criticized the Indonesian government
for its human right violation against East Timorese, and called for the freedom
of East Timor.
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It can be seen that the Philippine government had some pressure from the
Church when it decided between the religious values and the secular interests
of the relationship with Indonesia. In this chapter, it will be analyzed how the
Philippine government came to the decision on the policy regarding East
Timor.
The Philippines’ Core Values
To address the Philippines’ core values, the thesis will study the Philippines’
Constitution, the Medium–Term Philippine Development Plan and the
Philippine Defense Policy Paper
A ) The 1987 Philippine Constitution
The 1987 Philippine Constitution is analyzed here because it was written after
the critical change of Philippine politics, which is “People Power Movement”
in 1986. The new strong spirit of democracy and the liberal ideology were
added into the constitution which guided the country’s foreign policy
differently from the previous administration.

Before the 1987 Constitution was adopted, the Philippines was governed by
the martial law since 1972. President Ferdinand Marcos justified the martial
law and centralized state power based on the threat from the Communists, the
Muslim secessionists in the south, and the possible coup. But aside from these
threats against the regime, the Philippines has its inherited problem on the
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governance.

Before the Spanish arrived the Philippines, the Filipinos were loosely grouped
under the village leaders or sultanates. Then the Spanish introduced the feudal
system in which the landlords patronized the peasants in their territory. The tie
between the local patrons and people formed up, and takes the deep root in
the Philippine society. Moreover, the archipelagic geography of 7,107 islands 277
makes it harder for the state power to intervene in the local relationship.
Some local patrons have their own small armies. Some hold the positions in
the governmental offices, when the state bureaucracy is established, which even
blurs the private and the governmental governance. 278 As for Muslims in
Mindanao, they accept the tribe leader (Datu), who functions as the law maker,
the governor, and the judge, rather than accepting the governmental officials. 279

President Ferdinand Marcos declared the martial law to eliminate the old
governance system, but the abuse of power, the corruption, and the economic
decline brought the backfire against himself. The “people power” uprising
against the regime in February 1986 ousted President Marcos from the
country, and Corazon Aquino became the next president. She restored the
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democratic spirit, such as the civil rights, the free press, and the rights of
minorities. The liberal ideology is obvious in the preamble of the new
constitution, “ … The blessings of independence and democracy under the rule
of law and the regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace …

“

280

Section 1 and 3 of Article II of the constitution affirms the democratic
ideology of the country, as follows “The Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them” and “Civilian authority is, at all time, supreme
over the military. The Armed Forced of the Philippines is the protectors of
the people and the State 281”

The constitution also limits the term of presidency, allows the legislature to
revoke the President’s declaration of martial law, and it ensures that the state
of martial law will not suspend the operation of constitution, the civil court or
the legislative assembly. 282

Not different from Indonesia, the Philippines recognizes the vulnerability of its
territorial integrity due to its archipelagic geography. Therefore, the constitution
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declares the sovereignty over both land and sea, “ The national territory
comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction … The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines. 283”

In the same time, with the democratic spirit, the Philippine government knows
that to hold many islands together as a nation, the central government has to
accept the cultural diversity of the people. Section 14 of Article XIV of the
constitution pronounces that “The State shall foster the preservation,
enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the
principle of unity in diversity …

“ Likewise, section 22 of Article II of the

284

constitution states that “The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development 285”

Furthermore, to preserve the national unity, the constitution allows the local
government the authority to govern itself. Section 25 of the article II declares
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that “ The State shall ensure the autonomy of local government. 286” With this
article, the autonomous region for indigenous people is established in northern
Luzon. Then in 1997, four provinces in Mindanao were set up as the
“Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” and Nur Misauri, the leader of the
Moro National Liberation Front ( MNFL) was the first elected governor. He is
also the president of “Southern Philippine Council for Peace and
Development” which is responsible for the economic development in other 13
provinces of Mindanao, and later they will be set up as the autonomous
region too.287

As for the position of the religion in the state, despite that the majority of
Filipinos are Catholic, and the Catholicism is the base of Philippine society,
the Constitution destines the Philippines to be a secular state. Section 6 of
article II of the Constitution indicates that “The separation of Church and
State shall be inviolable. 288” Ms. Teresa L. Taguiang, the Deputy of Chief of
Mission of the Philippine embassy in Thailand 289 explained that the Philippines
needs to be secular to affirm that the state does not impose any particular
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religion on its people. Also, secularism means the government recognizes all
religious minorities’ rights. If any religion really influences the Philippine
politics, it should come from the individuals’ will, but not directly from the
Church’s imposition.

B ) The Medium–Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), 1999–2004
When the fighting in East Timor erupted, the Philippines was in the beginning
of its third medium–term development plan. The most important agenda of the
plan is poverty eradication. But the Philippine approach is relatively inward–
looking, compared to Malaysian and Indonesian development plans. The
Philippine government set the missions to eliminate the poverty as follows,
• Developing the rural areas through the agricultural modernized programs
and the foreign capital and technology.
• Expanding the access to the social services, for example, education, housing
and social welfare to empower the disadvantaged in the society.
• Strengthening the competitiveness of private sector through the privatization,
and deregulation. The government will also invest in education, science and
technology and information technology. These policies would raise the
productivity of the Philippine industry which will sustainably create jobs for
Filipinos.
• Improving the infrastructure, for example, water system, transportation and
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telecommunication. This measure is to increase the competitiveness as well.
• Ensuring macroeconomic stability. Due to the Asian financial crisis, the
Philippine government needs to control the government’s expenditures,
strengthen the banking system, and increase the national saving rate.
• Reforming governance, so that it can work as the partnership with the
public sector and civil society, especially in delivery of the public service. 290

Because the Philippines needs the foreign investment to drive the national
economy, President Fidel Ramos initiated the “Development Diplomacy” since
1992 to attract the foreign capital. In the sub-regional level, he set up the
“East Asian Growth Area” (EAGA) which covers Mindanao of the
Philippines, Sarawak, Labuan and Sabah of Malaysia, and Moluccas,
Kalimantan and Sulawesi of Indonesia, and Brunei. The four countries develop
the transportation in the area and simplify the investment procedure which
results in the cooperation on the fishery industry, palm oil manufacturing, and
real estate. 291

However, it seems that the goal of the plan was not well achieved, because in
the next medium–term development plan, the objective is still the same, which
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is fighting with the poverty. Furthermore, some strategies are not changed, such
as, improving the education and fiscal strength of the government’s budget. 292

C ) The 1998 Defense Policy Paper
During the time of violence in East Timor, the Philippines was applying the
1998 Defense Policy Paper. The paper recognizes the significance of the
economy upon the national stability after the end of Cold War Era. And the
international terrorist groups emerge as the new threat which affects the
Philippines directly because of the possible connection between the global
terrorists and the Muslim secessionists in the south of the Philippines. 293
The defense plan sets the main defense objectives, of which could be the core
values of the Philippines, especially the first three objectives, 1. Secure and uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines
2. Protect and defend the national territory against the external aggression, and
the communities against internal armed threats.
3. Safeguard Filipino lives and property during times of crisis and calamities,
here and abroad 294
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To achieve the above–mentioned objectives, the Philippines, not different from
Indonesia and Malaysia, assesses the national security through the
comprehensive aspects which are the political stability, economic development
and social cohesion. 295 On the front of the political stability, the plan considers
the ending of the insurgency as its immediate national goal, because the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF), the breakaway group of MNLF, and
Abu Sayyaf’s terrorist acts still threaten the national stability and the regional
economic growth in the south. As for the aspect of economic development, the
plan believes that the Philippine needs to promote the regional and subregional economic cooperation, such as, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and
East Asian Growth Area (EAGA), and the freedom of trade to foster the trade
liberation. With regard to the social cohesion, the plan, again, addresses the
need to eradicate the poverty. It offers the insightful suggestion on the social
harmony which composes of all classes, all sectors and all genders. Hence, the
plan requires the government to care for the women, children, peasants, blue–
collared workers, and the disable persons.

The Philippine defense plan indicates the internal and external challenges
against its security. Among them are the insurgency of the Communists and
the Muslim secessionists, the transnational crime, the dispute over the Spratly
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islands, and the safety of the Filipino working overseas. On the other hand, the
defense plan sees the opportunities in dealing with the challenges. To deal
with the insurgents, the plan would continue the negotiation in order to bring
about the peaceful resolution in the long term. To achieve the economic
development, the Philippines shall expand the free trade in both regional and
global level. The mutual benefits from the interdependence economy would
lead further to the cooperation on security and defense matters. The solidarity
among ASEAN members in dealing with the common concerns can also
consolidate the cooperation and harmony among the organization’s members.

Interestingly, the plan affirms the Philippines’ obligation to the bilateral and
multilateral agreements, seeing them as a means to maintain the peaceful
relations with other countries and foster the Philippine national interests in the
same time. Among the important obligations which the Philippines deems
important are the cooperation with the UN operations and ASEAN activities.
The Philippines’ core values
To draw the conclusion from the study on the Philippine constitution and its
development and defense plans, the Philippines’ core interests which must be
its priority, when a foreign policy is designed, can be described as follows,
A ) The territorial integrity
Similar to Malaysia and Indonesia, the Philippines began to develop the sense
of national identity and the political unification under the colonial rule. Before
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the Spanish colonization, the biggest political unit in the Philippines was the
group of the same kinship in the village. 296 Aside from the feudal system as
mentioned above, the Spanish used Catholicism as a tool to unite the people.
However, through over 350 years of the colonization, the Spanish never fully
defeated the Muslims in the south of the Philippines. When the Americans
conquered the Philippines after the Spanish, they exacerbated the national
disunite by supporting the huge immigration of Catholics in the northern
islands to Mindanao island in the south. 297 The newcomers were seen as the
invaders and exploiters over the natural resources in the south. After gaining
the independence, the Philippine government still supported the immigration
which finally resulted in the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) in 1970s. The unequal development plan of the government also
causes the disunite. The southern provinces are the poorest provinces of the
country, since the people mainly work in the fishery and agricultural sectors.
The infrastructure is not well developed either.

However, the situation slightly improved under the administration of President
Fidel Ramos who declared the “ development diplomacy” to attract the foreign
investment and initiated the East Asean Growth Area (EAGA) to develop the
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economy in Mindanao. But the project did not completely achieve its goal due
to the lack of the peace and stability in Mindanao.

However, at least, President Ramos can conclude the peace agreement with
MNLF in 1996, and now the MNLF becomes the participant in developing the
region. Yet, the peace agreement with MNLF brought about the new resistant
group, - the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the fraction of MNLF who
objects the peace agreement and aspires to establish the Islamic state in the
south. 298 At present, the Philippine government established the line of
communication with the leaders of MNLF to bring them to the negotiation
process. 299 But the more dangerous group, Abu Sayyaf, emerges. According
to Ms. Teresa L. Tanguiang, the Deputy of Chief of Mission of Philippine
embassy in Bangkok, the Philippine government does not negotiate with Abu
Sayyaf, because they simply kidnap the local and foreign businessmen and
demand ransom. The government considers that this act is a threat and
unnegotiable. On the contrary, MNLF and MILF resist the government
due to their economic disadvantages. Therefore, the government tries to
negotiate to settle the resolution with them.
B ) The sovereignty
According to Ms. Teresa L. Tanguiang, the Deputy of Chief of Mission of the
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Philippine embassy in Bangkok, the more serious threat against the Philippines
comes from the instability in the West Philippine Sea, or in Spratly islands.
The Spratly Islands are islands located in the South China Sea, on the main
sea–route connecting Southeast Asia to East Asia. Under the islands, it is
believed to be an abundant source of oil and natural gas. At present, six
countries, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, China, and the Philippines, claim
their sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. On the Philippine part, it claims
only a western part of the Spratly Islands which is called Kalayaan Group of
Islands. The conflict over the islands causes the threat against the Philippines.
Since it decided not to extend the Military Base Agreement with the United
States, and the American military left the Philippines in 1992, the military
capacity of the Philippines to defend itself is relatively weak, especially when
compared to the military forces of China who claims the sovereignty on the
Spratly Islands as well.

Since 1995, few years before the eruption of the violence in East Timor, the
Philippines and China had the dispute on the Chinese construction on
Mischief Reef (Panganiban Reef) which is a part of Kalayaan Islands on
which the Philippines claims the sovereignty. The reef is approximately 1,000
kilometers from the Chinese coast, but only 300 Kilometers from the nearest
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Philippine coast. 300 So far, the Philippines tries to negotiate with China through
the ASEAN security cooperation along with other claimant ASEAN members
to gain more leverage on dealing with China.

C ) The economic development
Since President Ferdinand Marcos enforced the Martial Law in 1972, the
Philippine economy was continuously declined due to the wide corruption and
crony capitalism. 301 Although President Fidel Ramos can accelerate the
economic growth, it was interrupted by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. By
the time that the violence in East Timor erupted, the poverty was one of the
most severe problems of the Philippines, because it could lead to the political
instability and the social disintegration.

Just like in Malaysia and Indonesia, the economic development is used by the
Philippine government as a strategy to decrease the social disharmony, calm
the resentment of the secessionists and boost the legitimacy of the
government. Therefore, the economic development becomes another Philippine
core value, because it contributes to the utmost national interests, which are the
national unity and territorial integrity.

D ) Democracy
300

Sida Sorn – Sri, “ The Philippines,” in Asia Yearbook 1999/ 2542, (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn
University Press, 1999), p.88.
301
Peter A. Poole, “The Philippines” in Politics and Society in Southeast Asia, (Jefferson and
London, McFarland & Company Inc. , 2009 ), p. 167.

166

The distinguished character of the Philippines, compared to other Southeast
Asian countries, is that the Filipinos value democracy very much. Normally,
democracy is seen as a strategy to achieve the national stability, because
through the real democratic system, different sectors and individuals in the
society can express themselves freely and participate together in the
political process. 302 And the bottom–up governing system that allows the
citizens’ determination on the direction of the country would eventually
achieve the common solution and consequently, the common development.303
This is why the democracy is the guideline, when the government negotiates
with the insurgents, for example, the negotiation with MNLF, which ends with
agreement on the autonomy of Muslim–predominant provinces and the former
insurgents become the participants in the “Southern Philippines Council for
Peace and Development 304” in order to together develop the country.

The demand for the independence in East Timor and its impact on the
Philippines’ core interests
The demand for the independence of East Timorese cannot be related to the
Philippine separatist group, like the Thai–Muslim insurgents are related to JI
of Indonesia. Although the Philippines territorial integrity is intimidated by
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MILF and Abu Sayaaf, East Timorese have nothing which can link to the
both groups. They have no convergence in the political ideology, nor strategy.
In East Timor, the demand for the independence originated from the popular
level, and was driven mainly through the demonstration. Moreover, the East
Timorese are Catholic, and they called for the democratic secular state, while
MILF aims to establish an Islamic state.

The East Timorese and MILF also demand for the independence with the
different historical background. As mentioned already that East Timor’s right
of self–determination, including the independence, was recognized by both the
UN and Portugal since 1974, - before it was invaded. When Indonesia annexed
East Timor as its 27th province, the UN never recognizes this integration. 305
Hence, the independence of East Timor would not affect the problem of the
territorial integrity in the south of the Philippines.

The newly–independent East Timor cannot harm the sovereignty of the
Philippines either. But the fighting in East Timor can negatively affect the
economic development of the Philippines, because the fighting destroyed the
regional peace and stability which the Philippines needed to promote the
economic growth. The fighting in East Timor can also decrease the Indonesian
-Philippine bilateral trade and Indonesian investment in the Philippines. On the
other hand, the severe violation of human rights in East Timor conflicted with
the democratic value of the Filipinos. The victims of this violation were also
their Catholic fellows. In the policy setting, it seems that the Philippines
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pursued the different policy when compared to its own policy toward the
similar situation in other ASEAN countries.

The Philippine policy toward the demand for the independence in East
Timor
According to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the
“Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991” set three pillars for the Philippine
foreign policy, as follows:
1) Preservation and enhancement of national security
2) Promotion and attainment of economic security
3) Protection of the rights and promotion of the welfare and interest of
Filipinos overseas 306

From the three pillars, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines
projects seven objectives when setting the policy. The first three objectives are
1) To continue to the enhancement of national security and the protection of
the territorial integrity and national sovereignty
2) To participate in the national endeavor to sustain development and to
enhance the Philippines’ competitive edge in a global milieu
3) To protect the rights and promote the welfare of Filipinos overseas and to
mobilize them as partners in national development 307
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The first two principles of both pillars and objectives of the Philippine
foreign policy go in line with the Philippines’ core values which are the
territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the economic development. As for the
third principle, the well–being of Filipinos overseas becomes another pillar and
objective of the Philippine foreign policy, because the country exports the
skilled labors working around the world. And their remittances to their country
contribute greatly to the Philippine balance of payments. Therefore, their well–
beings abroad become a priority of the Philippine foreign policy. 308

Aside from the pillars and the objectives, the Department of Foreign Affairs
of the Philippines also drafts the eight “realities” which the Philippines has to
consider in pursuing the policy. Among them are :
• China, Japan and the United States and their relationship will be a
determining influence in the security situation and economic evolution of East
Asia
• Philippine foreign policy decisions have to be made in the context of
ASEAN
• The international Islamic community will continue to be important to the
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Philippines
• As an archipelagic state, the defense of the nation’s sovereignty and the
protection of its environment and natural resources can be carried out only to
the extent that it asserts its rights over the maritime territory and gets others
to respect those rights
• The country’s economic policy will continue to be friendly to both
domestic and foreign direct investments
• Overseas Filipinos will continue to be recognized for their critical role in
the country’s economic and social stability 309

When the East Timorese called for their independence, the Philippine
government had to assess how the situation would affect its interests and
decide the policy. The Philippine foreign policy, based on the outlined pillars
and objectives, not different from the Malaysian and Indonesian foreign policy,
focuses on preserving the national security, sovereignty, and the national
prosperity. As found in the part of core value analysis, the Philippines’ main
concern are the operations of the separatists in the South and the country’s
sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea or the Spratly Islands. Indonesia
has greatly helped the Philippines on preserving these interests.
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With regard to the separatists in the South of the Philippines, Indonesia has
been the mediator between the Philippine government and MNLF and MILF.
The relationship with Indonesia greatly contributed to the achievement of the
peace agreement with MNLF, and the Philippines was on the process of
negotiation with MILF. In the stage of the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC), to which the Philippines was not a member and the situation in the
south of the Philippines was monitored by the organization, Indonesia always
defended for the Philippines and negotiated with the secessionists through the
OIC channel. 310

With regard to the Spratly Islands, the Philippine military capability cannot
compare to the Chinese armed force. Therefore, the Philippine government tries
to keep the negotiation with China on the Spratly issue in the ASEAN
context where the Philippines has the ASEAN claimant countries as its
collaborators. So far, the strategy of multilateral negotiation works well. In
1992, ASEAN issued the “Declaration on the South China Sea” which abides
the ASEAN countries to resolve the problem of sovereignty in the South
China Sea through the peaceful means, and without resort to force. 311 China, as
ASEAN’s partner through the cooperation ASEAN + 3, signed this declaration
in 2002. Indonesia, as the biggest member of ASEAN, has always supported
the Philippines in the negotiation on Spratly Islands, and lately has just urged
the ASEAN members and partners to officially adopt the declaration, after it
was signed long ago.312
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The two countries also have the defense cooperation. Through the “Philippine–
Indonesia Joint Defense Cooperation Committee” (JDSCC) , the Philippine and
Indonesian officials meet annually to update one another on their defense
situation. Furthermore, they pursue on the border patrol operation, intelligence
exchange and educational exchange between military personnel of the two
countries. 313

With regard to the economic development, Indonesia was a main investor in
the Philippines. Before the Asian financial crisis, the value of Indonesian
investment in the Philippines reached 2,940.4 Million Pesos, 314 (approximately
67.178 Million US Dollars). It was also the main investor in the East Asian
Economic Growth (EAGA) which the Philippine government established to
develop the economy of the disputed area in Mindanao. Although the
investment was suspended due to the financial crisis in 1997, the Philippines
hoped that the investment from Indonesia would get back to normal when it
recovers from the crisis.

With the Indonesian contribution on the Philippines’ national interests, the
Philippine government chose to overlook the human rights violation in East
Timor which actually contradicted to the Philippine stance on the human right
issue. Ms. Teresa L. Taguiang, the Deputy of Chief of Mission of the
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Philippine embassy in Thailand, gave the reason that the Philippines was
abided by the non–interference principle of ASEAN which guarantees the
sovereignty of all country members. Therefore, it cannot say anything which
could be perceived as the interference. 315 But normally even in ASEAN, the
Philippines is the main proponent of human rights, for example, the Philippines
supported the “constructive intervention” (constructive engagement) policy which
would allow the ASEAN member countries to express an opinion or concern
over the domestic affairs of other member countries. 316 The main target of the
policy was Myanmar which has the worst records on the human right
violation. Likewise, in the same period, the Human Right Committee of the
Philippine Parliament voted to object the Malaysian state’s assault against
Anwar Ibrahim, the former Vice President of Malaysia. 317 President Joseph
Estrada initially decided not to attend the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, but he changed the decision after
discussion with the senators. Still, he proposed the “ASEAN Human Rights
Mechanism” to prevent the human right violation in ASEAN, but his proposal
was denied. 318
However, when it concerned the Indonesian assaults against East Timorese, the
Philippine government always stayed silent, although the Philippine government
was under the pressure from the influential Philippine Catholic Church. Not
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only the Philippine government did not comment anything on the Indonesian
suppression against East Timorese, it also denied to issue visa for Jose Ramos
–Horta,319 the Nobel Laureate and East Timorese activist, to enter the Philippine
during the APEC Summit in 1996 in Manila, for fearing that it would irritate
the good relations between Indonesia and the Philippines.

On the contrary, many Filipino Catholic organizations, such as, the society of
the Divine World and Religious of the Virgin Mary, sent the Filipino
missionaries to provide the shelter for the homeless and the education for
children in East Timor. 320 When the Asia–Pacific Conference on East Timor
(APCET) was held in Manila in May 1994 by the Catholic Institute of
International Relations, the Indonesian government pressed Manila to stop the
meeting. As a result President Fidel Ramos banned the foreign participants to
join the conference, for example, the Nobel Peace Prize Winner Mairead
Maguire was stopped at the Manila airport and was sent back by the next
plane to Amsterdam. Susan Castillo, a university professor who was scheduled
to speak in the conference was stopped at the airport and was sent out too.
The Archbishop, Jaime Sin, strongly criticized his government in his letter to
Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximene Belo in Dili, East Timor, “As a Filipino citizen
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and as brother in the faith, I apologize for the ineptitude of my political
leaders to spearhead the growth of freedom and human dignity in our region
… I’ m sorry to see the political leaders of my own nation giving in to the
pressure of a foreign nation. (Indonesia) 321” In the letter which was distributed
to the public by the conference organizers, Archbishop Jaime Sin further
criticized the Indonesian assaults against East Timorese, “I know how much
your people have suffered all these years on account of the illegal Indonesian
occupation of East Timor … I know that this has resulted in abominable
human rights violations inflicted upon your flock 322” Many Philippine clergies
supported Archbishop Sin on his solidarity for the Catholic fellows expressed
in his letter. Moreover, the conference issued the statement calling for the UN
intervention, the release of all East Timorese political prisoners, and the
international pressure to end the Indonesian occupation. 323

Different from the Malaysian and Indonesian cases, the Philippine government
did not do anything to decrease the pressure from the Church. It just stayed
silent, and responded to the Indonesian government rather than the Church. The
reaction of the Filipinos was the main variable in this case. Normally the
Philippine Catholic Church has the high influence on the Philippine society.
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80.9% of the Filipinos are Catholics, 324 and the Church is the official center of
the Catholic adherents. In the international level, the Philippines is the thirdlargest Roman Catholic country after Brazil and Mexico. With its large
Catholic population, the Church receives the high attention from the Vatican.
The late Pope John Paul II visited the Philippines twice. 325 In the domestic
level, according to John Leddy Phelen, the Roman Catholicism is “the cement
of social unity 326” for the Philippines. Due to the archipelagic geography, the
Philippine population is very diverse on both the ethnicity and language.
Although the majority of the sub-ethnic groups can be categorized under the
same Malay-ethnic group, they speak different eighty-eight local languages. 327
Furthermore, the local people tend to be loyal to the local patrons rather than
the central government, and the Philippine presidents have to ensure that their
relationship with the local influential persons stays healthy in order that the
government’s policy would be carried out.

Among the cleavage in the country, most Filipinos have one thing in common,
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and that is they are Roman Catholics. Coupled with the fact that the
Philippine society has no other strong social organization or institution, the
Philippine Catholic Church always has the high power in domestic politics.
The Church can show (or not show) its support for any candidate, and this
really affects the vote that the candidate would receive. The Church had a
role on attracting the participants in demonstrations in 1986 to oust the
former President Ferdinand Marcos, and on impeachment of President Joseph
Estrada in 2001. But when it comes to the East Timor case, the Church
cannot draw the popular support on its agenda. Aside from the Philippine
religious organizations themselves, the Filipinos did not protest on the
Indonesian occupation or express the solidarity for the East Timorese.

As it is found in the previous chapters that the position of the religion under
the framework of the nation-state can affect on how the people relate
themselves to the co-ethnics or co-religionists across the border. And
nationalism in the Philippines is not very powerful like that of Malaysia.
It is not promoted heavily by the state as the tool to create the
national unity. This is because before the independence the Philippines had
been the Spanish colony for 377 years (from 1521 to 1898, starting even
before the nationalism would originate in Europe). Then it was occupied by
the U.S. for another 48 years (from 1898 to 1946). Not only that the
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Philippines gained the independence quite early when compared to its
neighbors, but it also gained the domestic self-rule since 1935 before the
formal independence. Through the hundred years of western colonization, the
Filipinos absorbed the religion, educational system, the political ideology,
namely the western culture, to be a part of the Philippine daily life. By the
time that the country gained its independence, it did not feel the resentment
against the invaders any longer, except in the South of the Philippines where
the Spanish and American authority never reached. This does not mean that
there is no Philippine nationalism. It does exist, but its impact is not
predominating in the modern nation-state of the Philippines like it happens in
other Southeast Asian states.

Since the Philippine nationalism is not very strong or heavily promoted in the
age of nation-state, it never takes the specific ethnicity or religion as a core
or symbol of its nation. Actually, it cannot do so either due to the extremely
ethnic diversity in the country (in the level of the sub-ethnic groups). And
such ethnic policy would be risky to drive the Muslims in the South to
secede. Hence, although majority of the population are Catholics, the Philippines
has no “national religion.” Furthermore, the Constitution specifically
destines the country to be a secular state.

Thus, when Catholicism is not particularly valued and affirmed as the national
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identity in the society, the Filipinos did not relate themselves to East Timorese
simply because of the common Catholic identity. With the secular structure of
the Philippine politics, the Church can propose its agenda to the society as a
moral guidance, but it cannot impose the agenda directly on the government.
Hence, when the people were not convinced by the Church regarding the East
Timorese, the Philippine government did not really have to balance against the
pressure from the Church, and can pursue its policy easily.

The Philippine policy toward East Timor changed only after the Indonesian
government itself had recognized the result of East Timor’s referendum. The
Philippines sent the troop to join the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The Philippine general, Jaime de los
Santos, became the first commander of the mufti-national forces. And the
general eagerly conducted his duty. He protested to Alwi Shihab, the
Indonesian Foreign Minister, when the pro–Indonesia militias sneaked through
the border to attack East Timorese. 328He signed two Memorandums of
Understanding with the Indonesian Army Commander to affirm the code of
conduct along border of East and West Timor. 329 Ms. Teresa L. Taguiang, the
Deputy of Chief of Mission of the Philippine embassy in Thailand, explained
that Philippine soldiers in UNTAET can freely perform their duty. This is not

328

The United Nations, “ UN officials in Jakarta to discuss recent incursions into Eat Timor,”
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/news/N080300, and “UN troops in East
Timor arrest armed attacker near Indonesia,”
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/news/N070300.
329
The United Nations, “The United Nations and East Timor – A Chronology,”
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html

180

considered as the interference. And it should not cause any disturbance on the
relations with the Indonesian government either, because the Indonesian
government already recognized the independence of East Timor. Therefore, it
did not violate the non-interference principle of ASEAN. 330

As for the Philippine government’s stance, after East Timor’s independence
was recognized, it no longer denied to issue visa for Timorese leaders. Both
Xanana Gusmao, the President of East Timor, and Hose Ramos Horta, his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, obtained visa in many occasions, despite the
Philippine government knew that the two leaders would publicly raise the topic
of their struggle for the independence in the past 331 which inevitably referred
to the Indonesian suppression.

In sum, to measure the influence of the religious factor on the Philippine
foreign policy, when compare the policy with the indicator (please refer to the
table on page 22 of the first chapter), it is found that the Philippine policy
toward East Timor was not affected by the religious factor at all, because the
Philippine government did not interfere in the Indonesian domestic affairs to
save the East Timorese, in spite of the hard pressure from the Philippine
Catholic Church.

Conclusion
One finding which can be extracted from the Philippine case is that the
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strength of the religious institution does not merely fortify the religious factor
on the foreign policy. With the idea of secularism predominating in the
country, the Philippine government responded to the constituencies rather than
the religious institution. However, the situation could have changed, if the
people had joined with the religious institution.

Secondly, the Philippine case affirms the finding from the previous chapters
that the religious commonality does not automatically lead to the religious
solidarity. Rather, the imposition of the religion relating to the national identity
of the country, through which the state gives values to a particular religion or
ethnicity, can cultivate the ethno-religious bond across the border through the
similar ethno-religious identity of the people. The imposition of the religion or
ethnicity is important, because it forms up the worldview of the people on
how they perceive themselves or their group through the ethno-religious
identity in relation to “others.” However, as seen from the Indonesian case,
aside from the imposition of the religion (and ethnicity) in the nation-state
paradigm, many other factors, such as, the root-cause of the conflict, the
geographic proximity, or the ties of the kinship, can also have the influence on
forming the religious solidarity.

Thirdly, in the era of the nation-state, the government is the agent which
pursues the foreign policy. And the government sets a policy under the
guideline of the national interests, because the protection of these interests
could affect both the stability of the state and the government itself. In the
Philippine case, the government still has to term with the immediate problems
of the new state, such as the territorial integrity and the sovereignty. With the
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limited military capacity of the Philippines, it cannot deal with the Chinese
navy in the Spratly Islands or control the separatists in the South. Hence, it
needs to maintain the good relationship with Indonesia in order to consolidate
its own prime interests. This point affirms the finding from the previous
chapters that the indispensable national interests can directly affect the foreign
policy.

Therefore, it leads to the conclusion that in the Philippine case, in spite of the
hard pressure from the Philippine Catholic Church, the Philippine government
did not allow the religious factor to affect its foreign policy toward East
Timor when East Timorese called for the independence. It carried out the
policy aiming to preserve the relationship with Indonesia, because the bilateral
relations contributed to the national interests of the Philippines themselves.
And it did not need to create the balance between such policy against the
religious pressure, because simply the religious commonality did not
automatically make the Filipinos have the religious solidarity for the East
Timorese. Hence, the relationship between the two countries concerning the
East Timor issue was not affected by the religious factor.
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CHAPTER 6
INDONESIA’S POLICY TOWARD THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES

Rohingya is a Muslim minority group living in the Buddhist–predominant
nation of Myanmar. In a country where the government violates the citizens’
rights as common, it is difficult for the people to live a normal life, and it is
almost impossible, if these people are minority of the country. Rohingyas are
marginalized from the society and the political process because of both their
Islamic religion and their Indian - mixed descent. The cruel living conditions
drive hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas to flee from the country. Their
situation in Myanmar was specifically worsen in 2009, because the junta
government wanted to get rid of any resistant groups before the national
election in 2010. Through 2009, hundreds of Rohingyas were frequently found
drifted with broken boats in Bangladesh, Thailand, and mostly in Aceh, - the
eastern province of Indonesia. While the Aceh local government welcomed
them, the Indonesian government insisted not to shelter any refugee.

The Rohingya case can prove how secular–oriented the Indonesian foreign
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policy is. Compared to other assaults against the religious minorities in
Southeast Asia, Rohingyas suffer the worst oppression simply because of their
religion, but the Indonesian government avoided to get involved, because their
fellow Muslims’ sufferings did not really affect Indonesia’s national secular
interests.

The situation
Around 4 percents of 50 million Burmese are Muslims. They are roughly
composed of Rohingya, Panthy, Pashu and the mix of Indian, Pakistan and
Bangladesh. 332 Rohingyas originally live in Arakan, - the northwestern state of
Myanmar, neighboring Bangladesh. The local people got to know Islam from
Arab merchants since 712. 333 Some local people converted to Islam, while some
Arab merchants settled down and married the local women. In fifteenth
century, the Muslim empire expanded from Dacca to Arakan. In this period,
many Bangladesh immigrated to Arakan too. 334 Therefore, the ethnicity of
Rohingyas is mixed from the beginning, and this causes the vulnerability
against Rohingyas. While they see themselves as local Burmese, the
government and other Burmese perceive them as “foreigners.”

The ethnic combination increased when the British seized Myanmar, and later
Arakan State as a part of the Burmese kingdom at that time. Under the
colonization of the British, Indian labors flooded into Myanmar. Many new-
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coming Indian moneylenders gained their control over the land of the poor
Burmese peasants. 335 The conflict of the economic benefit led to the racial riots
between the Indian Muslims and Burmese Buddhists. When the British were
about to relinquish their control in Myanmar, the Muslim leaders in Arakan
State were afraid that they would become the minority under the Buddhist
Burmese governance. So, they offered Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the
newly–established Pakistan, to incorporate their land with Pakistan, 336 but Jinnah
refused the proposal. This incident made the Rohingyas become the object of
the Burmese government’s mistrust. Consequently, the Rohingyas formed up the
Mujahid Movement which aimed to establish the Muslim State of East
Pakistan. 337 Although the movement did not achieve its goal, it rendered the
Muslims in Arakan more conscious on their autonomy.

On the other hand, when Myanmar obtained its independence, the central
government used the religion as a tool to unite the nation. Buddhism was
declared as the state’ s religion. Further, the government migrated Buddhists
into Arakan State to dilute the Muslim majority there. 338 Just like in other
Southeast Asian countries, the nationalist policy brought about more Resistance
from minorities. The Mujahid Movement transformed to be the “Rohingya
Independence Front (RIF) .” In return, the Burmese government responded by
the ethnic cleansing operation called “Naga Min” or Dragon King in 1978
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which expelled approximately 200,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh. 339

The turning point of Rohingyas’ status was in 1982 when the government
issued a new citizenship law. Before this law, Rohingyas had been given
“Foreign Registration Card”, while the Burmese had had the “National
Identification Certificate.” 340 But the 1982 Citizenship law classified the
inhabitants into two groups which were the members of the 135 state–
recognized indigenous groups and the “associated” groups. The Burmese
government did not consider Rohingyas as its indigenous group. According to
the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar, “In actual
fact, although there are (135) national races living in Myanmar today, the so–
called Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been
a “Rohingya” race in Myanmar. 341” As for the second choice, which is being
registered under the category of the “associated” groups, a person has to prove
that his/her ancestors resided in Myanmar dated back to 1948, 342 which is
difficult to do in the case of Rohingyas, because the Arakan State is an
isolated state, surrounded by the mountains, in which their ancestors had not
registered with the government yet at that time.

As a result, many Rohingyas hold the status of “foreign resident” which
leaves them vulnerable to the state’s abuses, such as forced labors and forced
migration. In turn, the government’s ethnic–nationalist policy provoked
339
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Rohingyas to fight back. Many resistant groups emerged in this period, such
as, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya Islamic
Front (ARIF), and the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO). 343
However, the groups cannot overcome the inner fractions due to the lack of
the financial support and the strong suppression of the Burmese government. 344
In 2009, the Burmese government launched the attack against the armies of
minorities throughout the country as a preparation for the national election in
2010. Also, the mission was a part of the constitution’s fulfillment, as the
Article 338 of Burmese constitution states that all armed forces in the country
must be under the command of the national defense. 345 The harsh suppression
drove Rohingyas to flee from Arakan State by the self–made boats, because
the Arakan state is located by the sea, and the movement by land is strictly
controlled by the army.

Hence, in the beginning of 2009, the Southeast Asian countries witnessed
hundred of Rohingyas in the almost–dead conditions drifted onto the Thai,
Malaysian, and Indonesian coasts. The biggest waves of Rohingya refugees
were found in Aceh province of Indonesia, where 193 Rohingya refugees were
found in January 2009, and another 220 of them landed in Aceh again in
February of the same year. Then, 129 Rohingya refugees were rescued again in
March 2011. 346
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Compared to other cases concerning the violation against minorities in
Southeast Asia, Rohingyas suffer the worst hardship, since they do not even
have the legal citizen status. While the local people in Aceh provided the
reliefs to the Rohingya refugees, 347 the Indonesian government, as the biggest
Muslim country, tended to avoid the problem of their Muslim fellows. This
chapter tries to try to find the reasons with which the Indonesian government
pursued such policy.
Indonesia’s core values
As already stated in the first chapter that this chapter will skip the study on
the Indonesian main policies and ideology, because the thesis already did so in
chapter 4, in which the thesis found that the Indonesian core values which
must be considered in the policy setting, are the national unity and the
territorial integrity, the sovereignty over its archipelago, the economic
development, and the internal security. With this finding, the thesis will analyze
further how the problem of Rohingya refugees affected the core values of
Indonesia.
The Rohingya refugees and its impact on Indonesia’s core value
Approximately 800,000 Rohingyas are now in Arakan State. Although they
form up some insurgent groups, but there is no record of their sabotage
activities. So far, they only wrote a few letters to some international
organizations. 348The weakness of the Rohingya insurgent groups results from
the harsh military suppression of the Burmese regime, and the lack of support
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from the Muslim fellows in other states of Myanmar. Even Burmese Muslims
in other states perceive Rohingyas as the foreigners too, due to Rohingya’s
Indian descent. 349 Therefore, their insurgent groups are too weak to post any
threat against the Burmese regime, nor the regional peace and stability. The
number of Rohingya refugees was also too little to influence the whole
economic structure of Indonesia. Hence, the economic core interest of Indonesia
was barely affected from the Rohingya issue.

However, when consider the Indonesian core interests on security, the
Rohingyas might be able to cause some security impact. Rohingyas came to
Indonesia as refugees. Almost all of them were found in the poor health
condition due to the dehydration and malnutrition. In fact, 22 of 220 refugees,
drifted onto Acehnese coast on 3 February 2009, were reported to die during
floating in the sea. 350 This means, it was almost impossible for Rohingyas to
post any threat against Indonesia’s security, when they firstly arrived ndonesia.
But after they recover to the healthy condition, and especially if the number
of the refugees rises, they can start the political activities which cause the
troubles for the host country, like it now happens in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In Pakistan and Bangladesh, there are around 350,000 and 200,000 Rohingya
refugees respectively. In Bangladesh, the Rohingya refugees provide the
financial support for the insurgent groups in their home. Some Rohingya
refugees who are members of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) are
349
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alleged to link with the local Islamist groups in Bangladesh, such as , Jamaat
El–Islami and Harakat–ul–Jihad–ul–Islami. In Pakistan, they are alleged to join
with the Pakistani – Kashmir organizations, such as, Harakat–ul–Mujahdeen. 351

As for in Indonesia, the representatives of the Rohingya Solidarity
Organization (RSO) were reported to attend the meeting held by Abu Bakr
Bashir, the spiritual leader of Jamaah Islamiya (JI), which discussed the
establishment of an international Mujahidin association. Another representative
from the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) attended the same meeting, but he
expressed the objection against the use of violence. 352

The Indonesian government’s concern on the merge of the Rohingya refugees
into the local insurgent groups was due to the fact that most of Rohingya
refugees arrived in Aceh, the province where the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
(GAM or Aceh Liberation Movement) has long called for the independence.
(In fact, it was predicted that it would be the next province to leave Indonesia
after East Timor.) But Tsunami, happening on 24 December 2004, swept away
167,000 Acehnese in one day, made another 500,000 Acehnese homeless, and
destroyed all the infrastructure.353 The devastation rendered the GAM to easily
settle the peace negotiation with the Indonesian government. But the
Indonesian government still has to be cautious on any threat from the
insurgents both in Aceh and in other provinces. Therefore, although the
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Rohingya refugees cannot harm the Indonesian security at present, the
Indonesian government needs to consider any possible threat against its
internal security and territorial integrity in the future.
Indonesia’s policy toward the Rohingya refugees
As already found in the previous chapters that the religion is not the
influential factor in the Indonesian foreign policy, because Islam is not valued
as the national identity, although it is the ground of the national ideology,
Pancasila. The Rohingya case affirms this finding and adds that the degree of
the suppression against the religious minority does not directly relate to the
religious solidarity either. Compared to the previous case study or any other
cases of minorities around the world, the Rohingyas have been severely
suppressed, but the Indonesians barely paid attention to the case. Only
Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization demanded the
Indonesian government to treat the Rohingya refugees better. Din Syamsuddin,
the chairman of the organization said, “Indonesia should deal with them
[Rohingya refugees] properly. I hope the Rohingya refugees will be looked
after until there is an appropriate solution based on humanitarian principles. …
If Indonesia will not help, Muhammadiyah is ready to cooperate and assist the
refugees with what they need. 354”

The media did not report much on the Rohingya refugees either, (when
compared to the Thai-Muslim insurgency). Either because it was difficult to
access the refugees kept in the Indonesian naval bases or enter Myanmar to
seek for the information sources, the result was the Indonesians did not know
354
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much about the conditions of Rohingyas in Myanmar. Accordingly, the pressure
from the people on the Indonesian government was less than in the ThaiMuslim insurgency case. The Rohingya case demonstrated the role of the
media on how each issue would be perceived by the public, and the public
perception would later affect the level of the religious solidarity.

Rather, the pressure on the Indonesian government came from the international
level, when the case appeared in the international media. This means the
Indonesian government was much less constrained on its policy decision,
because the government’s stability did not rely on the international support
anyway. However, the Indonesian government responded by assigning the
Indonesian immigration office to conduct the interview with the refugees
under the coordination of the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 355

With this management, the Indonesian government demonstrated the compliance
with the international organizations, while its officials gained the control over
the mobility of the refugees. Moreover, it created the opportunity to leave the
decision to the international level, because no country would like to solve to
the refugee problem by itself. Providing the shelter for the illegal immigrants
would cause the economic burden and security problem in the long run. In the
same time, with the humanitarian standard, it cannot push the refugees away
either.
355
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The Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian media realized
this and offered the solution which was cooperation of the ASEAN to which
Myanmar is the member. Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of Muhammadiyah
suggested the Indonesian government raise the issue in ASEAN summit in
Thailand in February 2009, “This is the right time for the issue to be raised
at a regional forum. We have so far been too lenient toward the military junta
in Myanmar. 356”

The Jakarta Post, the prominent newspaper of Indonesia, offered the same
solution, “We do sympathize with the Rohingya people. ASEAN needs to
improve international cooperation, especially among the nations in the region,
to overcome this refugee problem. Indonesia alone will not be able to do the
job. 357”

In the international level, the International Concern Group on Rohingya (ICGR)
openly expressed its hope that Indonesia would discuss the issue of the
Roingya minority group, ( it should be noted here that the organization did not
limit the issue to the refugee problem only.) in the ASEAN Summit. The group
urged that “We hope the Indonesian government will propose that the issue of
Rohingya ethnic group be discussed at the ASEAN Summit. 358”
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However, in spite of the suggestion on the ASEAN Summit from many sides,
the Indonesian government decided to raise the issue of Rohingya refugees in
Bali Process, which is a ministerial conference of 31 countries established in
2002 to solve the problem of human trafficking and related transnational
crimes. Not only because the Rohingyas took asylum in many countries in and
outside Southeast Asia, for example, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, but the Indonesian government also wanted to push
away the responsibility to solve the problem of Rohingya minority from
Indonesia’s and ASEAN’s shoulder. Since the attempt to comprehensively
solve the problem of Rohingya minority group would need the closer
engagement in Myanmar’s domestic affairs which would violate the noninterference principle of ASEAN, and would hinder the mutual trust among
members in the organization, the Indonesian government decided to leave the
issue to Bali Process, in spite of knowing that there would be no real
resolution, because the forum does not really concern the refugee problem. And
it also has no enforcement power on the non- member country. In the same
time, with this decision, the Indonesian government still maintained its full
authority to control the activities and mobility of Rohingya refugees residing
in the country. Furthermore, in this meantime, it can also send the refugees
back, once the host country agree to accept them, as it sent 114 Rohingyas
back to Bangladesh. 359

On the other hand, the Rohingya case proves that the religious factor did not
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really affect the Indonesian foreign policy. In spite of no promise on the
improvement on the conditions of the Rohingyas, the Indonesian government
still maintain the good relationship with Myanmar as normal. In 2009, after the
Indonesian government raised the issue of Rohingya in Bali process, in which
Myanmar denied to accept Rohingyas as its citizens, but was ready to “talk”
with Indonesia about the refugees, the Indonesian government celebrated the
60th anniversary of their relations with Myanmar in the same year. 360

The Indonesian government, along with other ASEAN members, called for the
democracy in Myanmar, but its discourse focused on democracy in general,
rather than stopping the persecution against the Rohingya minority, as seen
from the steps of the road map starting from releasing the political prisoners,
especially Aung San Suu Kyi, and the participation of the opposition in the
Burmese politics. 361 Indonesia and other ASEAN countries pressured Myanmar
to forgo its turn of ASEAN chairmanship, 362 in order to preserve ASEAN’s
image and economic benefits on negotiations with the western partners, such
as the United States and the European Union (EU). The pressure partly came
from the democratic aspiration which flourished in Indonesia after 1998. Then
again, the pressure was pursued under the principle of non–interference which
left the final decision to the Burmese government, which means it did not
really achieve any change in Myanmar’s political process.
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Aside from the urge for the democracy in Myanmar, the Indonesian
government maintained the good relationship with Myanmar as normal. The
bilateral economic cooperation continued without any hindrance. The Indonesian
government aims to increase the bilateral trade volume to 500 Million US
Dollars by 2015. 363 In 2009, the year when the Burmese government’s torture
against Rohingya emerged, Indonesia imported from Myanmar slightly less than
the previous year, from 29.67 Million US Dollars in 2008 to 29.05 Million
US Dollars in 2009. And the total bilateral trade decreased from 280.44
Million US Dollars in 2008 to 203.82 Million US Dollars in 2009. But the
bilateral trade boosted again in 2010, when it rose to 316.01 Million US
Dollars. 364

In 2010, when U Thein Sein became Myanmar’s president, he chose to make
the first state visit in Indonesia. During the visit, he invited Indonesia to
increase the investment in the agricultural, mining, and oil and natural gas.
Their joint commission will also meet to increase the bilateral cooperation on
tourism. 365

Most of all, President Susio Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia used to urge
Myanmar to release the political prisoners and stated that the gross violation
of human rights cannot be considered as the domestic affairs. 366 Not only that
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the Burmese government proceeded on the national election in 2011 while
Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD)
the opposition party, was detained in her residence. After the election President
Yudhoyono himself expressed with President U Thein Sein of Myanmar that
he “appreciates the significant development in Myanmar recently and supports
the Myanmar government to continue reconciliation effort (with the Burmese
opposition) 367”

To be assured about the finding, the thesis compares the Indonesian policy on
the Rohingya refugees with the indicator, (please refer to the table on page 22
of the first chapter), it found that the Indonesian policy was not affected by
the religious factor. According to the indicator, the lowest level of the
interference is launching speeches. The Indonesian government had some
speeches against the junta government, but its content did not involve the
religious solidarity for Rohingyas. The Indonesian government did not interfere
in the Burmese domestic affairs to save the Rohingyas. It just aimed to create
democracy in Myanmar in general. Indonesia and other ASEAN members
discussed the road map to democracy for Myanmar before the Rohingya
refugee issue would rise. Hence, according to the indicator, the Indonesian
foreign policy was not affected by the religious factor. Moreover, the urge was
not really serious. On the other hand, the increasing volume of the bilateral
trade and investment and the political support proves that the relationship
between Indonesia and Myanmar was not affected by the issue of Rohingya
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refugees at all.

Conclusion
The study on the Indonesian policy toward Myanmar on the Rohingya
refugees affirms the finding in the previous chapters that normally the
government carries out the foreign policy to serve the indispensable national
interests. As already discussed that the Rohingya refugees could affect the
Indonesian interest on the internal security in Aceh province. The Indonesian
economic benefits in Myanmar was actually not enormous, hence the
Indonesian government could pressure the Burmese government to treat the
Rohingyas better in order to decrease the number of the refugees. But the
Indonesian government chose to overlook the Rohingya issue and hold on
with the non–interference principle of ASEAN, because the non–interference
principle in turn guarantees the utmost interest of Indonesia which is the
sovereignty.

The reaction of Indonesians, the religious organization, and the media on the
Rohingya refugees did not exert any serious pressure on their government. The
case demonstrated that the religious similarity does not automatically lead to
the religious solidarity across the border. The religious worldview of the
people shaped through the nation-state framework also plays a part on
creating the solidarity among the co-religionists, as already discussed that for
Indonesians Islam is not asserted as the national identity as strongly as in
Malaysia. It is interesting that Acehnese who practice Islam more strictly than
other Indonesians and called for the Aceh independence had more sympathy
for the Rohingyas than the Indonesians did. The Aceh online community
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raised 5.1 Million Rupiahs (approximately 428 US Dollars) for the Rohingyas
within two weeks 368 which was a relatively high amount when consider the
very poor economy in Aceh. They also provided foods and a public kitchen
for the refugees. The Aceh bloggers also raised the awareness of the
Rohingyas in Myanmar through their blogs and Facebook. 369

The Rohingya case also proves that the degree of the suffering of the coreligionists does not directly affect the level of the religious solidarity. When
compared the Indonesian policy toward the Rohingya refugees and the ThaiMuslim insurgency, it is found that although the Indonesians have no ethnic
ties with either the Thai-Muslims or the Rohingyas, the Indonesians expressed
more solidarity for the Thai-Muslims. The media could be the reason here. The
frequency and how the issue was raised in public influences the perception of
the people toward the issue, and it consequently affected the strength of the
religious factor which the government had to term with.

In the governmental level, the Indonesian government was more responsive on
the Thai-Muslim insurgency than the Roingya refugees, (in the sense that it
was eager to solve the issue, although not through the religious approach). This
is because the economic and security interests in the Thai-Indonesian
relations was much more than the interests in the Indonesian-Burmese
relations. And the Indonesian government could not let the issue of the ThaiMuslim insurgency damage the enormous benefits in the Thai-Indonesian
368
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relationship. So, the point leads back to the finding that the national interests
really guide the foreign policy and they are more influential factor than the
religious factor as seen from the comparison on the reaction of the Indonesian
government on the Thai-Muslim insurgency and the Rohingya refugees.

To conclude the finding from the chapter, the Indonesian government chose to
solve the Rohingya refugees via the Bali Process rather than ASEAN
cooperation in order to avoid the interference in the Burmese domestic affairs
which would violate the key principle of ASEAN. The principle of noninterference needs to be protect in order to guarantee the sovereignty of
Indonesia itself. And the Indonesian government can pursue the policy almost
without balancing against the religious factor, because the Indonesians did not
pay much attention to the Rohingya refugees. As a result, the religious factor
did not affect the Indonesian policy toward the Rohingyas as seen from the
indicator that the Indonesian did not interfere in Burmese domestic affairs to
save them. Thus, the Burmese-Indonesian relationship was not affected by the
refugee case.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The thesis “ Religion, Nationalism, and Regional Politics in Southeast Asia : The
Relations between Thailand and Malaysia” aims to study the influence of the
religion on the foreign relations in Southeast Asia by taking the Malaysian
relations with Thailand toward the Thai–Muslim insurgency as a case study,
then comparing it with the similar cases in Southeast Asia in order to draw a
conclusion on whether and how the religion affects the foreign relations in
Southeast Asia.

The thesis sets the hypothesis that the religious factor hardly affects the
foreign policy of countries in Southeast Asia, because the Southeast Asian
countries prioritize the national interests over the religious factor. And the
thesis seeks to elaborate on :
1 ) What would be these national interests which the Southeast Asian
countries prioritize over the religious factor ? And why are these interests
indispensable ?
2 ) How do the Southeast Asian governments balance the religious factor
against the national interests ?
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Through the answers of both research questions, the hypothesis is proven and
clarified. From the study on the states’ policies and strategies, the thesis finds
that many Southeast Asian countries have the similar indispensable interests to
protect, such as the national cohesion, the territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines have the separatist groups. Malaysia
does not have the separatists, but has the severe problem on the racial
disharmony in the nation. Based on these concerns, the national interests are
set, and they are the ground of all public policies, including the foreign policy.
The national interests of the national unity, the territorial integrity and
sovereignty determine the existence and stability of the states, therefore they
are indispensable when the states pursue the policy.

The problems of the state-formation are perpetuated in the Southeast Asian
countries not only because they have emerged as the nation-states less than a
century, but also their formation did not come from the popular level. As
discussed in the beginning of the thesis that the borderlines in Southeast Asia
which include and exclude many groups of people to form up the states were
not initiated by the inhabiting people. Rather, the borderlines were decided by
the western colonizers and the ruling elites.

The state-formation in Southeast Asia contradicts the conventional belief on
the concept of nationalism that each nation should have a state of its own.
After the borderlines between states were set, the people became either
majority or minority in their own homes. But the problems of the stateformation arose after that.

203

To consolidate the existence of the nations, many Southeast Asian states
imposed the idea of nationalism on their population. The nationalist programs
tried to conceptualize the “nation.” They drew the basic qualifications of the
majority of population, such as the ethnicity, religion, and language, as the
“national” symbols which represented the whole country. Hence, the minority
was missing in the nationalist framework. The problem of minority-majority is
not about the number of each group of people. But it is about how they
perceive and treat each other in the nation-state. David Brown claims that the
resistance from the minority against the central government would surface
only after the central government interferes in the power structure of the local
societies which would affect the power of the local rulers. 370 This surely does
not mean the political interference only, it includes the interference on the
resource management or the cultural dominance.

On the other hand, when the nationalist programs were imposed in a country,
some specific qualifications of the majority, such as their religion and
ethnicity, were politically valued and affirmed as the national core. They were
valued, because they were now re-produced as the symbol of the authenticity
and significance of the people living on the specific territory. The ethnic and
religious qualifications of the majority link to the history, - the glory in the
past in particular. Through this process, the nation claims the right to exist as
a nation-state, the authority over the territory, and the right to protect itself
from the “outsider.”
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However, when the ethno-religious qualifications are valued and affirmed, the
connectedness could be felt among people with the same qualifications either
within or outside the borders. Hence, it could lead to the common sympathy or
solidarity, if their religious or ethnic fellows are in difficulties. Surely, this
sympathy involves the same network of kinship. But the popular sympathy or
solidarity based purely on the similar religion or ethnicity did not exist in
Southeast Asia before the era of nation-state. The Malays did not interfere to
liberate Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat when sultans of these provinces paid
yearly tributes to Bangkok before the British would enter the region. But after
the ethno-religious qualifications are adjusted through the nationalist
framework, people do not only feel the family ties among them which may
exist before the establishment of borders and nation-states, but also the
significance of a particular religion or ethnicity which needs to be protected.

But the paradox of nationalism is that when a state promotes the values of a
particular ethnicity or religion as the core of the nation, it cannot pursue the
absolute policy to serve the particular ethnic or religious group, because the
government represents the whole nation. It needs to create the legitimacy to
claim the authority over other ethno-religious groups in the state as well.
Moreover, with the fact that none of the Southeast Asian countries have the
political loyalty from all of their population, whether the problem would be
severe to the extent of separatism or not, the Southeast Asian states cannot
extremely pursue the policy which responds only to the specific ethnoreligious group. Even though Malaysia applies the Bumiputera policy which
benefits Malays, its utmost objective is the national cohesion and social
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harmony. The policy is enforced because the well-being of Malays affects the
stability of Malaysia on the whole.

Furthermore, as mentioned above that the national interests of the Southeast
Asian countries are the national unity, the territorial integrity and sovereignty,
to preserve these interests in the international level, a country needs the good
relationship with its neighbors. The territorial integrity and sovereignty would
not be achieved without the political recognition on the sovereignty from the
neighbors. Hence, the non-interference is the mutual interests among the
Southeast Asian countries, especially Southeast Asia is the region with high
ethnic and religious diversity, and most states lack the legitimacy, which means
the threats could come from within rather than outside. This is why the
principle of non- interference is the grounding principle of ASEAN, and valid
until today. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, S. Jayakumar,
commented that “the surest and quickest way to ruin is for ASEAN countries
to begin commenting on how each of us deals with these sensitive issues, like
race, religion, language. 371”Thus, although the conflict between the government
and the religious minority exists in many countries in Southeast Asia, the
neighbors barely step in to save their religious fellows.

Therefore, in order to claim the state’s authority over all ethno-religious
groups and to gain the good relationship with neighbors which would protect
the indispensable and immediate interests of the state, the Southeast Asian
countries need to limit the influence of the religious and ethnic factor on
371
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their policies when interacting with the neighbors with the different ethnicities
or religions. However, as discussed above that people could have sympathy for
their co-religionists or co-ethnics across the borders, consequently the
governments need to sometimes term with the pressure from the
constituencies, the religious organizations/institutions or the opposition in order
to prevent the ethno-religious factor to override the national interests.

The answer to the second research question explains how the Southeast Asian
governments term with the ethno-religious factor, and it reveals how ethnicity
and religion function under the framework of nation-state. Actually, as seen
from the findings of the case studies, only the Malaysian government really
needed to handle with the religious pressure. The Indonesians did not demand
their government as heavily as the Malaysians did to save the Thai-Muslims
or the Rohingyas. And the Filipinos did not show the solidarity for the East
Timorese. The lack of the ethnic similarity could be the reason here, as
normally nationalism relates to both ethnic and religious qualification. Also, in
Indonesia and the Philippines, the conflicts were not politicized by the
oppositions. The media also had its role on how the people perceive the rising
issue whether it was the religious conflict or not. However, this is beyond the
scope of the research questions. The point here is how the governments dealt
with the looming religious factor.

Timing was the basic strategy. After the incidents in which the Thai soldiers
suppressed the insurgents with the excessive use of force, both Malaysian and
Indonesian governments allowed the people and religious groups to protest
freely. The leaders of both countries also intended to inquire Prime Minister
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Thaksin during the ASEAN Summit in Laos after Tak-Bai incident. The
Malaysian Parliament condemned the Thai government on the incident too.
However, this was just a political reaction in the time that the solidarity of
Muslims for the Thai-Muslims in both countries was high. After time had
passed for months, both Malaysian Prime Minister and Indonesian President
exchanged the visits with Thai Prime Minister as normal. Likewise, when 131
Thai-Muslim refugees fled to Malaysia, the Malaysian Minister of Foreign
Affairs announced that the refugees would be sent back to Thailand only
when the Thai government guarantees their safety. But three months later after
the attention of the media faded away, the Malaysian government sent one of
the refugees whom the Thai authority identified as a insurgent back to
Thailand. 372

However, the main strategy which the Malaysian and Indonesian governments
dealt with the religious factor was the contestation on the religious
interpretation. While the religious groups or parties in Malaysia presented the
religious discourse on the Thai-Muslim insurgency as the dominating Buddhist
government against the suppressed Muslim minority, the Malaysian and
Indonesian governments interpreted the issue as the outcome of the unequal
development and the misuse (or misunderstanding) of the religion. Both
governments avoided the dichotomous view which would present the
insurgency as the fight between the two opposite religions. With the pressure
from the Muslim constituencies on the governments to do “something,” the
Malaysian and Indonesian governments did reach out to help the ThaiMuslims, but through the cooperation with the Thai government, such as the
372
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3E strategy of Malaysia which aims to improve the education, employment
and entrepreneurship of the Thai-Muslims and the Islamic educational
cooperation with Indonesia. (It is noteworthy that both Malaysia and Indonesia
focused on the “correction” on the Islamic education.) With this strategy, the
Malaysian and Indonesian governments can claim that they did help the ThaiMuslims (and help the Thai government in the same time.) They demonstrated
as the Muslim governments that solving the conflict was not about fighting
against anyone or any religion. Muslims can have a constructive and
cooperative approach in engaging a problem.

With this discourse, the governments imposed their own religious interpretation
and marginalized the radicals in their countries (especially Indonesia) in the
same time. The cooperative approach was consonant with Islam Hadhari policy
of Malaysia and Pacasila ideology of Indonesia which emphasize on the
peacefully co-existence between Muslims and other religious adherents. In the
end, this approach was also supportive to the national interest regarding the
national unity of both countries too.

Finally, the thesis finds that in fact the religion and ethnicity are neutral, but
they are re-produced, interpreted and valued in accordance with the political
needs of the elites in the different times. When the huge influx of foreign
immigrants fled to Malaysia, the Malaysian Constitution classified the Malays
separately from other races through identifying the Malay identity based on
their religion and language. (“A Malay is a person who professes the Muslim
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religion, speaks the Malay language, and practice the Malay customs. 373”) But
when the Malaysian government wanted to position the country in the global
level as a moderate Muslim country and mend the racial disharmony in the
country, it imposed “Islam Hadhari” (“Muslims believe that God has
commanded them to accept and tolerate diversity … The need to maintain
national harmony is paramount in a racially and religiously diverse country
like Malaysia. At the same time, the approach accords totally with the
injunctions of Islam which require man to be compassionate and kind to their
fellow human beings. 374”) and “Melayu Baru” or “New Malay” (“… who could
transcend Malay ethnocentrism and accept reduced Malay dependence on the
state’s affirmative action. 375”) David Brown notes that the imposed nationalism
in Southeast Asia excluded some ethno-religious minorities which fuelled the
ethno-religious mobilization. Thus, now the Southeast Asian states promote the
more inclusive national identity to reduce the sense of marginalization of
minorities. 376Hence, the value and interpretation on the ethno-religious
qualification of the national identity change through the domestic situation and
decision of the regimes.

However, with the current predomination of the nation-state worldview, the
states do not have to worry much either about the pressure from the ethnoreligious factor, because in the end people need to think of the interests of
373
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their countries too. No-one wants to sacrifice the interests of their own
countries in the interference across borders to save the ethno-religious fellows.
The constituencies in each country also assess their governments based on
more than just the protection of the religious values. Dato’ Nazirah Hussain, the
Malaysian ambassador in Thailand, comments that the Thai-Muslim insurgency
is not the issue that the constituencies consider in the national level. In the
election, people think about the domestic prices of the foods or oil rather than
the insurgency in other country. 377 (And the relations with Thailand contribute
to the Malaysian economy.) Therefore, it can be seen that even with the
pressure from the religious factor, and the Malaysian government responded by
the 3E strategy, it is enough to calm down the religious factor, despite that the
strategy did not really achieve anything in improving the conditions of the
Thai-Muslims. The fighting in the South of Thailand is still on-going, but PAS
and the Malaysian religious organizations stopped their protest for the ThaiMuslims’ causes many years ago.

In conclusion, the hypothesis of the thesis that the religious factor hardly
affects the foreign policy of countries in Southeast Asia is affirmed through
the findings that
1) the Southeast Asian countries are not only new countries, but their
formation was not established by the popular level. Hence, they still have the
problem on the stability of the states such as national unity, the territorial
integrity and sovereignty. These concerns determine the existence of the states.
Thus, they are the indispensable and immediate interests when the states
377
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pursue the foreign policy. To achieve these interests, the Southeast Asian states
need the cooperation from their neighbors who are of different ethnicities and
religions. Therefore, in pursuing the foreign policy, the Southeast Asian states
need to control the ethno-religious factor so that it would not impede the
regional cooperation which contributes to their mutual interests. Also, with the
ethno-religious diversity in countries, the states cannot pursue the policy by
giving weight to a specific ethno-religious group either.

2) But the states have to sometimes term with the religious factor, and they
balance it through the discourse on the assessment of the conflict and
contestation on the religious interpretation. As for the assessment of the
conflict, the states tend to propose that the rising conflict is not a religious
conflict. Rather, the conflict could be the result of the economic and/or
educational problems. However, with the discourse of the religious groups, if
the engagement with the conflict involves some religious dimension, the states
emphasize the religious teachings on tolerance, kindness, and the ability to
peacefully co-exist with other religions. Therefore, the Malaysian and
Indonesian governments tried to cooperate on correcting the Islamic education
in Thailand.

With these two findings, the thesis concludes that the religion hardly affects
the foreign relations in Southeast Asia.
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